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1 Introduction  
 
Is the ISM Code working? Fortunately, or unfortunately, the author has worked in the 
close proximity of lawyers during the last twenty years and therefore feels confident 
in answering the question in the way only a lawyer could: - ‘… on the one hand it is, 
but on the other hand it isn’t!’ 
Hopefully, this book will provide a more illuminating insight into the real answer to 
that question. At one level the answer really is both yes and no – at a deeper level 
there is a complicated and often complex and conflicting picture - which perhaps 
should not surprise us when we consider we are dealing with a multi-national, multi-
faceted industry with a globalised labour force.  
 
According to IMO: It has been estimated that some 12,000 ships had to comply by the 
first deadline with the second phase of implementation bringing in another 13,000 
ships (IMO Briefing 28/6/2002) – accordingly we should not be too surprised to find a 
diversity of opinion and experiences. 
For one Georgian Master it is quite clearly one of the most significant moves forward 
that has ever happened to our industry: 
 
“I think that the implementation of the ISM Code is the most 
important step in the new millennium for the improvement of safety 
at sea”  
 
Whereas, for one British Chief Engineer, his perception seems quite different: 
 
 “ISM is the biggest pile of paper eating Industrial White Wash that 
has ever been produced, ships are still being lost or cause incidents, 
but most will be ISM compliant and the paperwork will be up to 
date.” 
 
Others are perhaps more philosophical in their reflections such as the Master on board 
a Netherlands Antilles vessel who suggests: 
 
“Personally I am more interested in the weather forecast!” 
 
Or, the Maritime University Lecturer who suggested: 
 
“ISM is a good system badly implemented.” 
 
Can that be reconciled with the claim of one leading, national flag tanker 
owner who claimed, in unambiguous terms, that: 
 
 “We are now saving $1,000,000 per ship per year which we directly 
attribute to our ISM implementation.” 
 
A very important issue to get clear in our minds, even at this early stage, is that the 
ISM Code is identical, word-for-word, for every ship and every ship operating 
company everywhere in the world. The reasons why there might be such varied 
responses and experiences will be the real subject of this study. 
The only thing that can be said with any degree of certainty about ISM 
implementation is that there is a very wide-ranging scale of perceptions, level of 
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support, experiences and expectations for this whole ISM phenomenon– as the above 
examples start to illustrate. Much was written in advance of phase one implementation 
on 1st July 1998 about whether the ISM Code was needed and whether it could or 
would be implemented. Post phase one implementation much has been written about 
whether the Code has been implemented. Invariably the authors of those articles and 
reports tended to be negative in their approach – often condemning the ISM Code as a 
failure or at best a good idea that had been ‘still-born’. Rarely were the authors of 
those reports the people at the sharp-end of implementation, the seafarers or ship 
operators, and it seemed that their opinions were based on individual bad experiences 
and not much more – subjective opinions with little or no empirical evidence to 
confirm that their views were widely held. 
Some endeavoured to support their view that the ISM Code was not working by 
drawing attention to the apparent fact that accidents were still happening at an 
alarming rate and claims remained at a high level, port State detentions appeared to be 
increasing and ships which were in possession of all the relevant ‘paperwork’ were 
breaking up, sinking, spilling their oil into the ocean and killing their seafarers. On the 
other hand there were those who attempted to argue that the Code was working and in 
their support they groped around desperately looking for something to cling onto - 
often relying upon a claim by a single P&I Club that they had experienced a reduction 
in their claims post ISM implementation - which they attributed to the successful 
implementation of Safety Management Systems by their Members. Indeed the 
Secretary-General of IMO himself has made repeated references to the particular 
report and even published a special briefing on 25.9.2001 entitled ‘IMO welcomes 
ISM Code study’.  Those  prophets of doom, in the first case, seemed not to appreciate 
that for every one ‘Erica’ there were many thousands of tankers conducting their trade 
without incident. That the port State control authorities had implemented a 
‘Concentrated Inspection Campaign’ and were progressively and aggressively 
increasing the frequency and intensity of their inspections and that to expect radical 
changes ‘overnight’ would be unrealistic and impractical. For those optimists – who 
were almost ‘clutching at straws’ trying to find something to prove that there was 
light at the end of the tunnel – they failed to recognise that the particular P&I Club 
which had made the claim was one of the smallest of the Clubs representing less than 
2% of the world shipping – and thus a minute sample. They also failed to realise that 
none of the other twelve Clubs of the International Group of P&I Clubs, which insure 
more than 90% of the world deep sea fleet, were making any similar claim – nor did 
any other insurer. Indeed there was a noticeable silence, which should have been 
apparent to those who had kept an open mind on the subject. Since a lot of good 
publicity could have been obtained by anyone who could make such a claim then the 
silence surely tells its own story – but the truth behind this is not necessarily as it 
might appear.  The question should have asked – “…should we realistically have 
expected to see any significant reduction in accidents and claims, on a global scale, 
with immediate effect – post 1st July, 1998?” Realistically the answer would have to 
be “No”. 
That does not mean however that the ISM Code was doomed from the start – only that 
it would take some time for its benefits to fully manifest themselves across the entire 
international shipping industry. 
However, it was becoming apparent that many ship operating companies, ships and 
individuals were experiencing significant problems both with the initial 
implementation and with maintaining their implemented Safety Management Systems 
(SMS).  
The author therefore decided to embark upon a project to collect information and 
evidence of ISM implementation from the seafarers, operators and other participants 
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in the shipping and related industries and professions. The intention was to try to 
produce a picture of ISM implementation 2½ years on from the first phase 
implementation and in the lead up to the second phase implementation. 
The project involved a detailed and extensive survey with more than 70,000 
questionnaires being distributed worldwide as well as a dedicated Internet website 
being established at http://www.ismcode.net I The website included details of the 
research and relevant information about the ISM Code and also allowed the 
questionnaires to be completed on-line. 
Three versions of the questionnaires were produced: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first questionnaires were despatched in April 2001 and by the end of November 
2001 nearly 3000 completed forms had been returned and the data entered in a Access 
data-base. In addition to the answers to the specific questions raised in the 
questionnaire the respondents were also encouraged to provide narrative comment to 
share their experience of ISM implementation. Nearly 800 detailed and interesting 
comments were received and catalogued.  All respondents were offered total 
anonymity – many chose to exercise that option but many more were quite willing to 
openly put their names to their comments. 
The author is extremely grateful to all respondents and his only regret is that time and 
resources did not allow him to respond and thank each contributor personally or to 
enter into a dialogue – particularly when some very genuine and kind offers of help 
were made. For that he extends his sincere apologies but hopes that the results and 
conclusions in this book will accurately reflect the views and opinions put forward. 
The author’s views will be expressed extensively throughout this book but much more 
importantly those Masters, seafarers, ship operators and other stakeholders will be 
given their opportunity, wherever possible, to have their say – in their own words. No 
apology is made for the numerous quotes which will be included in the text and which 
will provide much of the substance of this study. If we are to understand how 
implementation is progressing we need to listen to those who are involved directly in 
that process – we need to hear of the problems experienced as well as the successes 
achieved. Where mistakes have been and are being made we need to learn from those 
mistakes and where successes have been achieved let us understand how those 
successes were achieved and be prepared to emulate those pioneers. It is not 
suggested that we simply try to copy what others have done – rather we should try to 
understand the principles and method adopted and then try to apply them. 
It will be noticed from the pictures of the questionnaires above that a ‘colour coding’ 
was introduced when the questionnaire forms were printed: 
 
Masters and Seafarers – in blue 
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Ship Operators – in green 
Other Stake Holders – in red 
 
That colour coding has been carried forward into this book to allow the reader more 
easily to identify and distinguish between the respective views and results of the 
Masters and Seafarers, Ship Operators and Other Stakeholders respectively. 
Anonymity has been maintained for all contributors – even where the individual may 
have indicated that they were prepared to be identified - except where press reports or 
conference presentations and similar are being quoted. It was considered sufficient for 
the purpose of appreciating what the individual had to say merely to define their 
position in the industry and possibly to identify type of ship or organisation in which 
they were based and, occasionally, by their nationality. 
More detailed explanations of the questions in the questionnaire forms and the 
answers which were provided are addressed in the various sections of this book.  
In addition to individuals who returned completed questionnaires or otherwise 
submitted their personal reflections and observations – there were a number of other 
activities which provided group participation and for which the author is most 
grateful. For example Nautical Institute branches around the world held debates 
involving local branch members to share their experiences and returned minutes or 
other records of those debates. Nautical Colleges in many countries have encouraged 
their marine students to participate. National Ship Owners organisations have solicited 
the views of their members and have encouraged them to participate in the survey. 
BIMCO (The Baltic International Maritime Council) provided an opportunity for the 
author to participate in their annual ISM Residential Course in Copenhagen where the 
views and comments of the delegates and other speakers were obtained. BIMCO also 
encouraged their own members to participate and provided a link from the front page 
of their website to the dedicated ISM site. The author was invited to speak at 
numerous seminars and conferences which provided further opportunities to meet 
with and discuss relevant issues with a very wide cross section of people within the 
industry with important and valuable contributions to make. 
Many shipping newspapers and other maritime publications were also extremely 
helpful in carrying feature articles covering the research and encouraging their readers 
to participate. All these contacts provided extremely valuable opportunities for the 
author to widen his own knowledge, understanding and appreciation of the real issues 
involved in the apparently innocent question: Is ISM implementation working? 
Inevitably there must always be some reservations held with regard to the true 
representation of the data and observations received from questionnaires and a survey 
of the type undertaken – since it could possibly be argued that it is a particular ‘type 
of person’ who completes questionnaires and their views may not coincide with the 
‘rank and file’ members of the intended participants and thus may not be a true 
representation at all. When the various sections of the book are explored it will 
become apparent that a very wide cross section of views are expressed – from those 
who are vehemently against ISM to those who are 100% supporters – with many 
shades of grey in between. There are seafarers of all ranks and many nationalities.  It 
is the view of the author that the results as set out in the following sections of this 
book do provide an accurate reflection of the varied views of a significant number of 
those at sea and those ashore on the question of ISM implementation during the year 
2001. 
Whilst it may appear unfair to inflict a conclusion on the reader at the beginning of a 
work such as this – it is believed that on this occasion it is important if objectivity is 
to be maintained and a serious bout of depression is to be avoided. A very important 
point to take hold of, at this stage and to carry forward as we proceed into the 
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substance of the book itself is that the ISM Code can work and is working very 
satisfactorily in a number of companies. This will hopefully be demonstrated in due 
course. There will, though, be many negative issues coming to light in the sections 
ahead – it is important that we confront those issues but, at the same time, keep in 
mind the knowledge of the possibility that a properly implemented SMS can work and 
is working on board ships today. 
  
As we now start to consider, in more depth, some of the findings from the survey it is 
important that we introduce some consistency into our understanding and use of 
particular terms. A number of the expressions we will be using do have quite specific 
meanings and are defined within the relevant regulations. It is therefore appropriate, 
perhaps, to set out those definitions as contained in SOLAS Chapter IX, resolution 
741(18) / MSC.104(73) and resolution 788(19) / A.913(22): 
 
• Accident means incidents involving injury or damage to life, the environment, 
the ship or its cargo. 
 
• Hazardous occurrences are situations which could have led to an accident if 
they had developed further (i.e. near miss situations). 
 
• Non-conformity means an observed situation where objective evidence 
indicates the non-fulfilment of a specified requirement. 
 
 
Five further definitions, taken from the ICS / ISF Guidelines on the application  of the 
ISM Code, will also be useful: 
 
• Internal SMS Audit is a systematic and independent verification process 
carried out by the Company as part of its management function to determine 
whether the SMS activities and related results are in compliance with the 
SMS. 
 
• Objective evidence means quantitative or qualitative information, records or 
statements of fact pertaining to safety or to the existence and implementation 
of a SMS element, which is based on observation, measurement or test and 
which can be verified. 
 
• Observation means a statement of fact made during a safety management 
audit and sustained by objective evidence. 
 
• Safety management audit means a systematic and independent examination 
to determine whether the SMS activities and related results comply with 
planned arrangements and whether these arrangements are implemented 
effectively and are suitable to achieve objectives. 
 
• Verify means to investigate and confirm that an activity or operation is in 
accordance with a specified requirement. (Examples of verification activities 
includes inspections, tests and operational checks on ships and their equipment 
prior to departing port, at sea or before entering port or closing with the land. 
A system audit is also an example of a verification activity.)  
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1.1 Aims of the survey 
 
As was suggested in the Introduction, little if any empirical evidence seemed to exist 
that confirmed, or otherwise, whether the ISM was working, was starting to work or 
was having any tangible effects. Prior to commencing the research project the author 
had started to glean an impression, from talking to serving Masters and officers as 
well as shore based ship operators – that there were some who were speaking in quite 
favourable terms about their experiences of ISM implementation and some who 
seemed to have had bad experiences and were very strongly opposed to the whole 
idea.  
It is perhaps worth reflecting upon a few of the varied views in order to consider what 
we are really up against. A typical and encouraging comment was submitted by a 
ferry master: 
 
“The crew are definitely more safety aware and basic training 
greatly enhanced.” 
 
Some seafarers had recognised that not only was it proving useful in itself but they 
had found that they could use the ISM Code to their advantage – as one Master put it: 
 
“ISM has made things better. If you use the system properly it puts 
the pressure back on the office as they have to be seen to be putting 
things to rights.” 
 
Others would then start to paint a quite different picture – some seafarers seemed to 
have had quite contrary experiences – as one Master reported: 
 
“The only thing that ISM has changed is the volume of paperwork. 
Now instead of doing planned maintenance we only have time to 
write about what we should be doing. 
Instead of training we now have checklists. The ‘blame’ mentality is 
still there now there are thousands of pieces of paper to make sure 
the finger gets pointed to some poor soul and not the accountant 
who starved them of the funds to do things properly.” 
 
One Second Engineer did not require many words to sum up his experience of ISM 
when he stated quite simply that his view of the Code was: 
 
“Waste of paper and time!” 
 
For others there were various degrees of resentment; they felt that they had had the 
ISM Code inflicted upon them. Indeed there were many Masters and officers, with 
whom the author discussed ISM, who stated most forcefully that they had had good 
safety systems in place for many years and did not need this formalised system, and 
certainly resented the additional paperwork that seemed to accompany ISM as 
unwelcome baggage. 
What was becoming apparent from these discussions was that different people were 
reporting very different experiences. Sometimes a likely explanation was forthcoming 
when it transpired that they were working for very different types of ship operating 
companies. However, there were also examples of individuals working within the 
same company who had very different views, perceptions and experiences of whether 
the ISM Code was working or not.  It was perceived therefore that if an understanding 
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of the current status of implementation was to be established then the views of a very 
wide range of individuals would have to be obtained. 
 
1.1.1 To establish the current status of implementation 
 
It had been recognised at an early stage that even though the survey questionnaires 
could be completed ‘on-line’ – the fact was that many seafarers on board ship would 
not have access to the Internet. It was therefore decided to print paper copies of the 
questionnaire for distribution to seafarers. 
Initially it was considered that a survey of Members of the Nautical Institute would 
provide a good ‘sample’ - with 38 branches around the world and over 7000 members 
in 70 countries - that must provide a good overall picture. However, it was then 
recognised that restricting the survey to Members of the Nautical Institute could 
produce quite a distorted picture. First, by definition, the sample would be almost 
exclusively Masters and deck officers. Secondly, such a survey would exclude a very 
wide range of seafarers who, for various reasons, had not joined the professional body 
or otherwise did not have access to the Institute journal ‘Seaways’. Whilst the 
Nautical Institute membership was most definitely to be included - it was decided to 
expand the scope of the survey to include as wide a range of seafarers as possible. 
The Institute of Marine Engineers (now ImarEst – Institute of Marine Engineering, 
Science and Technology) carried a feature article in their journal MER - directing 
their Members towards the dedicated website where they could participate and 
complete the questionnaire ‘on-line’. The Merchant Navy Trade Union – NUMAST 
not only carried a major article in their Telegraph - but also agreed to enclose a copy 
of the questionnaire – a circulation of about 25,000! Similarly the International 
Federation of Shipmasters’ Associations also distributed questionnaires with its own 
‘Newsletter’. 
However, whilst the individuals likely to be contacted through these sources would 
now include Engineers and other officers, the survey was still limiting the potential 
individuals being contacted and consulted to those reading the newspapers and 
journals of the professional bodies based in the U.K. Other sources of distribution of 
the questionnaires had to be found to include those seafarers who might not have the 
opportunity of reading such publications. 
Whether or not as a result of ‘divine’ intervention or inspiration will have to remain a 
point for speculation but the author approached the Mission to Seafarers to see if they 
could help and received a most positive response. Two allies and supporters were 
found within the headquarters of the Mission in London – the Reverend Canon Ken  
Peters and the editor of the Mission newspaper – ‘The Sea’ – Gillian Ennis. In 
addition to a major feature article which appeared in The Sea and the inclusion of a 
further 25,000 copies of the questionnaire – Canon Peters wrote to all the Chaplains in 
the Missions around the world asking them to take copies of the questionnaire with 
them when they visited ships in their ports. The chaplains were asked to encourage as 
many ranks and nationalities of seafarers as possible to participate and complete the 
forms – assisting them with the task if necessary. Many of the Mission stations are, in 
this 21st century, linked up to the Internet and therefore the Chaplains were also asked 
to encourage seafarers to utilise that facility to visit the dedicated website and 
complete the forms on line. 
Batches of questionnaires were also sent to over 300 Nautical Training Establishments 
around the world with a request that the head of faculty distribute the questionnaires 
to mariners who may be ashore studying for their professional qualifications. 
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Most of the shipping newspapers and magazines carried feature articles about the 
research project and included a request for their readers to visit the dedicated website 
and complete the appropriate questionnaire ‘on-line’ – Lloyds List even created a 
direct link from it’s own site to the ISM research site. Completing the questionnaires 
on line would have proved a considerable help to the author since the data would then 
have been dropped automatically into the relational Access Data-base which had been 
set up and which would be used to analyse the data in due course. (The data from the 
paper questionnaires would require manual input.) However, it became apparent that 
relatively few questionnaires were being completed on-line compared with the dozens 
of completed paper questionnaires that quickly started to arrive from Masters and 
seafarers. It was therefore decided to print and distribute paper copies of the versions 
of the questionnaire for the Ship Operators and the Other Stakeholders.  
 
Whilst some Ship Operator versions of the questionnaire were sent directly to specific 
shipping companies, batches were sent to the National Ship Owners Associations with 
a request that they distribute them; making their own request of their members to 
complete and return the forms and participate in the survey. Some organisations were 
extremely helpful and supportive. Shipowners organisations were also approached 
and again some were very responsive and helpful – BIMCO gave considerable 
coverage of the project in their own publications and created a web-link from the front 
page of their website to the dedicated ISM site. 
 
Clearly, the two ‘key players’ in ISM implementation were going to be the Ship 
Operators on the one hand and the Seafarers on the other. However, there are many 
other individuals and organisations directly or indirectly involved in ISM 
implementation who could provide valuable objective assessment of the current status 
of implementation – as viewed from their particular perspective. A non-exhaustive list 
of the types of individuals and organisations anticipated to fall into this category is set 
out below: 
 
Agents 
Charterers 
Classification Societies – 
acting in there capacity as a 
Classification Society 
Classification Societies – 
acting on behalf of a Flag 
State Administration 
Flag State Administrations 
H&M Underwriters 
Insurance brokers 
ISM Consultants 
Lawyers 
Maritime College Lecturers 
P&I Insurers 
P&I Representatives 
Port State Control 
Inspectors 
 
Pilots 
Press 
Professional Bodies 
Shipbrokers 
Shipowners Associations 
Surveyors / Consultants 
Trade Unions 
University lecturer / 
academic 
  
A pilot explained the role such an independent – third party – could play in providing 
an impartial objective evaluation of apparent implementation: 
 
“Working as a Pilot (mainly tankers) I am not directly involved in 
the operation of the ISM Code.  
Boarding ships of various owners and nationalities gives a good 
opportunity to observe standards on board and get the views of 
masters and officers. 
Since the ISM Code was introduced there has been no noticeable 
improvement in standards. We see the same ships and the same 
people on them, all that has changed is that ships staff are further 
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burdened by a mass of paper work. 
The success of the Code seems to depend on companies operating 
within the 'spirit' of the Code but the companies which really needed 
the Code are hardly likely to enter into this spirit and just see the 
code as another bureaucratic obstacle to overcome or circumvent.” 
U.K. Pilot 
 
 
By obtaining data and views from this potentially very wide range of 
individuals and organisations, seagoing and shore-based, directly and 
indirectly involved in the implementation process, a fairly clear picture 
should emerge of the current status of ISM Code implementation.  
 
1.1.2 Identifying what is going right and what is going wrong 
 
From informal discussions, and the various articles that had appeared concerning the 
status of ISM implementation, it was anticipated that some of the results were 
probably going to be fairly predictable. There seemed to be widespread criticism of 
the amount of paperwork which Masters and senior officers were now expected to 
complete - supposedly as part of ‘ISM’. There was criticism of the irrelevance of 
much of the paperwork and checklists that were supposedly part of ISM. There also 
seemed to be a considerable reluctance to report anything – other than the most 
serious accidents which one couldn’t avoid reporting – because of various fears and 
apprehensions. 
Fortunately many seafarers are practical and helpful individuals who want to comply 
and do a good job in a professional manner – sometimes the starting point is to 
recognise that things might not be going quite as planned and that steps do need to be 
taken to rectify the situation – as one Indian Able Seaman pointed out: 
 
“If ISM Code has to be only concerned with paperwork i.e. making 
reports then it has been achieved. But if it is concerned with safety 
then there is a lot of things to be done in this regard.” 
 
 
The survey questionnaires were constructed to address these and many other issues. 
The three versions of the questionnaires were not identical but were integral and, on 
the whole, addressed the same issues. The intention was to eventually bring all the 
data together to compare and contrast opinions between different sectors and to 
construct the ‘big picture’- the belief being that only by viewing the ‘big picture’ 
could a real appreciation be made of what was going right and what was going wrong. 
Inevitably, the structure of the questionnaires was going to receive criticism from 
different parties – particularly those who perhaps approached ISM implementation 
from one specific direction. An example of such criticism can be seen in the following 
observation received from a Port State Control Inspector: 
 
  “Your questionnaire is rather restricted to ‘accidents and non-
conformity reporting’. In my opinion it is more useful to check, 
during PSC inspections, how the ship’s crew is working, how the 
managing company is backing up the vessels; is the company really 
interested in upgrading maintenance and indeed actively following 
the ships maintenance / monitoring the ships maintenance. Some 
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parts of the ISM Code for the Companies / vessels are solely 
obligatory parts to receive the DOC / SMC, so they make only the 
minimal obligatory effort: many times a S.M.S. is far sub-standard.” 
 
The issues addressed by the PSC inspector are very important and it is hoped that 
many of these were addressed by the respondents in the narrative section of the 
questionnaires if not in their answers to the questions contained within the 
questionnaire. Unfortunately the questionnaires already included about 30 questions 
on six sides of paper and, if the document increased any further in size, there was a 
very good chance that few people would have the time or would take the trouble to 
complete it. The author extends his apologies to those who would have liked other 
issues covered or the emphasis changed – but he hopes that many of those issues will 
actually come out through the numerous comments and observations from 
respondents which will appear in this book. 
 
A number of respondents provided detailed comments and some of these are felt, by 
the author to contain such important, first hand, experiences that they will be 
reproduced in full or with a minimum amount of editing. One such report, which is 
most relevant to this section, where we are making an initial appraisal of  what is 
going right and what is perhaps going wrong, was submitted by a British Master who 
explained that he had set up Safety Management Systems on board ships in five 
different companies – and consequently had considerable relevant experience to 
share: 
 
“ There is still widespread fear among crews and officers that this is 
all directed against the vessels and crew. The concept that the 
owners / manager becomes partly liable has been lost.  
There is acceptance that extra paperwork is inevitable, but no faith 
that it will make any difference. The time lost to administration of 
SMS is thus not often balanced by a gain in method and control. 
From the level of SMS compliance I find on assuming command of 
vessels, many masters are at best not understanding and at worst 
ignoring ISM, and audit is obviously not finding it. 
In other companies (not here) I am often asked to go onboard 
vessels and ‘tidy up’ SMS just before audit (I refuse). 
ISM is capable of being a good tool, but at the moment it is too 
large. It has become a means to legitimise an unscrupulous operator 
and burden the well intentioned.”  
 
Whilst the experiences of those directly involved in the implementation process are 
perhaps the most relevant of all – the observations of independent third parties can be 
extremely valuable. This is enhanced considerably when coming from an individual 
who has seen ISM from a number of different perspectives such as the following Port 
State Control Inspector: 
 
“As an ex-seafarer who has seen the ISM Code from all sides; as 
Marine Superintendent, ship’s Master and as a Regulator – I firmly 
believe that though ISM in itself is a good thing and if used properly 
will improve the safety standards of vessels – it will never work as 
long as the guidelines are so generic and all encompassing. Also 
many companies are using ISM and its procedures as an excuse for 
non investment in comprehensive training. 
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To make the system work the guidelines should be more descriptive. 
I carried out a PSC on a bulk carrier classed with a major Society 
and it’s ISM manual was generic for the whole fleet which included 
tankers, bulkers and Ro / Ro’s. I think ISM should be for individual 
classes of vessels not generic for fleet.” 
 
There are a number of very important issues raised by the PSCI which will, perhaps, 
not receive unanimous support but do deserve a response. In this section of the book 
however the intention is merely to flag up various issues and explain the approach 
which has been taken when conducting the survey and research – detailed responses to 
these and other issues raised in these introductory sections will appear in the relevant 
sections later in the book. 
It may also take an external observer to adopt a dispassionate view and raise some 
fundamental questions – such as the one raised by a Maritime University lecturer: 
 
“If the SMS is working, why do we have all other controls, e.g. oil 
companies vetting inspections etc? They don’t seem to trust the 
system?” 
 
There were many seafarers amongst the respondents who saw ISM as attacking their 
professionalism or was generally perceived to be a cause for the decline of all that had 
been good at sea. A small selection of some of these are reproduced below – which 
will provide a flavour of those perceptions – whether we may personally agree with 
them or not:  
 
“ISM has created more work. ISM undermines the professionalism 
of the engineers engaged in their duties. ISM allows paper engineers 
to shine, and professionals to be considered out of date. ISM is all 
about paperwork, paper maintenance is easy to achieve.” 
British Chief Engineer 
 
No-one seems to trust people – at one time we had Lloyds or 
whoever and Flag States. That was enough. Then we got; Vetting, 
ISO 9000, ISO 9001 now ISO 14000 + Audits + ISMA + ISM + Port 
State Control. 
Who is going to be next to check that the rest are doing their jobs? 
Someone has lost the plot. We are supposed to get ships from A to B 
– maintain them, get the cargo in and out safely etc. Now we fill in 
forms. It has accomplished nothing but increased a few jobs and a 
lot of bullshit.” 
British Master 
 
“ISM is too bureaucratic. 
Paperwork rules the job rather than being its servant, and has 
become a data base upon which lawyers can build their same old 
arguments. 
I believe ISM has contributed to the decline in morale at sea. It has 
suppressed individuality, with the shipowner, in practice, being no 
more accountable than he ever was.” 
British Ferry Master 
 
 “Crew standards + level of training continue to decline.” 
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British Chief Mate 
 
“Increased workload on Master and Chief Engineer involving ISM 
implementation negates half of what is meant to be achieved i.e. 
significant manhours lost every day just filling in forms, filing 
records and checklists etc. I presently sail with an ‘all-British’ crew 
and feel that the system is wasted. Previously I sailed with all 
foreign crew and the system, once understood, had some significant 
effect.’ 
 British Master 
“Filling up checklists has become an integral part of today’s job. 
However, I do feel that all officers in general and junior officers in 
particular need to practice good values of seamanship. This would 
reduce lots of accidents / near misses etc.” 
Indian Master 
 
“ISM ignored human factor – too tired of paper work!!” 
Korean Chief Officer 
 
“There is too much stress on documentation taking most of the time. 
Attention  is more towards correct maintenance of documentation 
than some times actual practice being carried out. 
If documentation is reduced slightly actual implementation of ISM 
will be more significant. 
Indian Chief Mate 
 
Again there are numerous important and controversial issues being raised in these 
examples. The view of the author is that many of them are based on very serious 
misunderstandings of the very basic principles of ISM – and are cause for serious 
concern. Many of the issues will be addressed and explored fully in the later sections. 
 
For many Masters and seafarers, and indeed ship operating companies, ISM was their 
first encounter with ‘formal’ management systems. In some cases it would appear that 
little if any training or preparation was provided to explain the principles behind the 
idea of such management systems. Consequently, misunderstandings at that most basic 
level were introduced at a very early stage and it would appear that, in some cases, 
these have still not been addressed. A Classification Society Auditor based in the 
Middle East explains the problems, as he has experienced them, when attending on 
board vessels: 
 
“The ISM Code has created a ‘paper chase’ on board vessels which 
fails to address the main problem – crew training. 
Some companies assume that by having a auditable system that 
complies is a substitute system for good quality crew. 
Audits are carried out in accordance to their documented system – 
ISM – just as similarly a QA audits a company – it doesn’t imply it’s 
good i.e. because a chocolate factory complies to its QA system – it 
doesn’t mean the chocolate tastes good – similarly a ISM system on 
a vessel doesn’t mean the vessel is any safer or good – it just 
complies to a auditable system – does it?” 
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Another Class Society Auditor reported similar experiences and also highlighted the 
important role of another new concept – the idea of a safety culture: 
 
“ISM is a quality system. To work in a quality system it is necessary 
to: 
understand what a quality system is - believe in the quality system 
be educated to the ‘safety culture’. 
Safety culture is something which cannot be learned from books.” 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, since the fundamental concepts of formal management 
systems might not be fully understood, or appreciated, the idea of a cycle of continual 
improvement that should be at the heart of such systems is also lacking. Part of this 
understanding involves identifying hazardous occurrences, near misses, non-
conformities, and the like; reporting them, analysing them, finding out what had gone 
wrong with the system, learning lessons and implementing corrective actions.  In this 
way the cycle of continual improvement helps to make the people involved, the ship 
and the company safer and more efficient.  
 
There are of course many other ‘players’ in related industries who are watching very 
carefully how ISM is progressing. The insurers – both Hull and Machinery and P&I 
clearly have a vested interest. Surprisingly few cargo insurers seem openly to make 
statements about ISM – whilst they are perhaps a little removed from the immediate 
operation of the ship – they clearly have a direct interest in the quality and standards of 
ships being used to carry the cargoes they are insuring – as well as the people working 
on board those ships and the people ashore operating those ships. One H&M insurer, 
based in the Mediterranean had clearly given the matter some very careful 
consideration and shared his thoughts on the matter: 
 
“The concept of ISM is obviously a first class idea. To the very good 
companies it made no difference as essentially all ISM was doing 
was formalising what was their normal operational practice. 
To other companies ISM was perceived as a bureaucratic burden 
and was operated with reluctance. ISM will only operate well if the 
owners wish it to. 
On some vessels the volumes provided by the owners fill whole 
shelves and are clearly never read or used. A conscientious attempt 
should be made to limit the number and size of the ISM manuals. 
The lack of continuity of service by crews who are generally 
supplied by agencies is not conducive to the efficient operation of 
ISM. 
ISM has to be implemented on board as a way of life, but in reality 
on most vessels it is perceived as yet another paper work burden that 
further limits the time available to actually operate the vessel. 
If there is a delay to the vessel or cargo operation due an ISM defect 
then it is expected that this would be held against one or more 
members of the crew and could lead to disciplinary action or 
dismissal, hence the reluctance to report defects.” 
H&M Insurer – based Mediterranean  
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1.1.3 Suggesting what needs to be done to move forward in a 
positive way to improving the management of safety on 
board ships 
 
Having progressed from establishing the current status of implementation to 
identifying what is going right and what is going wrong – the logical next step would 
be to consider whether any practical suggestions could be made to those Companies, 
ships and individuals who might be experiencing difficulties to move forward in a 
positive way to improving the management of safety on board.  
As the completed questionnaires began to arrive along with their narrative comments 
it started to become clear that there were some who had gone through such an 
experience and had either emerged from, or at least were coming out of, the other side 
with a new found conviction that ISM could work and that it could be a most useful 
tool for helping to manage safety on board. An Indian Master shared his experience as 
follows: 
 
“ISM system is now transforming from paperwork culture to 
implementation culture. On board systems have been organised a lot 
since its implementation. Most operations are now carried out in a 
predetermined and planned way. It has given a systematic approach 
and laid down minimum safety standards to be followed. ISM system 
has streamlined all ship related operations on shore and ship.” 
 
An Australian Master reported a very similar experience: 
 
“Initially there was a lot of confusion associated with the ISM 
system but as time has progressed so has the system and it is now 
reasonably user friendly. Parts are under constant revision to ensure 
the safest and best practices exist at all times.” 
 
Some respondents who were positive about the progress being made had no hesitation 
in making a clear link between the attitude of the Company running the ships and 
successful functioning of the SMS such as the following Indian Chief Officer: 
 
“It is how your company implements the Code which is crucial in 
deciding how honestly and effectively the objectives of the Code are 
achieved. In my own experience – I feel that ship-board and shore 
based personnel are now viewing  ISM in a more positive and 
serious manner and not an unnecessary pain – anymore.” 
 
 
These types of reports are clearly most encouraging and many other seafarers could 
probably relate similar experiences. A European Flag State Administration had no 
doubts when it reported: 
 
“The ISM Code is working and will improve the situation over 
time.” 
 
 Other seafarers would appear to have had most unfortunate experiences and it may 
take a considerable amount of persuasion to convince them that even if these Masters, 
and others are correct then ISM can work; the paperwork can be brought under 
control and made relevant and the ISM Code can make a significant and positive 
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contribution not only towards the way safety is managed on board but the way the 
whole ship operation is managed. In just a few words this British Chief Officer 
perhaps encapsulates the frustrations experienced by many: 
 
“The only difference the ISM Code + ISO 9002 has made is a huge 
increase in paperwork and hence working hours.” 
 
Many others appear to be at an earlier stage of transition from being ‘sceptics’ and the 
comments of this Australian Second Engineer are quite typical of many which were 
received: 
 
 “I believe it will take more time, a culture can not change over 
night. We the seafarers are trying and I am sure those results will 
show. A simpler documentation system is needed as the paper work 
has become a nightmare. These SMS are massive document driven 
software programmes and we need time to get to know them.” 
 
The respondents not only flagged up the problems but many also suggested ways in 
which progress could be made with implementation. Some of the suggestions were 
based on their own learning experience and have the potential for being most useful in 
guiding others who are at the early stages of the learning process to help them avoid 
some of the pitfalls. Sometimes the advice is very simple and basic but address issues 
which are perhaps all too often ignored, or forgotten about, or just taken for granted.  
A classic example was provided by a Filipino Master: 
 
“Communication between ship to shore is most vital importance in 
achieving ISM Code a success.” 
 
Indeed, as will become evident in later sections of this book, one of the major factors 
which appears to be inhibiting the successful implementation of the ISM Code in 
some companies is an inadequate level of communication between ship and office 
ashore. In some cases this goes far beyond just a failure to keep in touch with each 
other – to out-and-out mistrust, perceptions that there is no support or interest, to 
feelings of isolation and abandonment. In some cases it was possible for the author to 
see the perceptions from both sides – to see the comments from the seafarers and to 
see those coming from management ashore. It was of considerable concern to see that 
each side had very different perceptions to the other – the message each had been 
trying to convey to the other had been lost somewhere along the way. 
Often it was impossible not to share in the absolute despair expressed by some 
Masters – who had tried very hard with ISM implementation but ended up feeling as 
though they were trying to ‘push water up hill’. A British tanker Master expressed 
such despair: 
 
“Attempts made on the vessel to comply with ISM Code have met 
with little or no response from Company – and when response is 
received – mainly dismissive. 
The other master – when I am on leave – does not bother with ISM 
and Company does not follow this up.” 
 
An issue which became apparent, from numerous responses from seafarers, was a 
perception that all shore management are using ISM for is to cover their own backs. A 
significant number stated quite clearly that in their view the shore management were 
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using the ISM Code to shift all the responsibility, and liability, from the office onto 
the ship. If such perceptions were in fact true it would of course represent a very 
serious situation; what is equally worrying though is that such perceptions 
demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of the ISM Code. Anyone who has read 
the Code could not be left in any doubt at all that the obligation and responsibility for 
the implementation and operation of the Code rests with the Company – and that 
responsibility is non-delegable. This issue will be looked at closely in due course – as 
well as other significant ‘misunderstandings’ and ‘myths’ that seem to have 
developed. Typical of the misinformed type statements is the following from a British 
Master: 
 
“The ISM Code has shown senior management to be doing all that is 
possible to run a safe operation. Should prevent them being 
prosecuted. Is the operation really safer? …I do not believe so.” 
 
The Company has the responsibility of not only developing the structure of the SMS 
but also of bringing it alive within the Company - if a ship operator did believe that 
they could get away with only implementing the former then they would be seriously 
misleading themselves. Indeed they are likely to have a very serious shock coming 
their way if problems arise in bringing the SMS  alive which results in injuries or 
damage. 
Some third parties also seemed to share a somewhat jaundiced view of certain 
categories of ship operators – a P&I Correspondent put it this way: 
 
“I am located in a part of the world where profits rather than safety 
are the single biggest consideration in the operation of ships 
generally. 
Ship operating companies see the ISM Code generally as just 
another piece of paper which is required to keep ships running. They 
do not participate in the true spirit of the Code, preferring instead to 
do the minimum to obtain certification. 
Sorry I can’t be more positive!” 
 
 
Another ‘fundamental’ issue which started to become apparent was the crucial 
importance which should be attached to the employer / employee relationship and in 
particular the need to have a loyal and familiar crew. In other words issues relating to 
continuity of employment as highlighted by a Norwegian Fleet Manager: 
 
“The key issue in respect of the ISM Code is stability of crew” 
 
The failure to have such ‘stability’ or continuity amongst the crew will almost 
certainly result in the crew having no meaningful sense of ownership of the SMS – 
without such ownership it is difficult to understand where the motivation would come 
from to make the system work – and without such motivation it may have to be 
conceded that the most magnificently written procedures manuals in the entire 
industry are little more than a few thousand words typed on pieces of paper. The 
significance is perhaps reflected in the following observation from a British Master: 
 
“ISM is applicable to Company systems. People operate these 
systems. Due to continual change out of personnel retraining in ISM 
is only done on board informally as and when items surface. The 
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code is only as good as the personnel. If no training and no 
continuity is achieved the objectives will never be met.” 
 
For many seafarers the biggest ‘problem area’ which was raised was the enormous 
increase in paperwork they had encountered and which they attributed to the ISM 
Code. Whether implied or stated explicitly, clearly this would be a most important 
issue to address if significant progress was to be made with implementation. An 
Indian Chief Engineer linked the necessity to the recognition that there also seemed to 
be a constant stream of ever more rules and regulations coming forward with which 
the ships and operators had to comply: 
 
“With impossible number of various regulations by various 
regulatory bodies has made the owners / operators totally sceptical 
about the practicality of these ISM Codes and has made them comply 
with these regulations not by choice but by fear of losing (the trade 
or business). Whereas it was the intention of the ISM Code to have 
the culture of safety consciousness from within and did not need to 
be ‘forced upon’. So time has come to sincerely review its 
effectiveness by all the concerned parties involved with shipping, one 
thing although is sure that the present situation of excessive 
paperwork / checklists / forms must be done away with if any long-
term good is expected from this ISM Code.” 
 
There seemed to be almost a recognition by some respondents that certain ship 
operators at least did require ‘policing’ and also recognised the important function 
Flag State and Port State Authorities may have to play in that policing role – as a 
Bangladeshi Second Engineer remarked: 
 
“ISM implementation body should create continuous pressure on 
shipowners, managers, manning agents and marine industry related 
personnels for implementing the Codes to maintain safer sea life.” 
 
It also became apparent that many respondents seemed to be in little doubt that 
standards differed considerably with ISM Implementation – not only between ship 
operating companies but also between Flag State Administrations, Classification 
Societies and Port State Administrations. Numerous first hand examples have been 
provided which seems to confirm that these are very serious issues which need 
addressing. With such perceptions in mind it is perhaps understandable that some 
seafarers and ship operators are despondent to say the least. One British Chief 
Engineer clearly feels very strongly about the significance of such inequalities: 
 
“I find it worrying that very different standards exist between 
different ‘issuers’ of DOC’s and whilst some ship owners have 
expended a great deal of time and money to produce a viable ISM 
system – others have produced something that is totally inadequate. 
Until this dual standard is rectified honest Shipowners are at a 
considerable disadvantage. 
I do not know why I and my officers should spend a good deal of 
valuable time on a minimally manned ship completing paperwork 
that has little if any value, does not make this vessel any safer or 
more efficient than prior ISM.  
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I would urge that ISM is consigned to the dustbin of history where it 
deserves to be – unlamented and unloved.” 
 
Some respondents seemed to have very clear ideas of where the ‘blame’ lay for the 
apparent failure of ISM and whilst they had ‘suggestions’ about what should be done 
they were perhaps less than constructive in their suggestions for finding solutions. The 
opinion put forward by one British Master provides a good example: 
 
  “Best to get the present laws enforced before bringing in new ones. 
ISM was a good tool but has been corrupted by incompetent third 
world substandard Class and Flag authorities. Time to get the 
‘IMO’ act together and sort this unholy mess out.” 
 
An interesting ‘general’ overview of what, in the opinion of this particular 
contributor, was going wrong and some suggestions on what might need to be done to 
put things right, was put forward by a surveyor working in the Far East: 
 
“Broadly speaking I consider the ISM affected companies as 
follows: 
Good / first class operators who never needed ISM in the first place 
have implemented fully and is operating well. 
Medium class operators. Typically they asked ‘experts’ to set up the 
system. The ‘experts’ set up an over-complicated system that is 
almost impossible to implement effectively. Little or no benefit has 
been gained except that all ships have a list of designated persons to 
contact in case of emergency. 
The cowboys. To them it is just another certificate. Typically ship’s 
staff do not take an active part in ISM. All reports are filled in after 
prior consultation with head office (the head office tell them which 
section has to be completed) The shipboard manuals are never read. 
 
The shipboard manuals are generally too big and complicated. In 
some cases the crew cannot even understand the language in which 
they are written. Ship’s staff complain about the amount of 
paperwork involved.  
Too much time spent in form filling and too little on the job. It can at 
times be dangerous for ship’s staff to have to give priority to form 
filling over and above the safe and efficient execution of their duties. 
How many big accidents will be caused by form filling will remain to 
be seen, but some day people will realise the negative impact of 
safety on form filling and hopefully do something about it. 
Checklists are futile. A checklist is only as good as the man and 
pencil ticking little boxes. If the man is competent why does he need 
a checklist? It would appear that the ISM Code is assisting 
operators employ cheap low skilled crews with the benefit that they 
can get adequate on board training with checklists. Senior personnel 
have a difficult job onboard running ships with these inexperienced 
‘check list crews’ who invariably have not received proper shore 
based training. 
The implementation of the code on sub-standard ships, typically 
eastern block is leading to the shifting of much tonnage to 
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recognised managers. I expect the reputation of some of the leading 
management companies will be damaged by this shift. 
Finally I have three recommendations for the future of ISM: 
 simplify it down to the bare safety necessities 
 make operators responsible for ensuring that the crew they 
employ fully understand and can operate the on-board 
system before they join the vessel 
 take ISM matters away from Classification Societies – they 
already have enough on their plate with Class and Statutory 
Certificates, and let’s face it the job they did was a complete 
balls up in the first place. It is time other bodies kept an eye 
on these Classification Societies.” 
 
Contained within the last opinion are many controversial and indeed radical ideas and 
proposals. This is the case with many of the comments that have been received from 
Masters, Seafarers, Ship Operators and many others involved in the industry who 
responded to the survey and provided their valuable input. It is many of those 
observations and proposals that will be examined in more depth in the later sections of 
this book. However, at this juncture the background and underlying concepts behind 
the ISM Code will be considered in more detail. It is suggested that a good grasp of 
these issues will be crucial if the analysis of the survey and a full appreciation of the 
extensive comments and suggestions received from the respondents can be made. 
 
 
1.2 Background to the ISM Code 
 
Commercial shipping is very old – certainly there is evidence of trading ships existing 
more than 2500 years before the Christian era. To a very large extent the shipping 
industry has been self-regulating throughout this very long history. Traditionally ships 
would be subject to the laws, rules and regulations of the flag state to which they 
belonged. They would also be obliged to comply with the local laws of the countries 
they visited. During the period from the early 17th century to the latter part of the 20th 
century it was quite true that ‘Britannia ruled the waves’.  The Merchant fleet of Great 
Britain dominated international trade – along with the fleets of other colonial powers 
such as France, Holland, Spain and Portugal. The merchant marine was a vital factor 
in the development of international trade, the expansion of the Empire and the 
prosperity of the nation – as well as a number of individual businessmen. Anyone who 
had sufficient funds could purchase a vessel and enter the business of shipping.  
Britain became a centre for the development of maritime law and marine insurance 
and since it was so influential in international trade it was very much the British rules 
that applied internationally. The ships were often armed with canon and carried 
marines – they were run very much along the disciplined lines of the Royal Navy. 
Against this background the Shipowners were allowed to run their companies with 
little supervision by the government – provided they obeyed the law. 
The origins of international maritime conventions can be traced to the late 19th 
century and early 20th century. However it was not until the years following the 
Second World War, with the formation of the United Nations that commercial 
shipping started to become more regulated on an international level The United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS) establishes the general 
rights and obligations of the flag State. Within the United Nations two specialised 
agencies deal with maritime affairs; the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) 
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and the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and they have a responsibility for 
devising and developing conventions and guidelines under which ships can be 
regulated. In general, matters concerning safety at sea, pollution prevention and 
training of seafarers are dealt with by IMO, whereas the ILO deals with matters 
concerning working and living conditions at sea. While IMO and ILO set the 
international regulatory framework for ships, each member State bears the 
responsibility for enforcing the international conventions it has ratified on the ships 
flying its flag. 
However, the industry was still allowed to regulate itself within the confines of these 
conventions once ratified by their flag states as well as other elements of the domestic 
law of that country. 
Up until the period following the Second World War almost all merchant ships would 
fly their own national flag. However, led by Shipowners from theUnited States, an 
increasing number  re-registered their ships and their companies in countries where 
their application of rules and regulations were a little more relaxed or provided tax 
advantages – these were the so called Flags of Convenience (FOC’s) or Open 
Registries. From inception the FOC’s were perceived by many as an opportunity to 
lower the very high, but costly, standards that had been maintained on board the 
national flag fleets. Even so, during those post war years there were fleets to rebuild 
and trades to re-establish which meant that the merchant ships were fully employed in 
helping to bring the world back to normality.  
In the late 1960’s, when the author first went to sea, a 15,000 ton general cargo ship 
would typically have a complement of 65 officers and crew on board. Most officers, if 
not crew members, would be on long term company contracts and it was not at all 
unusual for a seafarer to remain with the same family shipping company for his entire 
career. The loyalty, which was reciprocal as between employer and employee, was 
very strong – the ships were well run with good, well-qualified and motivated 
seafarers. 
 
 
During the second half of the 1980's/early 1990's, there seemed to be an explosion of 
maritime accidents and claims generally, with a significant number of high profile 
major incidents, some of which appear in the following list. 
 
1987 'Herald of Free Enterprise' capsized off Zeebruge.  190 people lost their 
lives. 
 
1987 'Dona Paz' ferry collided with tanker in the Philippines - estimated 
4,386 people killed. 
 
1989 'Exxon Valdez' ran aground off coast of Alaska spilling 37,000 tonnes 
of oil causing extensive environmental damage.  Final claims level 
possibly exceeding US$10 billion. 
 
1990 'Scandinavian Star' ferry disaster. 158 people died. 
 
 
1991 'Agip Abruzzo' with 80,000 tonnes light crude on board in collision 
with ro-ro ferry 'Moby Prince' off Livorno, Italy.  Fire, pollution and 
143 persons died. 
 
© Phil Anderson  
26/06/13 26 
1991 'Haven' fire and explosion off Genoa.  Claims in excess of US$700 
million. 
 
1991 'Salem Express' Egyptian ferry struck reef and sank.  470 people killed. 
 
1992 'Aegean Sea' broke in two off La Coruna, Spain.  Extensive pollution.  
Claims approaching US$200 million. 
 
1993 'Braer' driven onto Shetland Islands - widespread pollution.  Claims in 
region of US$200 million.  Donaldson Inquiry set up in UK. 
 
1994 'Estonia' ro-ro passenger ferry sank after bow door fell off during heavy 
weather at sea.  852 people lost their lives. 
 
1996 'Sea Empress' major oil pollution off Milford Haven, UK. 
 
1.2.1 Problem - an accident and claims explosion 
 
During the period 1987 to 1990 P&I insurance claims, and consequently the 
cost of P&I insurance rose on average by 200 - 400%.  It is understood that a 
similar phenomenon was also experienced with Hull and Machinery claims 
and premiums. 
It became apparent that the international shipping industry was perhaps no 
longer capable of regulating itself and action was needed to reverse the 
downward spiral of maritime calamity.  
It was against the background of this catastrophic situation that the author first 
became involved in looking at the problem of maritime accidents and to 
consider what he could contribute to help remedy the situation 
 
 
Various reports were commissioned by government agencies and by industry 
to try and provide an explanation as to what might be behind this problem. 
 
By the late 1980’s alarm bells were ringing in many quarters – the shipping 
industry seemed to be  in a disastrous state and few could provide any rational 
explanation as to what was going wrong. Numerous investigations and reports 
were commissioned to try and throw some light on the problem. For example 
in 1988 the UK Department of Transport funded research which was carried 
out by the Tavistock Institute and which led to the report 'The Human Element 
in Shipping Casualties' (Department of Transport, 1991).  The conclusions of 
that report were taken to the IMO by the then Surveyor General's Organisation 
(SGO) whose role was later taken over by the Marine Safety Agency (MSA).  
In 1991 the world's largest P&I Club - the United Kingdom Mutual Steamship 
Assurance Association (Bermuda) Limited - through its managers Thomas 
Miller P&I - who provide P&I insurance to approximately 25% of the world 
fleet - issued its first 'Analysis of Major Claims' (the UK Club, 1991).  In 1992 
the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, under then 
the Chairmanship of Lord Carver, issued its report on the Safety Aspects of 
Ship Design and Technology (House of Lords, 1992). 
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1.2.2 Cause – human error 
 
A common factor was appearing in each report which was basically that these 
accidents and incidents were primarily arising as a result of human failings.  
For example, in the 'Human Element in Shipping Casualties' report, it was 
stated that the human element was found to be causative in over 90% of 
collisions and groundings and over 75% of contacts and fires/explosions.  The 
UK Club report concluded that human error accounted for 58% of all claims 
and the House of Lords/Carver Report concluded at Section 4.2 that "... It is 
received wisdom that four out of five ship casualties - 80% - are due to 'human 
error ....". 
 
On reflection these conclusions should not have come as any great surprise.  
Whilst statistical data is probably not available, it is suggested that 'human 
error' or 'human factors' or whatever other title one wishes to label the 
phenomenon, have been responsible for almost all maritime accidents 
throughout history and that the figure is probably much closer to 100% The 
deciding factor would depend where the investigator/researcher stopped in 
tracing the particular causal chain for any particular accident.  Part of the 
problem was the fact that there were more accidents and claims which were 
costing more in terms of lives, environmental damage and money than ever 
before and the situation seemed to be getting worse. The problem was much 
more complicated than that though.  
At the end of the day the real problem was economics – almost the whole of 
the shipping industry was in deep economic recession. This had major knock-
on effects as the industry tried to survive in such very difficult financial times. 
The nature of the economic problem is quite easy to understand – it was the 
most basic of economic principles – the law of supply and demand. Basically 
there was a surplus of ships for the number and volume of cargoes to be 
carried. Many traditional Shipowners sold their ships and got out of the 
industry. Others looked for ways to cut their operating costs to levels that 
might allow them to at least break even with the very low freight and charter-
hire rates that they were being offered.   
Flying the national flag often involved restrictive practices with regard to 
labour laws and such things as compliance with safety related legislation. A 
flood of ship operators therefore deregistered and hoisted strange flags of 
convenience on their ships – registering the owning company as a ‘one ship 
company’ with a brass nameplate on a doorway in some tax friendly country.  
The wages bill was an obvious and immediate target – both in the offices 
ashore and with the seagoing staff. In the office ashore marine 
superintendents, who had provided a vital link between ship and shore, found 
themselves redundant. Safety, training and personnel officers ceased to exist 
almost overnight. Legal and claims department staff found themselves 
expendable and ‘assistants’ within the various departments were looking for 
other employment. Those who were left – the operations manager and 
technical superintendents, had to try to continue doing their own jobs but also 
the jobs of all those who had been casualties. On board ship the situation was 
even worse!  
The traditional seafarers of the UK, Scandinavia, Northern Europe and the 
Mediterranean were perceived to be too expensive. Cheaper labour supplies 
were identified in ‘developing’ nations – particularly in South East Asia. In a 
very short period of time the highly skilled and well qualified ‘traditional’ 
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seafarers were displaced with seafarers having little basic education and even 
less maritime education and training.  Of equal concern was the fact that the 
actual numbers of personnel on board were being reduced significantly which 
compounded the problem. Quite typically the number of officers and crew 
were being reduced by between one half and two thirds.  
People were not the only cost cutting target though. The ships themselves were 
built to have a typical trading life expectancy of about 15 to 20 years – after 
which they would be scrapped and replaced with new buildings.  New 
buildings were prohibitively expensive and so the ships were being traded well 
beyond their ‘natural life’. Simultaneously, maintenance budgets were being 
slashed – without vital maintenance the condition of the ships would quickly 
deteriorate resulting in an increased risk to people, the cargo being carried and 
indeed the ship itself. To compound this problem of older ships receiving less 
and less maintenance was the apparent relaxation of standards by the 
Classification Societies. The Societies had performed two very important roles 
for many, many years. Firstly they carefully monitored the construction and 
maintenance of ships which provided a type of ‘risk assessment’ and assurance 
/ guarantee for the Hull and Machinery and P&I insurers. Secondly, acting on 
behalf of various flag states, they monitored and assessed the compliance by 
the shipping company with a whole range of important safety related 
legislation. The Societies, however, are financed, and consequently their 
activities are strongly influenced by, the ship operating industry. 
There were other factors as well which were all contributing to a cocktail of 
disasters for the shipping industry. However, the key factors were people and 
management systems.  
The core issues were identified by the Secretary-General to IMO in a Briefing 
dated 28.6.2002 –‘Shipping enters the ISM Code era with second phase of 
implementation’ – when Mr O’Neil said: ‘…Previously, IMO's attempts to 
improve shipping safety and to prevent pollution from ships had been largely 
directed at improving the hardware of shipping - for example, the construction 
of ships and their equipment.  The ISM Code, by comparison, concentrates on 
the way shipping companies are run.”  - he continued ‘…this is important, 
because we know that human factors account for most accidents at sea - and 
that many of them can ultimately be traced to management. The Code is 
helping to raise management standards and practices and thereby reduce 
accidents and save lives’. 
 
 
1.2.3 Solution – management systems 
 
Efforts to address the problem had already started a little earlier.  In July, 
1986, for example, following publication of the report on the loss of the MV 
"Grainville", the British Government issued "M Notice 1188 (This was 
subsequently up-dated and superseded by M Notice 1424 in August, 1990) 
entitled "Good Ship Management".  This commended the publication entitled 
'Code of Good Management Practice in Safe Ship Operations' issued by the 
International Chamber of Shipping and the International Shipping Federation. 
 
The tragic loss of the MV "Herald of Free Enterprise" in March, 1987 resulted 
in the introduction of the "Merchant Shipping (Operations Book) Regulations 
1988 which were laid before Parliament and came into force in December that 
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year.  These Regulations  are applicable to all UK passenger ships on short sea 
trade (Class II and IIA) and were developed around the two central tenets of: 
 
• all such ships shall carry an 'operations book' containing instructions and 
information for safe and efficient operation, and 
 
• owners being required to nominate a person (known as the Designated 
Person) to oversee the operation of their ships and to ensure that proper 
provisions are made so that the requirements of the operations book are 
complied with. 
 
M Notice 1353 was issued in October 1988, giving detailed guidance on how 
compliance with these regulations could be achieved.  Attention was also 
drawn to M Notice 1188 and the 'Code of Good Management Practice in Safe 
Ship Operations'. 
 
At the 57th session of the IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) in May, 
1989, the UK delegation pressed, unsuccessfully at that time, for the draft 
guidelines contained in MSC 56/WP.4 (this working paper was ultimately 
adopted at the 16th Assembly, in October, 1989, as resolution A.647(16) and 
is the forerunner to the ISM Code) to include the two principles upon which 
the Merchant Shipping (Operations Book) Regulations 198/8 were founded. 
 
Further impetus was given to the need for these amendments to SOLAS when 
fire swept through the Norwegian passenger/car ferry MV "Scandinavian Star" 
in April, 1990 with the loss of 158 lives.  That tragedy initiated the action 
within the IMO that resulted in the inclusion of paragraphs "4.7 Designated 
person ashore" and "4.8 Operations documentation in resolution A680(17) 
which was adopted on 6 November, 1991 revoking resolution A.647(16). 
 
At the 18th session of the IMO Assembly on 4 November, 1993, resolution 
A.741(18) was formally adopted.  This revoked resolution A.680(17) and 
constitutes verbatim the International Management Code for the Safe 
Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (International Safety 
Management (ISM) Code).  This was incorporated on 19 May, 1994 into the 
SOLAS Convention 1974 as Chapter IX - entitled 'Management for the Safe 
Operation of Ships' making compliance with the Code mandatory in states that 
are signatories to SOLAS for various classes as follows: 
 
• Ro-ro passenger ferries operating between ports in the European Union by 
1 July, 1996 - pursuant to a regulation of the Council of the European 
Union; 
 
• Passenger ships including high-speed craft, not later than 1 July, 1998; 
 
• Oil tankers, chemical tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers and cargo high-
speed craft of 500 gross tonnage and upwards, not later than 1 July, 1998; 
and 
 
• Other cargo ships and mobile offshore drilling units of 500 gross tonnage 
and upwards, not later than 1 July, 2002. 
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(The Code does not apply to government-operated ships used for non-
commercial purposes). 
Alongside Resolution A.741(18) – The International Safety Management 
(ISM) Code – the IMO also developed Resolution A.788(19) – Guidelines on 
Implementation of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code by 
Administrations – which was adopted on 23 November 1995. Resolution 
A.788(19) was intended to provide the Flag State Administration with a set of 
outline guidelines which they could use when looking at the SMS’s of the 
shipping companies and ships under their flag to verify compliance with the 
ISM Code and the issuance of the DOC’s and SMC’s. The intention was to 
introduce some uniformity and consistency into these processes on an 
international level. It is important to understand however that these were 
‘guidelines’ only without any mandatory or compulsory status. It would 
appear that the intention of the authors and architects of the Code was that the 
two resolutions would sit side by side and complement each other. 
Resolution A.788(19) did appear to be taken on board by many 
Administrations but did lead to a certain amount of confusion. The opportunity 
was therefore taken at the December 2000 meeting of the IMO Maritime 
Safety Committee meeting – MSC.99(73) – to amend the text of the ISM Code 
(Resolution A.741(18)) to specifically include a number of provisions from 
Resolution A.788(19) and to replace that Resolution with a new draft 
A.913(22). The new Code and amended Resolution came into full force to 
coincide with Phase 2 implementation on 1st July 2002. 
The original intention of IMO was that the Flag State Administrations would 
be the bodies undertaking the verification and certification on board the ships 
flying their national flag. A limited number of Administrations did undertake 
this work but the IMO recognised the increasing dominance and influence of 
the Flags of Convenience (FOC’s) and the fact that many of the FOC’s had 
very limited infrastructure actually to undertake this task. Accordingly IMO 
built into the text of SOLAS Chapter IX and Resolution A.733(19) flexibility 
to allow Administrations to delegate the actual  task, but not the responsibility, 
of the verification and certification to ‘recognised organisation’ (R.O.’s) or to 
other Administrations. Almost all FOC’s, and many national Administrations, 
delegated to the Classification Societies  and a small number of independent 
consultants.  Many of these same Societies and Consultants had also set up 
consultancy companies in which they were selling their expertise to ship 
operators to set up, develop and write their safety management systems. There 
were, and still are, many in the industry who considered this dual role runs the 
risk of a very serious conflict situation arising. Those who were setting up the 
systems were then examining their own efforts and issuing certificates – many 
questioned the objectivity and indeed the ethics of such a practice. The 
implications and significance of this somewhat incestuous situation were to 
figure in the findings of this research. 
 
 
1.3 The Philosophy of the ISM Code 
 
The stated objectives of the Code are initially set out in the first paragraph of 
the Preamble to the Code which provides: 
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 "The purpose of this Code is to provide an international standard for the safe 
management and operation of ships and for pollution prevention". 
 
 This initial statement is expanded and the objectives are set out in full in 
Section 1.2. 
 
 
 
1.2 Objectives 
 
1.2.1 The objectives of the Code are to ensure safety at sea, prevention of 
human injury or loss of life, and avoidance of damage to the 
environment, in particular to the marine environment and to property. 
 
1.2.2 Safety-management objectives of the Company should, inter alia: 
 
.1 provide for safe practices in ship operation and a safe working 
environment; 
 
.2 establish safeguards against all identified risks; and 
 
.3 continuously improve safety-management skills of personnel 
ashore and board ships, including preparing for emergencies 
related both to safety and environmental protection. 
 
1.2.3 The safety-management system should ensure: 
 
.1 compliance with mandatory rules and regulations; and 
 
.2 that applicable Codes, guidelines and standards recommended 
by the organisation, administrations, classification societies and 
maritime industry organisations are taken into account. 
 
 
1.3.1 A change of perspective on rules and regulations 
 
 The author agrees with the points raised in the Intertanko document (Tatham) 
when they discuss the factors which led up to the Code's objectives being 
formulated.  At paragraph 3.2 they explain "... The Code was produced in 
response to potential pressure, following a number of high profile incidents, 
for the shipping industry to clean up its act, the perception being that the 
existing rules and regulations were not in themselves sufficient to ensure a real 
diminution in the number of shipping casualties - in particular it was felt there 
was a need to reduce the scope for human error by imposing an industry 
standard of good management ...". 
 
 The whole intention of the ISM Code has been summarised so well by Lord 
Donaldson when he said "... In the short and medium term, it (the ISM Code) 
is designed to discover and eliminate sub-standard ships, together with sub-
standard owners and managers, not to mention many others who contribute to 
their survival and, in some cases, prosperity ...". 
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 He continues "... In the longer term its destination is to discover new and 
improved methods of ship operation, management and regulation which will 
produce a safety record more akin to that of the aviation industry.  But, as I 
readily admit, that is very much for the future ...". (Donaldson) 
 
  The ISM Code is concerned with procedures whereby the safety and pollution 
prevention aspects of a ship are managed, both ashore and on board, rather 
than laying down specific rules as to the technical condition of the ship itself.  
There are of course numerous sets of rules, regulations and conventions 
dealing with technical issues which a shipowner will need to comply with.  
Indeed the full significance of section 1.2.3 can be easily overlooked and 
certainly under-estimated.  The Code is not necessarily introducing any new 
sets of rules and regulations, but rather provides a requirement that the SMS 
should be structured such that it can check and verify compliance with all the 
various existing rules and regulations.  Such rules and regulations would 
include, by way of examples, Load Line Regulations, Radio Regulations, 
Collision Regulations, MARPOL, the other chapters of SOLAS, Classification 
Society Rules, STCW and a host more.  A misunderstanding which seems 
frequently to arise in the minds of many people is to think that the ISM Code 
has suddenly become an all encompassing, all embracing piece of legislation, 
incorporating all these various sets of rules, regulations, conventions and 
legislation.  The Code does not incorporate them at all although it is a breach 
of these regulations that principally gives rise to exposure.  What the ISM 
Code does - as stated in its objectives - is to make a requirement that the 
Safety Management System will provide procedures by which a company can 
check that it does comply with the various rules and regulations and 
procedures to check and verify that they continue to comply.  Another 
important point to understand is that these procedures must be documented 
and recorded.  In this regard it is perhaps worth noting the contents of section 
2.3.2 of Resolution A.913(22) which states: 
 
 "All records having the potential to facilitate verification of compliance with 
the ISM Code should be open to scrutiny during an examination.  For this 
purpose the Administration should ensure that the Company provides auditors 
with statutory and classification records relevant to the actions taken by the 
Company to ensure that compliance with mandatory rules and regulations is 
maintained.  In this regard the records may be examined to substantiate their 
authenticity and veracity". 
1.3.2 Flexibility within the system 
 
 To understand fully how the stated objectives should be interpreted, it is very 
important to understand the significance of paragraphs 4 and 5 of the 
Preamble.  These read: 
 
  
Preamble 
 
4. Recognising that no two shipping companies or shipowners are the same, 
and that ships operate under a wide range of different conditions, the 
Code is based on general principles and objectives. 
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5. The Code is expressed in broad terms so that it can have a widespread     
application.  Clearly, different levels of management, whether shore-
based or at sea, will require varying levels of knowledge and awareness 
of the items outlined. 
 
 
 It is of considerable credit to the draftsmen of the Code that they intentionally 
drafted it in such broad terms.  Having achieved that, the general principles 
which are set down are of widespread application to all types of ship and 
owner.  The very general terms in which the ISM Code is written do need to 
be understood within the context of the "safety case" as proposed by Lord 
Carver.  This was put very well by Lord Donaldson when he said "... what the 
ISM Code seeks to do is to superimpose a safety case regime which is 
regulatory in the sense that it is compulsory and is intended to be fully 
enforceable, whilst being specific only in its general requirements ...". 
(Donaldson) 
  
 The other important point to recognise is that the Code does not anticipate all 
levels of management, either ashore or on board, to necessarily have the same 
levels of knowledge and awareness of safety and environmental issues. 
 
 If one needed an explanation as to why it was considered necessary to look 
afresh at the way maritime safety was managed which moved away from a 
regulatory framework to one based upon a "safety culture", one would only 
need to reflect upon the sobering and appalling rate of bulk carrier losses.  
During the period 1980 - 1997, there were reportedly 167 bulk carriers lost and 
what is infinitely worse and unacceptable is that 1,352 lives were lost on those 
vessels. 
 
1.3.3 Safety and environmental protection policy 
 
 The ISM Code requires the Company to provide, in clear and concise terms, a 
statement describing what its aims and intentions are with regard to its SMS 
along with outline details of how those aims and objectives are to be achieved.  
The requirements of the Code are set out in Section 2: 
 
  
2 SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY 
 
2.1 The Company should establish a safety and environmental-protection 
policy which describes how the objectives given in paragraph 1.2 will 
be achieved. 
 
2.2 The Company should ensure that the policy is implemented and 
maintained at all levels of the organisation both, ship-based and shore-
based. 
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1.3.3.1 Implications for the company 
 
 The significance and importance of the Safety and Environmental Protection 
Policy should not be underestimated - for it may come under very close 
scrutiny if a major incident occurs. 
 
 The policy is basically a statement by the Company to the Company and all its 
employees whether ashore or on board.  It is recommended that the policy 
should be signed by the Chief Executive or similar head of the organisation to 
demonstrate the commitment from top level management.  It should also be 
regularly reviewed. 
 
 It is very important that the statement in the policy really does voice the 
intentions, aspirations and commitment of that particular company rather than 
some eloquent prose provided by some so-called consultant selling "off-the-
shelf" Safety Management Systems. 
 
 From a practical point of view such a policy would be needed in order for the 
Company to have credibility with its personnel with regard to its commitment 
to safety and the protection of the environment.  From a pragmatic point of 
view it should be anticipated that if an incident did arise involving the 
Company then the press and media would certainly scrutinise the policy most 
carefully and use it to criticise, ridicule or condemn the Company. 
 
 For different, but related reasons, the courts would also look very carefully at 
the policy statement as well as the historical track record of the Company in 
light of the policy statement. 
 
 Some flowery standard worded bought off-the-shelf policy statement could 
cause considerable embarrassment indeed to a company. 
 
 
1.3.4 The safety management system 
 
 It would not be an overstatement to claim that what the ISM Code is all about 
is the development and implementation of a Safety Management System 
(SMS). 
 
 The responsibility is upon the owning or operating company to develop, 
implement and maintain not only a written but a living, dynamic, Safety 
Management System covering a whole range of safety, environmental and 
related matters.  The functional requirements are listed in Section 1.4 of the 
Code and are then explored in more detail throughout the rest of the Sections 
of the Code. 
 
  
1.4 Functional requirements for a safety-management system 
 
Every company should develop, implement and maintain a safety-
management system (SMS) which includes the following functional 
requirements: 
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.1 a safety and environmental-protection policy; 
 
.2 instructions and procedures to ensure safe operation of ships and 
protection of the environment in compliance with relevant 
international and flag state legislation; 
 
.3 defined levels of authority and lines of communication between, 
and amongst, shore and shipboard personnel; 
 
.4 procedures for reporting accidents and non-conformities with 
the provisions of this Code; 
 
.5 procedures to prepare for and respond to emergency situations; 
and 
 
.6 procedures for internal audits and management reviews. 
 
 
 
1.3.4.1 Implications of the functional requirements 
 
 The functional requirements as set out in Section 1.4 of the Code are really 
just the main chapter headings of the ISM Code - the named organs as it were of the 
SMS.  They are not intended to be an exhaustive list but rather represent the minimum 
requirements of an acceptable Safety Management System. 
It is the structure, implementation and working of the SMS which will be the real 
deciding factor of whether or not a company is complying with the ISM Code.  
 
1.3.4.2 Getting inside Safety Management Systems 
 
The greatest strength of the ISM Code is simultaneously its greatest weakness. It is 
arguably the single most important and influential piece of maritime legislation ever 
to have been enacted on an International scale, yet the Code itself is set out in 16 short 
sections on fifteen pages in an A5 size booklet. Its greatest strength lies not only in its 
simplicity but in its flexibility; the original draughtsmen on the IMO (the International 
Maritime Organisation) working party produced a set of very general principles and 
objectives, with a wide spread application, which could be interpreted and 
implemented by each individual shipping company or shipowner or ship as may be 
most appropriate to the way in which that operator managed its company and its ships. 
The intention was that compliance would be ‘individual’ and there would be 
considerable latitude and freedom in producing a Safety Management System (SMS) 
which would be most suitable for that individual operator. Of course each individual 
company and ship would be bound by those general principles and objectives, as well 
as all the other pieces of international and national legislation, industry and insurance 
rules and regulations and other contractual terms. The point is though that the ISM 
Code allows each operator to do it their own way.  
The other side of that coin though produces what is perhaps the greatest weakness of 
the ISM Code; with so many ‘individual’ interpretations and applications of the Code 
how is it possible to objectively measure compliance?  This aspect perhaps needs 
© Phil Anderson  
26/06/13 36 
splitting into at least two component parts to demonstrate the complexity of the issue 
under consideration – verification of initial compliance, and post implementation. We 
must consider not only verification of compliance as far as setting up the initial SMS 
is concerned – for which the Documents of Compliance (the DOC’s) would be given 
to the operating Company and the Safety Management Certificates (the SMC’s)  to 
the ship – but much more difficult to measure is the subsequent monitoring of 
successful implementation.  Complicating the matter even further, the determination 
as to whether an individual ship operator and / or ship complied and had implemented 
an acceptable SMS was made the responsibility of the individual Flag State 
Administrations – i.e. the Government of the Flag which is flown by the particular 
ship. Whilst IMO promulgated ‘Guidelines on Implementation of the International 
Safety Management (ISM) Code by Administrations’ in 1995 by way of Resolution 
A.788 it was still left to each Administration to decide how closely, if at all, they 
would follow those ‘guidelines’. Complicating the issue yet further, Flag States can 
delegate the task, but not the responsibility, to third parties to undertake the 
verification process and implementation on their behalf. IMO Resolution A.739(18) 
‘Guidelines for the Authorisation of Organisations Acting on Behalf of the 
Administration’ became mandatory by virtue of the new SOLAS chapter IX and 
Resolution A.740(18) – ‘Interim Guidelines to Assist Flag States’ – whereby 
Administrations can  authorise organisations to issue DOC’s and SMC’s on their 
behalf. Those ‘other’ organisations became referred to as ‘Recognised Organisations’ 
(RO’s) and, understandably, they would also have their own interpretations to apply.  
As a vessel moves around the world, from country to country, it is quite likely that it 
will be visited by inspectors from the local Port State Control (PSC), or similar body, 
who may wish to satisfy themselves that the ship complies with the requirements of 
the ISM Code. Clearly each individual PSC will have its own ‘bench mark’ against 
which it measures acceptable compliance and that is possibly based on the criteria 
decided by the Government of that country when considering ISM from its position as 
Flag State Administration. Compliance of any individual SMS could therefore be 
determined by the opinion of the ship operator, or more correctly ‘the Company’, the 
Flag State Administration or RO and possibly PSC. 
Experience suggests that objective standards have varied widely from Company to 
Company, from Flag to Flag and from PSC to PSC. It has been suggested that some 
Companies have ‘switched’ flag or in some cases the RO in order  to obtain more 
easily the DOC’s and SMC’s and it has even been reported that DOC’s and SMC’s 
can be bought from certain Administrations with little or no verification having taken 
place at all! 
How does one objectively ascertain and measure compliance with an International  
Code when there are so many different subjective interpretations actually determining 
compliance? Establishing that the DOC and SMC exist merely confirms that the 
particular Administration deemed it appropriate to issue those particular certificates – 
whether that is the same as saying that the SMS would satisfy any other 
Administration’s verification criteria is, perhaps, another matter – in some cases those 
certificates may be nothing more than worthless pieces of paper. 
 
Of course there may be situations which manifest themselves external to the SMS 
which might provide an indicator with regards to compliance, or non-compliance as 
the case may be. If, for example, defective, badly maintained or missing safety 
equipment is evident, this would suggest not only a failure to comply with Load Line 
Regulations or other sections of SOLAS but also a failure of the management system 
which should have had provisions with regard to planned maintenance, inspections, 
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testing and auditing to check that those systems were working and effective.  Such 
deficiencies with equipment may result in the vessel being detained by PSC. 
However, such a manifestation may only indicate, or highlight,  that there appear to be 
deficiencies in certain parts of the SMS – albeit very important areas – and it maybe 
that other parts of the SMS are working very well. 
Another external indicator might be the record of accidents, incidents and claims 
either for the Company as a whole or the individual ship. If the trend is clearly 
downwards then it may suggest that the benefits are being reaped, if the trend is in the 
other direction then maybe this would indicate that some further adjustment may be 
needed with the SMS.  
We must be careful though not to jump too quickly to what may appear obvious 
conclusions. However tempting it may be, we should not underestimate what is 
involved in the implementation of the ISM Code.  The philosophy underpinning the 
ISM Code will require all the seafarers around the world, their employer, their 
legislators and their regulators to change their whole approach to how they undertake 
their job. For some this will be a much bigger change than it will for others. Such a 
change will not happen overnight – for some it may take a long time. There may also 
be other, less obvious, external factors occurring which may be distorting the overall 
picture. One such factor could be the increasing tendency of individuals to litigate and 
pursue claims with an expectation of a ‘pay out’ regardless of merits or genuine 
claimants with an expectation of a very high level of settlement. We are living in a 
more litigious society and this factor is having a marked effect on insurance claims. 
 
We can therefore consider evidence derived from, say, PSC inspections / detentions, 
or Class records or insurers claims statistics as providing an indicator with regard to 
ISM compliance but with some serious reservations as to its full significance. Some of 
this evidence will be explored and its significance considered in much more detail in 
Chapter 2. 
 
If it is accepted that each SMS is different and individual, and hence direct 
comparisons with a master ‘blue-print’ will not be possible and that the manifestation 
of external problems and accident / claims statistics are at best mere indicators that the 
SMS may or may not be having a desired effect – we need to ask ourselves if there is 
any other way in which the working SMS can be observed or measured. 
  
The ISM Code was conceived in response to the recognition that the vast majority of 
all accidents and incidents at sea can be attributable to ‘human factors’ – some might 
use the term ‘human error’. Underpinning the ISM Code and the Safety Management 
System is the idea of a ‘safety culture’ being developed amongst those in the 
Company ashore and amongst those working on board ship. It is suggested, and it is 
the basis upon which the research project behind this book was based, that the only 
way to observe if the SMS has been successfully implemented is to get inside the 
SMS, into the safety culture to seek the views and perceptions of those directly 
involved with the implementation. 
 
By combining the observation of the SMS from the inside with the data available 
relating to external manifestations we can produce a reasonably clear ‘big picture’ of 
the current status of ISM implementation. We can identify where problems exist, the 
extent of those problems, what solutions might be available and what remedies may 
already have been found or what may need to be prescribed.  
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Without the creation of this ‘big picture’ – where progress can be demonstrated -there 
must be a risk that the greatest weakness of the ISM Code – its deliberate avoidance 
of having detailed, standardised sets of rules and regulations as a ‘bench mark’ against 
which compliance can be more easily measured (as some may claim) may be used by 
some to impose those detailed rules and regulations and virtually take away the 
latitude and freedom which each individual ship operator currently enjoys.  
 
There remains though, perhaps, a legitimate questions to ask: ‘With such a diversity 
and proliferation of Safety Management Systems in existence, how will it be possible 
to be sure that any particular system has been adequately created, developed and 
implemented effectively? If there is no ‘model’ or ‘ideal’ SMS ’ against which to 
measure other systems, how can we assess which is a good system? – which is a bad 
system? – which system is efficient? Which system is inefficient? These are fair and 
reasonable questions to ask. The answer can perhaps be best explained by way of an 
analogy: imagine trying to describe an elephant to someone who had never seen such 
an animal – this would not be an easy task and the mental picture the other person 
may form of this strange animal may actually be far different from the real thing. 
However, once that person sees an elephant for the first time there is no mistake in 
their mind, there is no doubt, they know exactly what it is that they 
have just encountered. Subsequent encounters with 
similar animals makes them easily 
recognisable but that person would have the 
same difficulty describing the elephant to 
anyone else who had not been so fortunate to 
have had the first hand direct experience of 
an encounter! In the same way when a 
good, working, dynamic, living SMS is 
encountered there may be some pleasant 
surprises but there will be few doubts in the          
mind of the individual who is having the 
experience as to what it is that they have come across.  
 
One of the first and perhaps most influential experience of this nature encountred by 
the author was a visit to a medium sized tanker operator a few years ago. The 
Managing Director of the Company had specifically asked to meet with his visitor 
upon arrival. After a brief exchange of pleasantries the MD, clearly very pleased and 
proud about something, launched into a somewhat disjointed description of how well 
his company was now doing; the accidents and claims were on their way down, 
morale was up and, he confided with a smile as wide as a Cheshire Cat, that profits 
were up! He unreservedly attributed the good times being experienced by the 
Company to the ISM Code – to quote him, almost verbatim, “I wish we had done this 
ISM thing years ago”. Clearly there was one person in the Company who was most 
upbeat about the ISM Code and it was difficult not to be affected and impressed by 
the MD’s open enthusiasm. That was only the beginning though. The MD had 
organised a meeting with his in house lawyer, accountant, technical managers, 
operation managers, safety managers and others. The MD’s support for ISM was very 
clearly reflected in each of the other executives and managers at that meeting. The 
ISM ‘bug’ was clearly contagious in that Company  - they had seen the advantages of 
making a total and unequivocal commitment to safety and the Company was now 
seeing the benefits. The support and leadership was from the very top was 
unambiguous and everyone was on the same ‘song sheet’ and at the same party! 
Without the need for a close examination of the procedures manuals or the records of 
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reporting hazardous occurrences or inspecting any of the detail – it was clear that 
what was being experienced here was the shore based side of a very successfully 
implemented Safety Management System. It is only by a personal experience of the 
aura and the ‘buzz’ in such an environment that anyone could really grasp the living 
and dynamic nature of such a management system. Unfortunately the author has not 
yet had the opportunity of visiting any ships of that Company but would be very 
surprised if the enthusiasm of the MD and the management ashore had not had a most 
profound and positive effect on board.   
 
The problem was, therefore, how to get inside as many Safety Management Systems 
as possible to see how those systems were structured and functioning. To achieve that 
end would require soliciting the views of a very wide range of individuals who were 
directly or indirectly involved in the running of those systems. Logistically it would 
not be feasible to meet sufficient individuals face to face to discuss their views and 
therefore other arrangements would have to be put in place to canvas the wide range 
of views needed. A major survey of the entire international shipping industry and 
related professions was conceived which would involve a number of different 
methods of approach.  
 
It was recognised at an early stage that this research project would be the first major 
study into the implementation since the first phase compliance deadline of 1st July 
1998 – although there had been a number of limited surveys on related issues. In an 
attempt to apply rigorous objectivity and sound research practices to the survey 
methodology the author decided to conduct the research under the guidance and 
supervision of a University. To this end he registered the project with the National 
Centre for Work Based Partnerships with the Middlesex University where the results 
of the research would be submitted towards a Doctorate in Professional Studies. The 
timing of the project was such that it would coincide with the run-up to the phase two 
implementation deadline of 1st July, 2002.  
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2 Objective evidence 
 
An observation was received from a British Chief Engineer which probably said what 
was on the minds of many in the industry: 
 
“The implementation of the ISM has been expensive for all 
companies. The work-load for officers on board has increased 
considerably due to its implementation (and preparation in our 
case). When will we be able to see statistics to justify its 
implementation. 
We are now nearly three years since the first phase compliance – 
where can we find statistics on its impact particularly on British 
registered vessels. Those of us still trying to achieve implementation 
/ compliance would like to be assured it isn’t just a paperwork 
exercise.” 
 
This is not an unfair or unreasonable request. Unfortunately, however, it is probably 
going to be a few years yet before any global or industry wide figure can demonstrate 
what the Chief Engineer really wants to see. 
The Secretary-General of IMO seemed quite confident in his address at the 25th annual 
World Maritime Day presentation when Mr O’Neil drew attention to the continuing 
decline in lives and ships lost at sea and to concurrent reductions in maritime 
pollution. Koji Sekimizu, representing IMO at the IMAREST Conference probably 
disclosed the source of that claim as Lloyd’s World Casualty Statistics which suggest 
that in 1995, three ships were lost for every thousand in the world fleet but in 2000, 
the equivalent figure was 1.9 for every thousand.. 
Most of us like to see ‘facts and figures’ – we feel comfortable with them and 
reassured by them. Hard and fast figures provide a firm foundation upon which we can 
base our knowledge. The actual situation, however – as far as ISM implementation is 
concerned - appears to be complex and very complicated. 
There are at least three obvious places to look for such statistical evidence that might 
demonstrate whether the ISM Code was working, or at least was starting to have an 
effect: 
 
1. The marine insurance industry – e.g. Hull and Machinery insurers, the P&I 
Clubs and cargo insurers. Their records of claims and claim trends should 
provide an indication. 
2. The port State control MOU’s and their secretariats. Their records of 
inspections and detentions should show whether the number of ISM related 
deficiencies noted are increasing or decreasing over time. 
3. Individual ship operators accident and claims results. 
 
Each of the three possibilities was explored to see if any hard facts could be obtained – 
unfortunately the conclusion reached was that only the third option offered any 
potentially useful information at this time. The problem with the first two potential 
sources is that they represent the ‘big picture’ and we are reduced to averages. ISM 
implementation does not easily reduce to averages – it is a very specific / individual 
matter which can only be applied to that particular case. However, even at the 
individual company level it is not always possible to obtain any meaningful statistics. 
Captain Eberhard Koch drew attention to the problem within a growing company:  
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‘…we are very sure that a certain number of accidents and incidents did 
not occur since implementation of our SMS. We can just not present any 
figures. It is of no use trying to read tendencies out of our P&I or H&M 
damage statistics when simultaneously over these years the number and 
composition of ships under our management has changed…’ (Koch) 
 
Each possibility will be explored in some detail here to describe the problems that 
presently seem to exist. 
 
2.1 Indications from the marine insurance sectors 
 
Shipowners have traditionally split their main insurance requirement into two parts – 
each part being covered by very different sectors of the insurance industry. The ship 
itself, with its machinery and other equipment is usually insured on a Hull and 
Machinery (H&M) policy drawn up on one of the worlds marine insurance markets – 
such as the Lloyds Market in London or with insurance companies. There are also a 
small number of mutual Hull Clubs. The liabilities, on the other hand, tend to be 
insured with the mutual Protecting and Indemnity Associations – more usually 
referred to as P&I Clubs. More than 90% of the deep sea Shipowners of the world 
have their liabilities covered in one of the 13 member Clubs of the International Group 
of P&I Clubs. The owners of cargo being transported by sea tend to arrange insurance 
cover on one of the insurance markets or through an insurance company. 
Accidents or incidents on board ship, of any significance at all, would almost certainly 
manifest themselves as insurance claims of one description or another.  Consequently 
it would not be unreasonable to expect that the insurance claims figures could be 
examined for the period leading up to Phase I implementation and for the period since 
that implementation deadline of 1st July 1998 to ascertain whether there was any 
detectable trend developing. Further, if there was a trend then it should be possible to 
measure the differences. Unfortunately, things were not quite that simple. 
A number of marine underwriting organisations and companies were contacted as well 
as all of the P&I Clubs with a request for statistical data on their claim trends. It 
became very difficult to obtain meaningful information. The probable reasons for this 
will be discussed presently. 
One thing which was noticeable about the various sectors of the marine insurance 
industry and their attitude towards the ISM Code, in particular comments on its 
apparent success or failure, was their almost total silence. The main exception was a 
series of claims made by the Swedish P&I Club in Gőteborg, which have received 
widespread attention. Indeed the Secretary General of the IMO, Mr William A. 
O’Neil, as well as many other journalists and industry leaders, have made extensive 
reference to the Swedish Club findings as confirmation that ISM can work. The 
author does not doubt the accuracy or the sincerity of the Swedish Club study – 
however, he believes that some considerable caution is needed when considering the 
findings. 
In a bulletin published by the Swedish Club in December 2001 it describes the 
research which had been done, which involved a comparison of the claim results (on 
the hull and machinery side) between 274 Phase I vessels and 319 Phase II vessels – 
i.e. a total of 593 vessels. The number of commercial trading vessels in the world fleet 
is estimated at about 47,000 (BIMCO / ISF 2000) - which would suggest that the 
Swedish Club survey involved approximately 1.3% of the world fleet. The insurers 
for the other 98.7% of the world fleet presumably were not able to confirm similar 
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The Swedish Club explained its own situation as possibly being attributable to the 
very high quality of tonnage entered in the Club which was not representative of the 
cross section of the world fleet. This may well be the case but the Swedish Club, 
along with all the other P&I Clubs and H&M underwriters applied very substantial 
general increases to the ‘calls’ / premiums during the 2001 and 2002 policy years with 
more increases to come. Wishing no disrespect to the Swedish Club – because of its 
relative size to the global market and the effect upon its own statistics of just a few 
more or less major incidents in one year than the next – the results should be viewed 
with some caution. If the UK P&I Club had made a similar claim then the whole 
picture might be much more optimistic, purely from a statistical perspective – since 
the UK Club provides liability insurance to approximately 25% of the world fleet. 
Since no such claim has been made we will be left to draw our own conclusions out of 
silence. 
However, the work of the Swedish Club does need to be taken seriously and 
appropriate praise given where due. A review of their methodology and results would 
therefore be relevant and appropriate here. The Swedish Club provides mutual 
insurance for both P&I and H&M. The bulletin they published in December 
2001(Swedish Club Highlights) focussed primarily on the results from the H&M 
claim trends – although they have been monitoring their P&I results. In the leading 
paragraph they claim: 
  
“A new study carried out by The Swedish Club confirms that 
shipowners implementing the International Safety Management (ISM) 
Code can expect to achieve a reduction in Hull claims of 30 per cent 
together with similar improvement in the incidence of P&I claims.” 
 
In December 1999 the Swedish Club had issued the findings of a study comparing 
claims involving Phase I vessels, which had to comply by 1 July 1998 and Phase II 
vessels that would be working towards compliance by 1 July 2002. Their study 
reviewed claims trends in the three years to June 30 1999, and noted that the claims 
development during the period appeared to be 30 per cent better for phase one vessels.  
The Club had predicted that the gap between the claim trends for the two groups of 
vessels would narrow as the phase 2 compliance deadline approached. Their actual 
results would appear to confirm this prediction. 
They tabulated the Hull claims development since 1995-96 for Phase I vessels, in 
relation to phase 2 vessels, as follows: 
 
Phase 1 vessels compared to phase 2 vessels 
 
• 1995 – 96 (base year) 100% 
• 1996 – 97   95.5% 
• 1997 – 98   85.2% 
• 1998 – 99   67% 
• 1999 – 00   70.8% 
• 2000 – 01   78% 
 
These results can be displayed graphically in the following diagram: 
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The Swedish Club observed that in the three years to June 30th 1999, a substantial gap 
opened between the Hull claims incidence rates for Phase I and Phase II vessels. 
Within 12 months of the 1998 deadline, Phase I Hull claims were running at just 67% 
of those for Phase II vessels. Interestingly from that point the gap began to narrow – 
presumably as a result of an increasing proportion of Phase II vessels became 
involved in the ISM Code implementation process. The suggestion is the lowest point 
of 67% would indicate an improvement of 33% by Phase I vessels compared with 
Phase II vessels – if true this would clearly represent significant savings in terms of 
direct as well as indirect costs of accidents and claims. 
They further predict that the gap will continue to narrow as the phase 2 ships complete 
their implementation process. Following this to its conclusion the two groups should 
return to 100% coincidence once ISM is fully implemented in both groups. 
At a major international conference held in May 2002 (Hernqvist). Mr Martin 
Hernqvist, the Swedish Club’s Loss Prevention Officer who had carried out the ISM 
study, presented a further set of figures which included the P&I results: 
 
Hull and P&I claIms development since 95/96 for phase 1 ships in 
relation to phase 2 ships
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The Swedish Club also conducted a survey of its Membership and although the 
sample was relatively small – 94 companies replying – it did produce some interesting 
data. The results can be seen in the following two diagrams: 
 
 
 
July 1st 1998 (phase 1 deadline) 
1 July 1998 (phase 1 deadline) 
© Phil Anderson  
26/06/13 44 
Can you see a change in the incident rate involving your 
vessels since the implementation of ISM?
Slightly worse
0%
Slightly better
52%
Much better
16%
No change
32%
 
If the incident rate has become better, do you think that has to do 
with the implementation of ISM?
No
3%
Yes, to a certain 
extent
78%
Yes, to a large 
extent
19%
 
 
Three further sets of findings from the Swedish Club survey are also worthy of note: 
 
• The three most important factors for a properly functioning safety 
management system and improved safety records were: 
1. Commitment from the top management ashore 
2. Increased safety awareness on board 
3. Checklists / procedures for key shipboard operations 
 
• The reasons for a non-functioning safety management system were: 
1. Too much paperwork / documentation 
2. People do not know how they are expected to use the system 
3. People do not believe in ISM 
 
• The top four proposals on how to convert a poorly functioning system into 
a properly functioning one were: 
1. More ISM training and education 
2. Reduce paperwork / documentation 
3. Provide seafarers with good examples of ISM in practice 
4. Make sure that the accident reporting procedures work and increase 
feedback from accident reports to the seafarers. 
 
These observations reflect in many ways the authors own results and conclusions.  
There are a number of problems which the author has with the Swedish Club claims – 
although, as he says, the author does not doubt the sincerity with which the Club has 
conducted its research nor the accuracy of the figures used. The original claim  by the 
Swedish Club that improvements of 30% were being noted between the two groups of 
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ships was made just over one year after the Phase I implementation date. Admittedly, 
the Club had been monitoring trends from three years previous but even so it would 
be unusual for a group of independently operating shipping companies to achieve 
such success with their implementation in such a short period of time. The sample is 
small and one or two additional major incidents would severely distort the figures. 
A factor that cannot be ignored, although admittedly does not in any way disprove the 
Swedish Clubs claim, is that the Swedish Club received much good publicity with the 
result of their study being widely reported – why has no-one else made similar 
claims? The Secretary General of IMO continues to make repeated reference to the 
study when seeking something to quote to confirm that ISM is working -  repeated 
references are made to it in newspaper and magazine articles and at conferences and 
seminars – the fact is that it appears to be the only such claim to have been made. Any 
of the other P&I Clubs would have revelled in such good publicity. Those remaining 
P&I Clubs still cover more than 90% of the worlds Shipowners – if any one of them 
could have made a similar claim then they almost certainly would. Their silence 
perhaps tells its own story.  
All the other P&I Clubs were approached as part of this research; many responded 
and indicated that they would provide details of their claims records – unfortunately, 
although repeated reminders were sent, only five clubs ended up supplying figures – 
and then it was on the strict understanding that total confidentiality was to be 
maintained. However, the author is most grateful to those clubs who did provide 
statistics – the review of those figures was extremely useful. The review basically 
confirmed that there was little by way of measurable trends in the claim figures since 
Phase I implementation in 1998 – although in some instances it might be possible to 
detect a downward trend in the number of claims but this tended to be accompanied 
by an upward trend in the value of claims.  
Looking for claim trends in this way could also be misleading. Consider, for example, 
if the Membership of a particular P&I was such that all the companies were already 
operating good safe ships in advance of ISM and they didn’t actually generate many 
claims at all. In such a situation it may be very difficult to do anything which would 
nudge the trend downwards – it is more likely to remain steady. The same argument 
could also apply to individual ship operators. 
The reality is that each P&I Club comprises many different ship-operating 
organisations. Each organisation will be progressing at its own pace with its ISM 
implementation and, consequently, the result for the whole club is going to be nothing 
more than the average across its entire Membership. Some shipowners appear to be 
making good progress with their implementation – many others are taking a little 
longer. It will take a number of years before ‘collective’ results can be detected, 
whether that be across a particular P&I Club, or a Classification Society or a 
particular Flag.  
 
However, the situation is not as simple as that. The whole of the marine insurance 
industry appears to have been under-funded in recent years i.e. the premiums being 
paid are not sufficient to cover the cost of the claims and liabilities which have been 
incurred. This situation has arisen because of two main reasons – firstly market 
competition – more underwriting capacity than customers and consequently insurers 
have been competing for business – even at below break-even prices. Secondly, the 
insurance sector – like everyone else – has been badly hit by the very poor return on 
investment income. As a consequence insurance premiums have been increasing 
significantly in all sectors during the 2001 / 2002 policy years. Almost all the P&I 
clubs of the International Group of P&I clubs made a general increase of between 
25% and 35% - with some clubs also making additional supplementary calls. One of 
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the leading broking houses – AON report the following rises in other parts of the 
marine insurance industry (Aon): 
 
• Blue water hull 15 – 33% 
• Brown water hull 15 – 25% 
• Brown water P&I 15 –30% 
• Marine liability 7.5 – 20% 
• Excess liability 7.5 – 15% 
• Brown water pollution   0 – 15% 
• Cargo 10 – 20% 
• Cargo storage 10 – 30% 
 
Even if an insurer was in a position to follow the Swedish Club claim and make an 
announcement that they were seeing a reduction in claims which they attribute to 
successful ISM implementation – it is suggested that they are unlikely to make any 
such claim in the present market climate since they might have some difficulty 
explaining to their Members / clients why they then make a further announcement that 
they require a further increase of 25% on all premiums for the second year running! 
 
It proved equally difficult, initially, to obtain meaningful statistics from the H&M 
insurers. A few years ago the Joint Hull committee at Lloyds used to produce some 
excellent casualty statistics but with the retirement of a particular individual those 
statistics seemed to cease being produced. 
Part of the problem is that, unlike the P&I sector, H&M insurance is very fragmented. 
Indeed the way in which each ship is insured makes statistical data collection from a 
single reference source very difficult. On each ship there may be 100 or more 
individual insurers – who may be positioned in different markets. The lead underwriter 
may take one or two percent and then many others would take smaller ‘lines’. In this 
way each individual insurer is limiting its exposure and basically spreading the risks 
covered over a wide portfolio. 
However, a very useful source was discovered in Norway – CEFOR (Central Union of 
Marine Underwriters in Norway) (www.cefor.no) who provide as a service - the 
Norwegian Marine Insurance Statistics (NoMIS) whose purpose is to compile and 
process statistical information. As of 31 December 2001 the NoMIS database claimed 
to comprise 53,167 vessel years and 20,113 claims. Their website contains a detailed 
statistical report on those incidents, which include international as well as Norwegian 
business, and  covers the period  1990 – 2001. The author is most grateful to CEFOR 
for their permission to reproduce the following graph which shows total claims per 
underwriting year for that period: 
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Source: CEFOR – www.cefor.no 
 
What is very interesting about this particular graph is that it shows very clearly indeed 
the cyclical nature of marine claims. It would certainly be tempting to draw certain 
inferences and indeed conclusions from the steady downward trend since Phase I 
implementation in 1998. It is also tempting to perhaps suggest that these figures could 
provide a partial explanation for what the Swedish Club had found. Clearly time will 
tell whether the recent downward trend is just part of the cyclical pattern of marine 
insurance claims or whether it really is heralding good news. 
 
A number of respondents were quite cynical about the marine insurance industry and 
seemed to infer that there was some sort of conspiracy taking place. For example an 
interesting observation was received from a manager of a Greek shipping company 
who said: 
 
…as far as insurance companies are concerned, ISM has achieved its goals 
by 100% as they now manage to pay less than what they did in the past… 
 
A similar perception was put forward by an Indian operations manager in a 
shipping company who said: 
 
At the risk of sounding hopeless, I honestly believe that the one thing that 
the ISM Code has surely achieved is creating an hitherto absent paper trail 
that helps pin-point blame when accidents occur, helps insurance 
companies shy away from paying on claims and aggravate the already 
stressed out lives of modern day seafarers… 
 
The author received other, similar, reports but did not receive details of any actual or 
specific incident where insurers had declined to pay claims on account of ISM 
violations. Presumably the reports were based on personal experiences but clearly 
run quite contrary to what the ISM Code is about and what it is trying to achieve. 
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Certainly the marine insurance industry will be delighted if the ISM Code is a 
success – for that will be beneficial to both the shipping and the insurance industries. 
 
 
2.2 Indications from port State control MOU’s 
 
IMO promulgate general guidance to port State control by resolution A.787(19) but in 
December 1998 the IMO produced  a set of ‘Interim Guidelines for Port State Control 
Related to the ISM Code’ by way of circular MSC/Circ.890 / MEPC/Circ.354.  In 
numbered paragraph 3 of those guidelines it is stated: 
“…3 Port States should recognize that port State control related to the ISM Code 
should be an inspection and not an audit. The ISM Code has been developed to 
promote a safety culture and is not intended to penalise those ships/operators whose 
Safety Management Systems embrace the principles and requirements of the ISM 
Code…” 
The intention being that port State should confirm that there is a SMS in place and 
appears to be working. 
A Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC) was carried out by the Paris MOU, in 
conjunction with the Tokyo MOU, following Phase One implementation on 1st July, 
1998 and the data produced from that CIC remains an important source of data 
specifically linking a detention to a non-compliance with the ISM Code. The 
campaign ran from 1 July to 30 September 1998. A further CIC has been conducted 
following the final deadline for Phase II implementation on 1st July 2002. (at the time 
of completing this manuscript the data had not been made available). 
The first results, of the 1998 CIC, showed that a total of 1575 eligible ships were 
inspected during the campaign. A uniform questionnaire had been used by PSCO’s to 
test key elements of the ship’s safety management system. A total of 81 ships were 
detained in port for major non-compliance’s in their system. 
Three ships were banned from the Paris MOU region for not having ISM certificates 
on board and a safety management system in place. These ships would not be allowed 
to enter any of the Paris MOU ports  until evidence was provided that a certified 
management system was in place. 
Bulk carriers were the largest category of ship found not to comply with 58 being 
detained out of 722 bulk carriers inspected. Chemical tankers, oil tankers, passenger 
ships and gas tankers figured to lesser degrees. 
Twelve flag states, with more than 10 ISM applicable inspections, showed the 
following rates of detentions: 
 
Turkey                                   16.4 St. Vincent & Grenadines            12.1 
Russia                                    10.3 Bahamas                                        7.4 
Cyprus                                    6.7 Panama                                          6.5 
Philippines                              5.6 Liberia                                           4.8 
Malta                                      4.3 Greece                                           4.1 
Italy                                          3.3 Norway                                        1.0 
 
Since the certification for the ISM Code provisions had been carried out to a large 
extent by Classification Societies on behalf of flag states, the results of the Paris MOU 
analysis indicated the detention rate by class in  relation to a minimum number of 10 
ISM applicable inspections as  follows: 
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Bureau Veritas                               11.3 Hellenic Register of Shipping                10.5 
China Classification Society           9.5 Russian Maritime Register of Shipping   9.4 
Lloyds Register of Shipping          9.3 Nippon Kaiji Kyokai                                7.4 
Polski Rejestr                                  6.7 American Bureau of Shipping                  5.7 
Registro Italiano Navale                 4.0 Det Norske Veritas                                   3.4 
Germanischer Lloyd                       1.2  
 
In the inspected areas of the management system on board the Paris MOU analysis 
found that the most frequent major non-conformities were in respect of the following 
issues: 
 
• Certificates and particulars not in order                               21% 
• No certificates on board 17% 
• Senior officers not able to identify ‘designated person’ 16% 
• No maintenance routine and records available 12% 
• Senior officers not able to identify company responsible      
            for the operation of the ship   9% 
• Programmes for drills and exercises to prepare for   
         emergency actions not available   8% 
 
Although the campaign was too soon after the phase one implementation deadline to 
draw any firm conclusions with regard to the extent of non-compliances – the initial 
impression provided  good support for the strong stance on enforcement by the Paris 
MOU, and others, to show that it had been effective in driving away non-compliant 
ships – or at least those ships which had not gone through a certification process.  
Prior to the 1st July, 1998 deadline there had been predictions that there would be 
serious congestion of the ports with fleets of banned, non-compliant, ships  - but this 
did not materialise. 
 
The Paris MOU Annual Report for 2001 records that there were 18,681 inspections 
carried out on 11,658 ships. On ISM it states that here had been ‘…a steep increase in 
safety management defects which, over 3 years, have increased by 150%…’ 
 
Clearly this is an alarming figure and is depicted in the following graph derived from 
the Paris MOU 2001 ‘Blue Book’ showing the ratio of deficiencies to individual ships 
x100: 
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A regular criticism of the port State control system is its lack of consistency and 
uniformity in its interpretation of what it is supposed to be doing. Clearly resolution 
A.787(19) and MSC/Circ.890 / MEPC/Circ.354 were an attempt to address this issue 
and the Secretariat of the Paris MOU very kindly provided the author with a copy of a 
document – ‘Port State Control Instructions – PSCC34/2001/01 dated 11 May 2001 – 
Guidelines for the Port State Control Officer on the ISM Code’.  This is an extremely 
useful document describing how the PSCO should approach an inspection when ISM 
factors are under consideration. An extract from that document is set out below: 
 
A. Initial inspection  
 
1. During all routine PSC inspections, a check should be made that the ship has ISM 
certification on board, in accordance with the ISM Code. The PSCO will at the 
initial inspection examine the copy of the Document of Compliance (DoC) issued 
for the Company, and the Safety Management Certificate (SMC) issued for the 
ship. A SMC is not valid unless the operating company holds a valid DoC for 
that ship type. The PSCO should also check that required audits and 
endorsements have been made to the certificates. 
 
2 The PSCO should in particular verify that the type of the ship as reflected in the 
SMC is included in the DoC, and that the Company’s particulars are the same on 
both the DoC and the SMC. 
 
3. If a vessel has been issued with interim certificates the PSCO should check 
whether it has been issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 14 of the 
Code. Though the Safety Management System may not meet the items 4 – 17 
listed in Part 2, a documented system should be in place and the PSCO should use 
his professional judgement in deciding whether a more detailed inspection is 
necessary. 
 
B. More detailed inspection 
 
A more detailed inspection of the SMS shall be carried out when clear grounds are 
established. Clear grounds include absent or inaccurate ISM certification or detainable 
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deficiencies in other areas. Many non-detainable deficiencies may also be evidence of 
a deficient management system and the PSCO should use his professional judgement 
in deciding whether these warrant a more detailed inspection. When carrying out a 
more detailed inspection the PSCO may utilise the following to verify compliance 
with the ISM Code. 
The following questions are not a checklist but contain examples of areas which could 
be inspected by the PSCO. (Each question has an explanatory note accompanying the 
guidelines) 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Is the ISM Code applicable to the ship? 
 
2. Is ISM certification on board? 
 
3. Are certificates and particulars in order? 
 
4. Is there a Company safety and environmental protection policy and are the 
appropriate personnel familiar  with it?                                                                              
Ref.: Section 2.2 of the Code. 
 
5. Is Safety Management documentation (e.g. manual) readily available on board?   
Ref.: Section 1.4 of the ISM Code 
 
6. Is relevant documentation on the SMS in a working language or language 
understood by the ships personnel?                                                                                                           
Ref.: Section 6.6 of the ISM Code 
 
7. Can senior officers identify the Company responsible for the operation of the ship 
and does this correspond with the entity specified on the ISM certificates?                              
Ref.: Section 3 of  the ISM Code 
 
8. Can senior officers identify the ‘designated person’?                                                                 
Ref.: Section 4 of the ISM Code 
 
9. Are procedures  in place for establishing and maintaining contact with shore 
management in an emergency?                                                                                            
Ref.: Section 8.3 of the ISM Code 
 
10. Are programmes for drills and exercises to prepare for emergency actions 
available on board?                                                                                                                             
Ref.: Section 8.2 of the ISM Code 
 
11. How have new crew members been made familiar with their duties if they have 
recently joined the ship and are instructions which are essential prior to sailing 
available?                                                                                                                          
Ref.: Section 6.3 of the ISM Code 
 
12. Can the master provide documented proof of his responsibilities and authority, 
which must include overriding authority?                                                                                                  
Ref.: Section 5 of the ISM Code 
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13. Does the ship have a maintenance routine and are records available?                                
Ref.: Section 10.2 of the ISM Code 
 
14. Have non-conformities, accidents and hazardous situations been reported to the 
Company and has timely corrective action been taken by the Company?                              
Ref.: Section 9.1, 9.2 of the ISM Code 
 
15. Are procedures in place for maintaining the relevant documentation?                     
Ref.: Section 11 of the ISM Code 
 
16. Are procedures in place for internal audits and have these been carried out?                   
Ref.: Section 12 of the ISM Code                                                                                                                 
 
PSCO’s should not normally scrutinise the contents of any non-conformity notes      
resulting from internal audits. 
 
17. Do detainable deficiencies or many deficiencies, if found, indicate a failure of the    
Safety Management System? 
 
C. Follow-up action 
 
1. No ISM certification on board 
In Annex  1 a flow chart is presented which shows all necessary steps after 
an initial inspection when the COC and / or SMC are missing. 
The chart includes the requirements of the Council Directive 95/21/EC. 
 
2. No valid ISM certificate on board 
When the ship’s ISM certificates are invalid, e.g.. periodic verification has 
not taken place or discrepancies exist between the DoC and the SMC, the 
flag State and the Company will be requested to take appropriate rectifying 
action. 
The principles outlined in Section 9 of Annex 1 to the MOU with regard to detention 
and rectification of deficiencies are applicable. 
 
3. Detainable deficiencies in hardware and / or operational areas 
3.1 The normal procedure in accordance with section 9 of Annex 1 to the 
MOU will be applicable. 
3.2 Detainable deficiencies and multiple non detainable deficiencies may indicate a 
failure of the Safety Management System.                                                                  
However, the PSCO cannot automatically conclude that the system has failed.                          
The PSCO should examine the relevant areas of the system to identify non-
conformities. 
3.3 Non-conformities shall be recorded on the PSC inspection form as indicated in 
Part 5 (SIRENAC Codes).                                                                                                               
The PSCO shall ask the flag State to issue and follow up non-conformity notes. 
Issuing classification society informed if appropriate. 
3.4 Prior to detention being lifted, the Company shall report to the port State 
Authority which corrective action will be taken regarding the non-conformities 
which have been reported. 
3.5 Non-conformities have to be rectified within 3 months 
3.6 Major non-conformities have to be rectified before sailing. 
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D. Areas which may warrant detention. 
 
The following items may be considered as major non-conformities [foot-note 2] and 
would make the vessel liable for detention. This list is not considered exhaustive but 
is intended to give an example of relevant items. 
 
Section of the                                                                                                                             
ISM Code: 
 
13 ISM certificates not on board 
 
13 Company on the DOC not the same as on the SMC. 
 
1.4 Safety Management documentation not on board 
 
6.6 Relevant safety information not in a working language or a language           
understood by the crew. 
 
3 +  4 Senior officers unable to identify operator and designated person (ship / 
shore system breaks down with this). 
 
8.3 No procedures to contact the company in emergency situations. 
 
8.2 Drills have not been  carried out according to program. 
 
6.3 New crew members are not familiar with their duties within the SMS. 
 
5 Master’s overriding authority not documented and master unaware of his 
authority. 
 
10.2 No records of maintenance kept or no evidence of maintenance being 
carried out as indicated in the records. 
 
 
The reason all this has been set out in detail is because it is important to understand 
what PSCO’s are recording as ISM deficiencies. Certainly all of the above would be 
considered ISM deficiencies but consider a situation whereby the PSCO identified 
deficiencies with the ‘hardware’ – for example, maybe lifeboat davits that had seized, 
or fire extinguishers that were empty. These are certainly deficiencies under the life 
saving appliance rules and perhaps other sections of SOLAS and would no doubt be 
recorded as such in the defect notice. However, they would also clearly point to a 
seriously defective safety management system – since if the SMS had been 
functioning then the life saving appliances would never have been allowed to fall into 
such a state of disrepair. But such deficiencies are unlikely to be recorded as ISM 
deficiencies. Consequently, in the authors view, the PSC statistics may not necessarily 
be an accurate indicator of ISM related problems. 
There is another concern with regard to the PSC records of ISM deficiencies. It is not 
at all surprising that the number of recorded ISM deficiencies is increasing with the 
passage of time, rather than decreasing as we might have hoped or expected. The most 
likely reason for the increase is not that there actually are more deficiencies – rather, 
more inspections are taking place on more ships. In addition the PSCO’s themselves 
are becoming much more sophisticated, knowledgeable and skilful in inspecting as 
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well as auditing and interrogating management systems. Indeed a number of seafarers 
were almost boasting in their   questionnaires as to how they were able to hide 
problems in the SMS from the PSCO. It can be anticipated that they will continue to 
develop their sophistication and start identifying an increasing range of ISM 
deficiencies. Many have already understood the point being made above with regard 
to defects in the hardware being indicative of problems with the software – i.e. the 
SMS. 
For these reasons the author has doubts about placing too much reliance on the PSC 
detention figures at this time as being any sort of indicator relating to ISM compliance 
– although a more detailed access to the actual detention documents might provide the 
necessary clarification.. 
 
2.3 Indications from individual Ship Operators 
 
During the course of his research the author had the privilege of encountering a 
relatively small number of ship operating companies where the SMS really had 
become well established and the rewards were coming in.  These companies were not 
the oil majors or the old liner operators – they were relatively modest organisations – 
quite typically operating a dozen medium sized ships – who had made the 100% 
commitment to ISM. 
Having said that, even old established companies such as A.P. Moller conceded that 
whilst they considered they had managed safety perfectly well for many years, through 
ISM implementation they had managed to scrap 25% of their former circulars and 
circular letters (Gobel) 
An example of one of those companies which had achieved major improvements was 
described in the introductory section above. Further, specific examples may assist to 
illustrate why these individual companies will provide the most powerful objective 
evidence possible to confirm that ISM can and does work. Because of the assurance 
given at the outset the anonymity of the actual companies will be preserved. 
 
Example One 
The Company operates a fleet of ten medium sized chemical tankers – average age 
about seven years, trading worldwide. 
The ships are operated from Northern Europe with all Europeans in the office ashore. 
The entire complement on board, including the Master and Chief Engineer, are 
Filipino. 
In the years leading up to Phase I implementation deadline of 1st July 1998 the 
company was experiencing an accident / claims problem. More than average numbers 
and severity of claims were being experienced which were not only affecting the 
insurance record but also creating a drain on many other resources in the company.  
The company decided that they were going to make the necessary commitment to ISM 
and make the SMS work for the company. They employed a relatively young and very 
enthusiastic Master to come ashore, assume the role as DP, and set up their systems.  
From day one he was to work very closely alongside the Chief Executive who was 
very much  in the driving seat as far as the whole project was concerned. The first job 
was to identify and measure every hole out of which money, and other resources were 
draining from the company. All the losses – both insured and uninsured losses - were 
identified and calculated. The calculation indicated that somewhere in the region of 
$2,500,000 was being lost, probably unnecessarily, each year. The company objective 
was set to plug all those drain holes and prevent those funds haemorrhaging out of the 
company.  
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The SMS was to be designed to achieve that end. Very specific targets were set – for 
example – in the first year they were to cut those measurable losses by $750,000. They 
not only met their target they exceeded it and reduced their losses by $1,000,000. In 
the following year they set their target to reduce the losses by a further $500,000 – 
again they exceeded their target. The same has been achieved each year since.  
A fairly regular set of officers and crew had been retained by the company but it was 
decided to find the best and create a special bond between the sea staff, their ship and 
the company ashore. Special terms of employment were agreed and enhanced social 
packages were put in place for the seafarers and their families.  
A Master and a Chief Engineer were taken out of the fleet to train in ISM auditing 
techniques. They also assisted the DP in preparing the first draft of the Procedures 
Manuals. The draft manuals were to go back to the ships for review, comment and 
amendment. The DP spent much time on board the ships and in the training facility 
which had been established in Manila. 
When the Master and Chief Engineer had completed their detailed ISM auditor 
training they were then sent back into the fleet as on-board trainers of other crew 
members. Simultaneously another Master and Chief Engineer were brought ashore for 
ISM auditor training. When they had completed their training they were put back into 
the fleet as on board trainers – the original Master and Chief were then reappointed 
into their command positions. And so it went on until almost all Masters and Chiefs 
had completed their training. As a direct consequence of this training the Masters and 
Chiefs were able to provide high quality on board training for other officers and crew 
in ISM related issues – including the development of a ‘no-blame’ and ‘safety’ 
cultures. As far as possible the same set of seafarers stayed with the same ship and a 
sense of ownership and belonging was developed. This also applied to the SMS on 
board each ship – the SMS belonged to the team on board that ship; they had been 
involved in preparing the procedures, they were the ones not only making it work but 
making it work successfully. The Master and his officers and crew on board conducted 
their own internal audits and had control of their non-conformity procedures. 
Although the levels of accidents was on its way down the ship staff started reporting a 
wide range of hazardous occurrences and near misses – each one was actioned and 
feedback provided. The seafarer making the report was publicly praised and thanked 
for his contribution. A very clear pyramid / triangle shape exists with the different 
categories of incidents being reported. 
The company has not only achieved, and bettered, the targets for financial savings it 
had set itself – its accidents and claims have reduced to almost zero. It has a crew 
retention rate of almost 100% with a list of seafarers submitting applications to join 
the company as soon as there is a vacancy. The company has now been placed on a 
‘Preferred Company Status’ rating with the oil majors such that they will be given first 
options on the most lucrative charters that may be coming available. 
 
Example two 
 
A very different company – this inter-island ferry operator runs a relatively small fleet 
of ropax  rail ferries and a new 98 m INCAT High Speed Catamaran which carries 
passengers, passenger vehicles and commercial vehicles. 
According to the Nautical Manager / DPA the service takes place across one of the 
most turbulent bits of water in the world.  There are strong tides and winds.  The ships 
operate in pilotage waters for half the voyage of 52 nautical miles.  The pilotage 
waters are constrained and the Masters all have pilotage exemptions for both ports. 
 
 Last year they carried: 
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 1.04 million passengers 
 400,000 lane meters of commercial vehicles 
 238,000 passenger vehicles 
 1.3 million lane meters of rail wagons 
 
The ships, except the high speed ferry, operate around the clock, operating three return 
crossings per day.  Crossing time is 3 hours with a one hour turnaround. 
 
 The shore side of the operation comprises: 
 General Manager  
 Nautical Manager 
 Technical Manager 
 On Board Services Manager 
Plus a support staff of six. 
 
 This is a relatively small shore management for such an operation but the DP 
explained that this is possible because day to day running and maintenance is 
delegated to Masters and Chief Engineers who work to a budget to which they have 
had the major input. 
The DP is an ex deep sea Master and, from time to time, he takes command of one of 
the ships at random -  “…to keep in touch with the realities of life in our ships...” He 
explained that he finds that experience invaluable.  The feedback he receives, 
particularly from Masters and Chief Engineers, is that they appreciate him doing this -   
because when they are reporting problems they feel they are talking to someone who 
has "been there".  
 
The DP explained that he pulled together a team that included himself and a Master, 
Chief Engineer and Onboard Services Manager from the fleet. That team then 
produced the first draft of their SMS.  
The process they used to write their SMS was to draft a chapter and then sail on the 
ships and discuss it with those on board.  After feed back the team would make any 
changes that were appropriate and necessary.  The DP explained: 
 
 The SMS has now been functioning for nearly three years.  It would be 
untrue to say that it has universal acceptance.  But we are getting there.  It 
takes time and constant "pushing".  We have had and dealt with over 400 
document change forms.  Over 95% of these have been valid and sensible 
suggestions from a wide range of personnel. 
 
All the hard work seemed to be paying off – the DP proudly advised that not 
only he but also many of the seagoing staff believe that ISM has provided a 
 wonderful tool to improve safety.  He believes that the ships are at last getting 
the idea that the system deals with problems and that corrective action IS taken. 
 
  
 
Details received from other companies were perhaps a little briefer but still of interest 
– such as the comments of an Indian manager in a ship operating company: 
 
…As far as our company is concerned, we have gone a long way towards 
the effective implementation of ISM Code… I feel that compared to past 
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, presently our operations are more organised. Our operating cost has 
reduced; there are practically no time loss accidents and there is more 
healthy atmosphere to work on both board and ashore… 
 
A similar experience was reported by a Swiss manager: 
 
…already prior implementation of ISM aboard our vessels, the safety 
culture was an important matter, it is true that after ISM implementation, 
accident aboard have been greatly reduced, maintenance boosted up and 
mechanical damage to property improved…  I definitely confirm that this 
system aboard our vessels is working but need continuous control… 
 
The level of achievement and improvement which might be possible is clearly going 
to vary enormously from company to company and from ship to ship. It all depends 
where the starting point might be. Those who will have most to gain from a properly 
implemented SMS will be the companies who were previously operating at a 
relatively low level of safety management. However, even those companies who 
believed they were already managing safety at a high level have found that a whole 
range of improvements have been possible – which raises their own level of safety 
even higher. An operations manager in a shipping company shared his reflections on 
this very issue: 
 
ISM has different meaning for different people. We use ISM in an 
enhanced form to manage our entire operation, i.e. it is the way we work 
and relates to all aspects of operations not only safety & the protection of 
the environment. For us it is successful. Many companies, however, 
require only the certification and do not actively use their SMS to enhance 
their management. This attitude will change with time and therefore in the 
longer view the ISM Code will contribute to a better managed and more 
professional ship management industry. Many operate at a higher level 
already but ISM will drag the base level higher. In summary we are better 
off with ISM than without it. 
 
There were companies who were clearly trying to move forward but were 
encountering obstacles such as reported by the following ship manager: 
 
…after 5 years of ISM I feel our system is growing top heavy, mainly due 
to complying with requests from auditors – we are about to conduct a 
major review to stop the tail wagging the dog… 
 
It is very important to always remember that the SMS is intended to be a dynamic 
process which is constantly evolving. It should be ready and capable of change should 
change be needed to improve the efficiency of the system. 
 
Others reported situations that were not so encouraging and in some cases reflected 
almost a sense of hopelessness – such as this Cypriot ship operator: 
 
…unfortunately it has created a heavy burden of paperwork to all people 
ashore and the Captains aboard the vessels (specially the small ships with 
limited crew) without significant change to the safety and environmental 
protection… 
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It would appear that many ship operators and seafarers have found themselves in very 
similar dilemmas. Often the conclusion reached is that the ISM Code is flawed and 
that all the paperwork and inefficiencies associated with it are the fault of the Code. As 
has been explained elsewhere, the Code does not call for vast amounts of paperwork to 
be generated. These problems are often associated with a poorly structured and badly 
implemented  SMS – particularly those which are completely alien to the particular 
company  which had been bought off the shelf. Ship operators and seafarers who are 
facing such problems should take a long hard look at their SMS – if they still conclude 
that the SMS they have is a good and efficient system but still the staff they have 
cannot adequately manage the system then they probably do have a serious manning 
problem. That problem is probably acute and in need of urgent corrective action before 
it leads to a serious accident. The response may well be that the ship operator believes 
that he  cannot afford to employ any more staff. The author sympathises with that 
dilemma but would suggest that the cost will be very small compared with the 
alternative. In this regard the case studies in Chapter 7 should be read carefully – 
particularly the Eurasian Dream. In addition to losing the right to rely on any of the 
Hague Visby defences on account of having an ineffective SMS, ship operators may  
find that insurers start using similar tests and refuse to pay claims in appropriate cases.
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3 Participants in the Survey 
 
This chapter will examine who was approached and invited to participate in the 
survey and who did actually participate. It will attempt to describe a profile of the 
respondents – which will show that they represent a very wide cross section of the 
international shipping and related industries and professions. 
As was explained in the introductory chapter the questionnaires were designed to 
include three categories of participants: 
 
i) Masters and other seafarers (blue) 
ii) Ship operators (green) 
iii) Other stakeholders (red) 
 
We will consider each group in turn but in the later chapters of this book we will 
compare and contrast the responses from the different category groups.  Specific 
details of individuals, ships or companies were not asked for and, although in some 
cases these details were given, it was decided to maintain total anonymity throughout 
the survey. The general view was that personal details such as names were not a 
significant factor in the investigation. However, it is conceded that it would have been 
useful to compare and contrast the views of the sea staff and the shore staff in the 
same company. This was possible in a few instances. In general terms, as will be seen, 
there do appear to be quite significant differences of perceptions regarding ISM 
implementation between those working ashore compared with those on board ship. 
However, it will also become apparent that there are significant differences of 
perception between different individual experiences. 
3.1 Masters and Seafarers 
 
Completed questionnaires from Masters and other seafarers started arriving very soon 
after the initial distribution with ‘Seaways’ and the NUMAST ‘Telegraph’ in April 
2001. Perhaps not unexpectedly, the majority of those early responses were from 
British Masters and senior officers either shore based or involved in the short sea 
trades or offshore supply boats. Alarm bells started to ring when those responses were 
reviewed since many were suggesting quite a negative attitude towards ISM with few 
words of support.  Indeed as the second wave of responses started to arrive from 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA a similar general pattern seemed to be 
developing – although a few individuals were starting to surface who were showing a 
much more positive attitude. 
Eventually more and more completed questionnaires were being returned from Indian, 
Filipino, Eastern European Masters and officers and a much better balance of opinions 
was starting to take shape. 
As had been expected most responses from seafarers were being received as 
completed paper copies of the questionnaire, although a significant number did 
complete the questionnaire ‘on line’ and did leave some most valuable and interesting 
comments and observations on the discussion page of the Website.  
A number of Shipowners were very supportive of the project and agreed to encourage 
the active participation of their seafarers. Typically a supply of questionnaires would 
be sent to the Master of each ship in the fleet with a request that the Master encourage 
everyone on board to complete the questionnaire. On a number of occasions the 
Master was specifically asked to encourage everyone to be frank and honest and to 
send the completed questionnaires direct to the author. The intention of course was to 
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reduce to a minimum the risk that the individual seafarers might be concerned that 
there would be ‘repercussions’ if they gave the ‘wrong’ answers and if they were seen 
by the management ashore. Other companies did not make such suggestions and the 
questionnaires were returned via the ship operator’s office - although it was 
emphasised to the Master that each officer and crew member should complete the 
questionnaire independently. A review of all questionnaires coming from the same 
ship did hold additional interest. On a number of occasions the perceptions of the 
seafarers were remarkably close to each other. Whether this reflected some level of 
‘cooperation’ between everyone on board in completing the questionnaire or 
otherwise genuinely reflected the way in which ISM was working on board that 
particular ship was difficult to judge. The participation though of those ships, and in 
particular the support from the Company ashore and the Master on board, was very 
much appreciated. 
Further bundles of questionnaires started to be returned from Nautical Colleges and 
other training academies around the world providing a most useful input from 
seafarers of nations who were perhaps outside of the initial distribution group.  
It was not always easy to determine, but on occasions it was very clear that completed 
questionnaires were being received from seafarers through the Mission to Seafarers in 
various parts of the world.  
 
Nearly 2000 completed questionnaires were received from Seafarers from at least 54 
different nations. Not unexpectedly the majority of responses were from the Masters 
and senior officers, although a significant number were received from junior officers 
and ratings. Many of those responses from junior officers and ratings contained 
extremely valuable comments and useful observations. 
 
3.1.1 Position on board – Masters and Seafarers 
The options of categories of seafarers provided were based on a very traditional style 
manning arrangement and proved adequate for the vast majority, but not all, 
respondents. 
 
For statistical purposes the categories were grouped together as follows: 
 
- Masters 
- Senior Officers – Chief Engineer, Chief Mate, Second Engineer 
- Junior Officers – Second Mate, Third Engineer. Third Mate, Junior Engineer, 
Other Officer 
- Ratings – Petty Officer, Senior Rating, Junior Rating. 
 
Seafarers who responded to ISM Survey
Masters
36%
Senior Officers
31%
Junior Officers
20%
Ratings
13%
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Initially the responses were mainly from Masters – although a significant number of 
completed questionnaires were appearing from Chief Engineers. Even by July 2001 
when a preliminary analysis of the figures was undertaken, almost exactly 50% of the 
seafarers respondents were Masters and the majority of them were from OECD 
countries. However, as time went on, more and more of the completed questionnaires 
being returned were from other ranks and other nationalities.  
Whilst the number of Masters – representing 36% of seafarer  respondents and Senior 
Officers at 31% are perhaps disproportionate to their actual numbers in relation to 
other seafarers on board, it is perfectly understandable that these ranks in command 
and responsible for the on-board implementation of the SMS were the ones most 
prompted to complete the questionnaire. 
What was very encouraging was the significant contribution from more junior officers 
and ratings. It is certainly correct to state that the SMS directly involves everyone on 
board – rarely though has the author seen or heard any views expressed by these 
categories of seafarers on ISM implementation prior to this survey. 
 
The ability to identify the different ranks on board has allowed a comparison to be 
made of the perceptions of the ISM Code and the working SMS between those 
categories of seafarers. It was also possible to analyse and compare their responses by 
national groups. 
 
3.1.2 Nationality of Masters and seafarers 
 
When the questionnaire was first drafted it was considered a point of interest to 
include a request for the respondent to declare their nationality for two main reasons: 
Firstly, to help complete the profile of the individual seafarer, and secondly, to try and 
make an assessment with regard to ensuring that a good and fair representative sample 
of seafarers had participated in the survey. The real significance of including this 
piece of information was not to become fully apparent until well into the survey when 
one of the biggest surprises of the exercise was to manifest itself. This will be 
discussed in Chapter 6 .  
 
Responses were received from nearly 2000 seafarers from many different  
nationalities as shown in the following table: 
 
Algerian 
Australian 
Bahamas 
Bangladeshi 
Belgian 
Brazilian 
British  
Bulgarian 
Canadian 
Chinese 
Croatian 
Danish 
Dutch 
Ethiopian 
Filipino 
Finish 
French 
Georgian 
German 
Ghanaian 
Greek 
Icelandic 
Indian 
Irish 
Italian 
Jamaican 
Korean 
Kuribatan 
Latvian 
Lithuanian 
Malaysian 
Maldivian 
Maltese 
Myanmar 
New Zealand 
Norwegian 
Pakistani 
Panamanian 
Polish 
Portuguese  
Romanian 
Russian 
South African 
Spanish 
Swedish 
Swiss 
Syrian 
Taiwan 
Tanzanian 
Thai 
Turkish 
Ukrainian 
USA 
Yugoslavian 
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3.1.3 Length of service with ship operator – Masters and seafarers 
 
Up until the monumental changes which took place in the shipping industry during the 
late 1970’s and 1980’s - when ships from the traditional maritime nations were 
‘flagged out’ in considerable numbers and many of the seafarers from those nations 
were replaced by personnel from countries where labour prices were lower – it was 
quite common, particularly for officers, to not only enjoy long term company 
contracts of employment but also remain very loyal to ‘their Company’ – often 
spending their entire career at sea with the same Company. That loyalty, and 
consequent bond, between the employee and employer was very strong and tended to 
engender considerable professional pride that, in turn, contributed to a positive 
attitude towards the safe and efficient running of the ship. With the breaking of those 
bonds there were inevitable consequences as was evidenced by the enormous rise in 
accidents and claims that occurred during the middle to late 1980’s. 
It was therefore considered appropriate to try and establish through the questionnaire 
whether there might be any correlation between the length of service of the individual 
seafarer with a particular Company and their attitude towards the ISM Code and the 
working of the SMS. Interestingly a significant number of the Seafarers who 
responded were long serving staff with the same Company. 
 
 
Nationality of Seafarers
- ISM Survey Sample
Far East
15%
Africa / 
Latin 
America
1%
Eastern 
Europe
8%
Indian sub-
Continent
21%
OECD
55%
© Phil Anderson  
26/06/13 63 
Length of Service with Present Company
5 Years - 10 
Years
17%
1 Year - 5 
Years
39%
Less than 1 
Year
15%
More than 10 
Years
29%
 
 
Interestingly the seafarer respondents were almost equally split between what can 
perhaps be considered short to medium term employed - with the same company for 
up to five years and what can be considered long term – above five years. The author 
must express a pleasant surprise to find that 29% of respondents had been in the 
employment of the same company for more than 10 years. 
A relevant comment was received from the Chief Executive of a Scandinavian 
shipping company who said: 
 
…Crew from manning agents not always taking company goals and 
objectives to their heart because they will be gone after a few trips. Lack 
of ownership because short employment. Others with long term 
employment recognise however the importance of a functional SMS 
because it makes their job easier by providing routines and the basis to 
train newcomers… 
 
It became apparent that a key  factor which was always present in those companies 
where ISM had been successfully implemented was  continuity of employment – 
particularly of the seagoing staff. 
3.1.4 Type of ship – Masters and seafarers 
 
It was considered important to establish through the survey what type of vessels the 
individual Seafarers were serving. Phase One of the ISM Code implementation, which 
had the final deadline of 1st July, 1998 for compliance, involved all passenger ships 
including passenger high speed craft, oil tankers, chemical tankers, gas carriers, bulk 
carriers and cargo high-speed craft of 500 gross tonnage and upwards. The deadline 
for phase two implementation was set for 1st July, 2002 when all other cargo ships and 
mobile offshore drilling units of 500 gross tonnage and upwards must comply. 
The survey took place during 2001 which would provide an opportunity of looking at 
the experiences from phase one ships and hearing views from those preparing for 
phase two implementation. In addition to establishing the type of vessel on which the 
seafarer was serving the survey also established whether the vessel held a Safety 
Management Certificate (SMC). It became apparent that many phase two ships falling 
into the category of ‘other cargo ships’ – particularly container ships, refrigerated 
cargo ships and offshore supply boats had gone through the verification and 
certification process well ahead of the 1st July, 2002 compliance deadline. 
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Type of Ship - Seafarers
General Cargo / 
Reefer / 
Container
19% Passenger / 
Ferry
11%
Other Type of 
Vessel
18%
Tanker
35%
Bulk Carrier
17%
 
Initially there was a disproportionate amount of responses from ships that fell into the 
category of  ‘Other Types of Vessel’  comprising, primarily, naval support type craft, 
survey vessels and off-shore supply type vessels. This was probably because those 
seafarers were to first to receive their questionnaires. Eventually, a much more 
balanced profile of the typical ships at sea was achieved providing the potential for a 
good representative sample of views and opinions to be obtained. 
 
3.1.5 Size of ship – Masters and seafarers 
 
In order to extend and elaborate upon the general profile of the vessels upon which the 
sample of seafarers were serving the questionnaire also allowed size and age of ship 
to be considered. 
 
Size of Ship - Seafarer
500 to 10,000 GT
38%
10,000 - 100,000 
GT
53%
Below 500 GT
2%Above 100,0007%
 
These results complement the results showing the types of ships – suggesting that the 
sample of seafarer respondents were serving onboard many different types and sizes 
of vessels – and thus providing the propensity for a good cross section of views being 
considered. 
 
3.1.6 Age of ship – Masters and seafarers 
 
To complete the profile of the ships on which the sample of seafarer participants were 
serving, the questionnaire asked about the age of the vessels. 
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Age of Vessel - Seafarer
Below 10 Years
35%
10 to 15 years
18%
15 to 20 Years
23%
Above 20 Years
24%
 
 
The profile of the ships according to age was fairly well balanced either side of the 15 
year mark. Because the SMS is primarily concerned with the human element and 
management side of the ship operation, an analysis of the significance of age of vessel 
on frequency of accidents / claims has not been undertaken in this study. 
 
 
3.1.7 Size of fleet – Masters and seafarers 
 
It was felt important to try and ensure that responses were being received from staff of 
shipping companies of different sizes. Whilst there are still a few large fleets in 
private hands – most large fleets would probably fall into three broad categories: 
 
- oil majors / liner operators 
- large third party shipmanagment companies 
- national state fleets 
 
These categories of ship operator were probably much more likely to have developed 
and implemented formalised safety management systems well ahead of any ISM 
requirements. 
Size of Fleet - Seafarers
Below10
32%
10 to 25
36%
25 to 100
25%
Above 100
7%
 
Interestingly, there were only about a third of the seafarers respondents who probably 
fell into this category. The other two thirds seemed to be sailing with the small to 
medium sized companies. This would indicate that the cross section of the sample was 
from a good variety of types of company background. 
 
3.1.8 Corporate structure – Masters and seafarers 
 
The conclusions reached based on the size of the company were reasonably well 
supported when the corporate structure itself was examined. 
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Corporate Structure - Seafarers
Private Ship 
Owner
34%
Corporate 
Ship Owner
36%
Ship Manager
23%
Demise 
Charterer
0%
Other Type of 
Ownership
7%
 
The seafarers in the ‘other type’ of ownership category would appear to be working 
primarily for national Government agencies – either in naval support type vessels or 
national fleets. 
 
 
3.1.9 Management system background – Masters and seafarers 
 
During the 1970’s and increasingly so into the 1980’s most of the oil majors started to 
implement quality management type systems. A number of the large ship 
management companies were not far behind – particularly those who were members 
of ISMA (International Ship Managers Association). These were all voluntary, or at 
least were not mandatory schemes and were often verified against ISO (International 
Standards Organisation) QA standards. 
As part of their own QA standards it was often a requirement that any ‘supplier’ or 
‘subcontractor’ would also need to be QA accredited. Accordingly, as time went on 
more and more ship-owners realised that if they were going to continue to tender for 
charters from these operators then they would have to go down the QA road. The 
author would have to express surprise though at the very high proportion of 
respondents who claimed to have had a formalised QA system ahead of ISM. 
 
Existing Q.A. System - Seafarers
Yes
89%
No / Don’t Know
11%
 
The most probable explanation is that many of the particular ship operating 
companies developed a QA system alongside their ISM systems during the run up to 
Phase I implementation. One of the implications of this though is that the individuals 
working within those companies should already have been well familiar with 
formalised, documented, management systems as well as such things as non-
conformity reporting. The indications from other parts of the survey would suggest 
that this might not be the case.  
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3.1.10 Flag of vessel – Masters and seafarers 
 
Many of the criticisms levelled at the decline in standards within the shipping industry 
start with the concept of ‘flags of convenience’ (FOC’s) or perhaps ‘open registers’. 
Certainly seafarers organisations – in particular the International Transport Workers 
Federation (ITF) – have long waged a campaign against the very idea of FOC’s 
alleging that they have allowed seafarers living, working and remuneration standards 
to be eroded. This also extends to the safety standards. A detailed Inquiry into many 
related issues was conducted by the International Commission on Shipping – under 
the Chairmanship of the Hon. Peter Morris. (Morris) 
Much valuable work has been done by organisations such as the Seafarers 
International Research Centre based at Cardiff University in an attempt to quantify the 
extent to which such claims may be valid. It would probably be fair to say that there 
most certainly are instances where particular FOC’s have lived up to the reputation 
painted of them by the ITF. However, it should also be stated that some FOC’s / Open 
Registries conduct their activities to very high professional standards.  
Within the context of this survey it was considered appropriate to try and establish 
whether the seafarers were working on board ships flying their own National flag or a 
FOC and if so whether there was any apparent connection between that fact and their 
attitude towards ISM. 
An analysis of the Flags showed a variety almost as extensive as the nationality of the 
seafarers themselves as the list below shows: 
 
 Algerian 
 Antigua and Barbuda 
 Australian 
 Austrian 
 Bahamian 
 Barbadian 
 Belgian 
 Belize 
 Brazilian 
 British 
 Brunei 
 Cambodian 
 Canadian 
 Cayman Islands 
 Chinese 
 Cypriot 
 Danish 
 Dutch / Netherlands 
 Ethiopian 
 Falkland Islands 
 Fijian 
 Finish 
 French 
 German 
 Gibraltar 
 Greek 
 Hong Kong 
 Indian 
 Indonesian 
 Iranian 
 Irish 
 Isle of Man 
 Israeli 
 Italian 
 Jamaican 
 Japanese 
 Jordanian 
 Kuwait 
 Liberian 
 Luxemburg 
 Malaysian 
 Maltese 
 Marshal Islands 
 Moroccan 
 Myanmar 
 Netherlands Antilles 
 New Zealand 
 Norwegian 
 Panamanian 
 Papua New Guinea 
 Philippines 
 Portuguese 
 Qatar 
 Russian 
 Saudi Arabia 
 Singaporean 
 South African 
 St Vincent and 
Grenadines 
 Swedish 
 Swiss 
 Thailand 
 Turkish 
 Ukrainian 
 United Arab Emirates 
 United States 
 Vanuatu 
 
 
It is not always easy to be accurate in identifying when a flag is a national flag or a 
FOC. For the purpose of the analysis undertaken here it was decided to accept the list 
of the ITF which identifies 30 countries as having so-called ‘flags of convenience’: 
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Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Aruba 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Belize 
Bermuda 
Bolivia 
Burma 
Cambodia 
Canary Islands 
Cayman Islands 
Cook Islands 
Cyprus 
Equatorial Guinea 
German 
International Ship 
Register 
Gibraltar 
Honduras 
Lebanon 
Liberia 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Marshal Islands 
Mauritius 
Netherlands 
Antilles 
Panama 
St Vincent 
Sao Tome & 
Principe 
Sri Lanka 
Tuvalu 
      Vanuatu 
 
 
Using the ITF list of so called ‘flags of convenience’ FOC’s – a comparison can 
be made of the respondents who were sailing on National flag vessels and FOC’s: 
 
 
The split by Flag
48%
52%
Flag of
Convenience
National Flag
 
This is probably not far away from the true profile of the international fleet – although 
the survey sample would indicate a slight bias towards the National flag. This was 
probably as a result of a relatively large participation by British seafarers sailing 
onboard UK registered ships. 
 
3.2 Ship Operators 
 
Within this category the survey was really looking to identify ship owners and ship 
managers rather than chartering organisations. It was looking for the company who 
had actually set up and was operating the SMS – within the context of ISM that meant 
the Company with the big ‘C’. 
Attempts to reach this category of potential respondent was threefold: 
i) Direct mail – both by post and by e-mail 
ii) Through national Shipowners Associations 
iii) Through specially targeted editorial in shipping magazines, newspapers 
and journals 
There are so many individual ship operating companies around the world that 
available resources would not allow a wholesale direct mailing approach. However, it 
was possible to identify about a hundred ship owning and ship management 
companies with a significant number of ship units in their operation and limit the 
direct mailing to those companies. There were also a number of companies with 
whom the author had already established contact and had an existing dialogue. 
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In many maritime countries with a ship owning industry – the industry has formed 
Trade Associations or Chambers of Shipping to provide a voice for itself and 
generally promote the industry as a whole. Most shipowners of any significance 
would be members of their national Association. Most of these national shipowners 
associations are themselves members of the International Chamber of Shipping and / 
or the International Shipping Federation. It was therefore possible to rationalise the 
mailing a little by sending a letter to the secretariat of each individual Association or 
Chamber, along with a supply of questionnaires, to ask for their help in distributing 
the questionnaires to their members and encouraging participation. 
There are also other, more specialised, ship operator organisations who were also 
potential sources of help with contacting ship operating companies. The largest is 
perhaps BIMCO – the Baltic and International Maritime Conference – based in 
Copenhagen. The main work of BIMCO is in drafting and regulating a whole range of 
standard shipping contracts such as charterparties, bills of lading and similar.  BIMCO 
had already been proactive in providing training and familiarisation with the ISM 
Code and had also conducted a limited survey of its own members.  BIMCO were 
extremely helpful with the research including feature articles in their own Newsletter 
to their members about the project, encouraging them to participate, as well as a direct 
link from the front page of their own website to the authors own ISM website. 
Intercargo is an organisation of ‘dry’  cargo ship operators - they also offered a lot of 
help and support and were to become directly involved at a later stage with the 
production of the ‘Seafarers Guide to ISM’ that  will be discussed later in Chapter 8. 
 
Most ship operating companies around the world would subscribe to one or more of 
the leading shipping newspapers and / or magazines – specifically Lloyds List and 
Tradewinds as far as Newspapers are concerned and Fairplay, Lloyds Ship Manager 
and Seatrade as far as magazines / periodicals are concerned. By providing the editors 
/ journalists with an interesting and maybe a little provocative or controversial 
interview or article the author could almost guarantee prominent editorial coverage 
which would reach the attention of the ship operators around the world. With the co-
operation of the editors and journalists it was also possible to include a personal 
request to ship operators to participate in the survey and provide them with the 
relevant contact details – including the Website address.  Lloyds List in particular 
were most kind and went one step further by displaying a scrolling banner on the front 
of their own website asking their readers to participate in the survey and provided a 
link direct to the ISM website.  
Through these various sources it was possible to reach a very significant proportion of 
the ship operators of the world. 
 
3.2.1 Position in the company – Ship Operators 
Within any ship operating company almost everyone will have some level of 
involvement with the ISM system – although some will be clearly much more 
involved than others. The level of involvement for individual positions within 
shipping companies may vary considerably between companies. This may be because 
of the way a particular company has established its systems but, probably, will be 
more directly dictated by the size of the company. For example in a very large oil 
major or liner operator there may be a number of individuals who devote their entire 
time to overseeing the SMS in their capacity as Designated Person (DP). In a more 
modestly sized company the Operations Manager may also double up as the safety 
manager and also deal with the insurance and claims matters. They may also be 
expected to fulfil the role of the DP. 
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It was hoped that a good cross section of views could be obtained from different 
groups of people with a variety of ship operating organisations and this seems to have 
been achieved. 
Respondents - Ship Operators
Safety Manager
29%
Others
19%Middle / Junior 
Manager
2% Technical Manager
5%
Operations 
Manager
12%
MD / CEO
10%
Other Senior 
Manager
10%
Shipowner
3%
Superintendent
10%
 
 
It is made very clear in the Preamble to the ISM Code, paragraph 6, that ‘the 
cornerstone of good safety management is commitment from the top’ – it was perhaps 
a little disappointing therefore that there were not more responses directly from the 
Shipowners / MD’s / CEO’s. Having said that, the author was in direct contact with a 
number of individuals at that very senior level and it did become very apparent that 
the cornerstone prophesy of the architects of the Code was fully borne out. 
 
It was also of relevance, perhaps, that the individuals most interested in participating 
in a survey such as this would be the DP’s. The ISM Code does not itself set out who 
exactly within the company should undertake the role as DP – only that such a person 
should have direct access to the highest levels of management. In an ideal situation 
the DP should be independent of a line management function but should have 
sufficient seniority to ensure that he / she can properly fulfil the role of DP. This 
would include ensuring that the SMS is functioning properly and that all safety 
aspects are being adequately resourced and supported.  
An analysis of the responses would indicate that two thirds of those submitting 
responses on behalf of the ship operator categories were DP’s. 
 
Designated Person
Yes
65%
No
35%
 
What is not clear though is whether, or to what extent, the DP doubles up in some 
other capacity within the ship operating company. 
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3.2.2 Nationality of respondent 
 
Not every respondent declared their nationality – although those who declined 
represented less than 10%. The nationalities represented in the sample included: 
 
 
Australian 
Bangladeshi 
Belgian 
Brazilian 
British 
Bulgarian 
Canadian 
Croatian 
Cypriot 
Danish 
Dutch 
Filipino 
Finnish 
French 
German 
Greek 
Hong Kong 
Icelandic 
Indian 
Indonesian 
Iranian 
Israeli 
Italian 
Jordanian 
Korean 
Mauritius 
Mexican 
Moroccan 
New Zealander 
Norwegian 
Pakistani 
Peruvian 
Polish 
Portuguese 
Romanian 
Russian 
Singaporean 
South African 
Spanish 
Swedish 
Swiss 
Turkish 
Ukrainian 
United States
 
 
It is important to recognise that the question asked for the nationality of the 
individual. Whilst many of the individuals were working inside their own native 
countries there were many more who had taken their expertise and were part of an 
‘ex-pat’ type labour force. In this regard compare the above list with that displayed in 
3.2.11 below. 
 
 
 
3.2.3 Length of service with company – Ship Operator 
 
Compared with the sea staff, shore based respondents tended to have been in the 
employment of the same ship operator for a much longer period of time. Indeed 43% 
claimed to have been employed by the same company for more than 10 years and 
another 25% for more than 5 years.  
 
Length of Service - Ship Operators
1 to 5 Years
24%
5 to 10 Years
25%
More than 10 Years
43%
Less than 1 Year
8%
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What is not clear from the responses is how much of that time was actually spent in 
employment ashore and how much might have been spent working in the same 
company but at sea. It has been a tradition for very many years for ex-seafarers to be 
employed within the industry ashore and, where possible, many companies have 
preferred to recruit from within their own staff.  
To some extent the issue is not necessarily relevant since the purpose of the question 
was to establish to what extent continuity of employment might be a factor in the 
attitude towards ISM and in the successful implementation of an SMS. 
 
 
3.2.4 Type of ships – Ship Operator 
 
In addition to asking which type of ship was operated - the questionnaire also asked 
the respondent to indicate the number of each type of ship operated by that company. 
The graph below is based on the percentage of the total number of ships identified. 
Types of ships - Ship Operators
Bulk Carrier
19%
Passenger / 
Ferry
31%
Tanker
27%
Other
14%Gen. Cargo / 
Container / 
Reefer
9%
 
We see a good cross section of ship types. Not surprisingly the majority are Phase I 
ships – Passenger, tankers and bulk carriers. There was also a not insignificant 
number of Phase II ships – although many of those appear to have achieved 
verification and certification early. 
 
3.2.5 Size of ships – Ship Operator 
 
The ship sizes were broken down into four broad categories – small ships, below 500 
GT, medium size ships between 500 and 10,000 GT, large ships 10,000 and 100,000 
GT and very large ships above 100,000 GT.  
Whilst there were a small number of respondents operating ships below 500 GT, most 
were operating ships in the medium to large range with a strong leaning towards ships 
between 10,000 and 100,000 GT – there were no respondents operating very large 
ships. 
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Size of ships - Ship Operators
Less than 
500 GT
13%
500 - 
10,000 GT
24%
10,000 - 
100,000 
GT
63%
 
 
The respondents therefore would appear to operate the most usual size of deep-sea 
vessel. 
 
 
3.2.6 Age of ships – Ship Operator 
 
The age profile of the vessels represented by the Ship Operators in the survey did not 
vary enormously from that of the Seafarer group – with a fairly even balance each 
side of the 15 year mark. 
Age of ships - Ship Operators
10 - 15 yrs
14%
Less than 
10 yrs
27%
15 - 20 yrs
37%
Above 20 
yrs
22%
 
 
Again this sample would seem to be quite representative of the world fleet as far as 
age is concerned. 
 
3.2.7 Size of fleet – Ship Operators 
 
A quarter of the respondents appear to work for relatively large ship owning or ship 
management companies but the vast majority were engaged with small to medium 
sized operators – operating up to 25 units. 
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Size of Fleet - Ship Operators
Above 100
1%
Below 10
43%
10 to 25
32%
25 to 100
24%
 
 
3.2.8 Corporate structure – Ship Operators 
 
From analysing the actual questionnaires it would appear that some respondents had 
difficulty ticking the correct box here since they seemed to operate both as ship 
owners in their own right as well as ship managers. What appeared to be the most 
appropriate category was chosen. However, there did appear to be a somewhat 
disproportionate number of private ship owners although bearing in mind that most of 
the fleets were in the small to medium size bracket – this is probably correct. 
Corporate Structure - Ship Operators
Demise 
Charterer
1%
Corporate 
Shipowner
25%
Ship 
Manager
34%
Private 
Shipowner
40%
 
3.2.9 Management system background – Ship Operators 
 
Interestingly there was quite a significant difference between the answers given by the 
Seafarers to those provided by the shore side staff of the ship operators when it came 
to declaring the extent to which the company had previously been involved in formal 
QA type systems. One explanation might lie in the understanding of what constitutes 
a formal QA type system. Another possible explanation is that the ships were 
subjected to QA type systems – particularly in the lead up to Phase I implementation 
compared with the office ashore who might already have been familiar with such 
systems. 
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Management system background - Ship 
Operators 
Yes
71%
No
29%
 
 
In any event, the survey still suggests that the majority of respondents from ship 
operator offices did have previous knowledge / experience of working in management 
type systems.  
 
3.2.10 Flags of vessels – Ship Operators 
 
There were surprisingly few different flags represented by the respondents: 
 
Antigua 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Brazil 
British 
Canadian 
Cyprus 
Dutch 
Greece 
Hong Kong 
India 
Italy 
Korea 
Liberia 
Malta 
Marshall Islands 
NIS 
Panama 
St. Vincent 
Sweden 
Turkey 
UAE 
United States
 
 
Again the sample was split almost equally between companies operating ships flying 
their own National flag and those using FOC’s / Open Registries 
 
Flag- Ship Operator
National 
Flag
57%
FOC
43%
 
The sample would therefore appear to represent a reasonably accurate cross section of 
the international industry as far as registry is concerned. 
 
3.2.11 Main centre of operation 
 
The other area of interest, as far as the ship operators were concerned, was where their 
centre of operation was based. This produced quite a list of different countries: 
 
Bahamas Belgium Brazil 
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Britain 
Canada  
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hong Kong 
India 
Italy 
Jordan 
Korea 
Mexico 
Monaco 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Singapore 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 
UAE 
United States
 
In terms of the number of companies from each country and represented 
within regions – the result would be as per the following graph: 
 
 
Ship Operators by Region
Middle East
3% Northern 
Europe and 
Scandinavia
45%
Far East
6%
Americas
9%
Mediteranean
37%
 
It would have to be recognised that there does seem to be a bias towards Northern 
European / Scandinavian ship operators with a significant under representation of ship 
operators from the Far East. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Other Stakeholders 
 
Because of the diversity of individuals and organisations falling within this category it 
was going to be difficult and particularly labour intensive trying to contact them. 
Whilst some might have been picked up through the Nautical Institute and other 
distributions and possibly the other media coverage – it was considered necessary to 
make personal, direct contact and to supply the correct questionnaire form. 
The ‘other stakeholders’ included a very wide range of individuals and organisations 
– some of the more significant are set out below: 
 
Flag State Administrations 
 
These are the national government departments or agencies who have the 
responsibility for ensuring that ships flying their national flag, i.e. ships registered in 
their country, comply with all the relevant rules and regulations and are issued with 
the correct certification – including ISM certification. Many of these flag States do 
not actually have sufficient infrastructure or resources to undertake their obligations 
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and responsibilities themselves and therefore they delegate to a Recognised 
Organisation (R/O) – usually the Classification Society. Their contribution therefore 
was very important to explain how they had undertaken the verification and 
certification process  and to describe the types of problems they had encountered. 
Each of the Flag State Administrations  have a delegate / representative at IMO – 
although some countries are much more active in their participation than others. 
Initially, individual / personal letters and questionnaires were sent to each of the 158 
member state delegates ‘care of’ the IMO address in London. That did not solicit 
much response and so the exercise was repeated and another full set of individual / 
personal letters with questionnaires were sent to their mailing address in their home 
counties. This did generate a more significant response but still many of the major 
Flag States did not respond. 
 
Port State Control Administrations 
 
The PSC authorities are also national government agencies / departments and  
attempts were also made to contact them in the same way as those attempting to 
solicit responses from the agencies handling the Flag State Administration duties – in 
many cases these departments were going to be one and the same or at least very 
closely related. Again, nearly 160 individual letters with questionnaires were sent.  
The Secretariat offices of each of the seven MOU’s around the world including the 
United States Coast Guard (USCG) were also contacted. 
 
Classification Societies 
 
The Classification Societies were very important potential contacts since they had at 
least three possible areas of involvement with ISM implementation: 
i) In their role as an actual Classification Society – where they would be 
attending vessels in connection with Classification matters – which would 
provide them with an opportunity to observe how the SMS was interacting 
with the maintenance and other Class issues. 
ii) In their role as Recognised Organisations acting on behalf of flag State 
Administrations 
iii) In their capacity as consultants to Companies where they provided a 
service setting up the particular SMS. 
 
There are 10 full member Societies and 2 associate members of IACS (the 
International Association of Classification Societies) and letters and questionnaires 
were sent to the Secretariat of each. In addition over 600 individual letters were sent 
to separate branch offices of different Societies around the world. There had been 
suggestions made that there might be some irregular practices taking place in certain 
Classification Societies regarding verification and certification and it was considered  
important to obtain direct individual feedback as well as the ‘party line’ which might 
come out of head office. 
 
 
 
ISM Consultants 
 
Whilst the Classification Societies almost achieved a monopoly with regard to ISM 
Consultancy as well a verification and certification as R/O’s – there were a number of 
independent ISM Consultants who did manage to break into the consultancy and R/O 
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activities. Unfortunately only about 20 such individuals and organisations were 
identified. Appropriate letters and questionnaires were sent accordingly. 
 
P&I Correspondents 
 
Whenever there is an incident onboard ship that is likely to result in a third party 
liability claim the P&I Club will probably be involved. In all the major ports, and 
most of the secondary ports, the P&I Club will have a local Correspondent – 
sometimes referred to as a Representative. The Correspondent would attend to assist 
the vessels Master on the spot to deal with the immediate problem, and ensure that the 
position of the Shipowner and P&I Club are fully protected. 
The P&I Correspondents therefore tend to be at the sharp-end of any incident that 
occurs on board – as a consequence of which they have experience of seeing many 
ships and seafarers in situations where the SMS is under close examination. They are 
therefore in an ideal situation to feed back with their experiences of ISM 
implementation. Through the author’s own contact network individual letters and 
questionnaires were sent out to nearly 500 Correspondents around the world. 
 
Surveyors and Consultants 
 
In a similar way whenever there is a H&M or P&I type incident onboard ship, and 
indeed in many other situations, surveyors or specialist consultants will be instructed 
to investigate the incident to establish causation and to evaluate the damage. As such 
these individuals, who tend to be very experienced professionals, are in an ideal 
position to observe how / if safety management systems are working or if not what the 
problems might be. Letters and questionnaires were sent to about 350 individuals and 
surveying firms around the world. 
 
Lawyers 
 
Following an incident, particularly a serious incident, it is quite likely that a lawyer 
will be instructed to take the evidence / statements, to investigate the matter to 
establish causation and prepare the case for fighting in the courts or in arbitration or to 
enter into settlement negotiations. In a similar way to the surveyors, the lawyers are 
provided with an excellent opportunity to observe how the SMS has been 
implemented and how it is, or isn’t, working. A very handy ‘International Directory of 
Shipping Lawyers’ is published in conjunction with ‘P&I International’ (Informa) and 
they kindly provided the author with an electronic version that was most useful for 
sending a large mail shot of letters with questionnaires to over 500 lawyers around the 
world. 
 
Insurers 
 
Whilst the P&I Correspondents, surveyors and lawyers may be involved at the sharp 
end of the investigation – their reports are likely to be presented to individuals within 
insurance organisations. These claims handlers, loss adjusters, managers, underwriters 
or similar are also being provided with an opportunity of observing the SMS in action 
– or maybe inaction! A P&I Claims handler may have many hundreds of claim files 
which he / she is dealing with. All the P&I Clubs were contacted with a request to 
circulate copies of the questionnaire around their claims handlers. Attempts were also 
made to send letters and questionnaires to H&M and Cargo insurers. 
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Nautical College Lecturers 
 
Almost all seafarers will spend some part of their career attending a Nautical school, 
college, academy or similar institution. It occurred to the author therefore that the 
lecturers, who would invariably be ex-mariners themselves, would hear from the 
students passing through what they thought about ISM and how the implementation 
process was going on board their ships. They would also be in a position to make their 
own assessment as to whether there were any cultural shifts taking place in the 
attitude of younger seafarers towards safety. Accordingly, letters were sent to well 
over 300 training establishments around the world. 
 
Pilots 
 
In the vast majority of cases, when a large ship approaches or leaves port they will 
utilise the services of a local pilot who can advise the Master on navigational issues in 
that port or harbour. In practice the pilot would usually take the ship from the pilot 
station to its berth. It can be appreciated therefore that any one pilot would have an 
enormous and varied experience of all different types, sizes and nationalities of ship. 
More importantly they would see first hand how the Masters, officers and crew – as 
well as the machinery – work and how the SMS was operating in practice. In addition 
to a small number of individual letters, a request was submitted to the International 
Pilotage Association (IPA) asking for help to encourage their Pilot members to 
participate and share their experiences. 
 
Professional bodies and Trade Unions 
 
Whilst Nautical and Marine Engineering Professional Bodies as well as seafarers 
trade unions and similar bodies were contacted in an attempt to get the questionnaires 
to the seafarers – it was also recognised that it would be useful and interesting to have 
feedback from the administrative and managerial staff of those organisations – to 
establish their views and observations. 
 
Others 
 
There were many other individuals and groups who were also contacted with a variety 
of backgrounds - as wide ranging as ships agents to marine biologists and 
conservationists, chaplains and accident investigators. 
 
3.3.1 Who responded? – Other Stakeholders 
 
In an attempt to keep the illustrations relatively uncluttered, the various individual 
categories of respondents have been grouped together as follows: 
 
- Service providers – e.g. agents, lawyers, surveyors, consultants, shipbrokers 
etc 
- Classification societies – in all their various guises 
- Flag state Administrations 
- ISM Consultants 
- Port State Control – including the various government agencies as well as the 
secretariats of the MOU’s 
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- Educationalists – including college lecturers, academics and other training 
providers 
- Insurers 
 
Categories of Other Stakeholder Respondents
Flag State 
Administrations
10%
ISM Consultants
8%
Port State Control
8%
Educationalists
9%
Insurers
11%
Classification 
socities
20%
Service providers
34%
 
 
The actual numbers of respondents who submitted completed questionnaires was not 
great – about 460. However, this group submitted numerous detailed narrative reports 
providing considerable insight into the status of ISM implementation as seen through 
the eyes of third party observers (although it clearly some of these observers would be 
very close to the implementation process – e.g. Flag State Administrations and 
RO’s.).   
 
As a matter of interest, and for completeness sake, the respondents were also asked to 
indicate whether or not they were ex-seafarers themselves. They responded as 
follows: 
Other Stake Holders - Ex-Seafarers?
Yes
79%
No
21%
 
Perhaps not unexpectedly the majority of the Other Stake Holder category who 
responded did have a sea-going background. 
 
 
3.3.2 Geographical base of respondents – Other Stakeholders 
 
Also for completeness sake it was considered appropriate to establish where the ‘other 
stake holder’ were based which would perhaps help identify any possible parochial 
bias which might exist. In fact they came from far and wide: 
 
 
Australia 
Belgium 
Brazil 
Britain 
Canada 
Chile 
Colombia 
Croatia 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
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Greece 
Hong Kong 
India 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Russia 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sweden 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Turkey 
UAE 
United States 
 
3.4 Survey participants – data and information 
 
There is an enormous amount of data in the database from the completed 
questionnaires received from the three main categories of respondents. This is of 
considerable importance but the full potential of this data will not be realised within 
the scope of this review. There will be an almost limitless number of permutations of 
queries which can be run on the relational data base. Within the scope of this survey a 
focus had to be maintained on key areas and a restriction had to be placed on the 
issues considered. It is vital that others who will make good use of it are given the 
necessary access. There is also a unique catalogue of detailed comments, 
observations, reflections and experiences received from nearly 800 individuals which 
provide an invaluable insight into ISM implementation which again cannot be fully 
utilised within this review but others who have the resources to explore related issues 
must make use of that data for the benefit of the shipping industry and in particular 
those who go to sea. 
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4 ISM Implementation 
 
What do we mean when we talk about compliance with ISM? This may appear, at 
first sight, a very simple and straightforward question – it actually turns out to be 
extremely complicated. We could talk in terms of a process of verification leading to 
certification. Once the ship operator is issued with a Document of Compliance (DOC) 
and the ship with a Safety Management Certificate (SMC) we could say that that 
Company and that ship are ISM compliant. The problem is that there is no one, 
universally accepted, set of standards against which all systems are measured.  
The author’s view is that the procedures manuals and even the DOC and SMC 
represent no more than 20% of what is needed to comply with ISM and, at best, 
provide only a suggestion that the Company and ship have successfully implemented 
a Safety Management System (SMS). Only once the written procedures and the SMS 
have become a dynamic, living part of the way things are done will ISM 
implementation have been fully achieved. What will be necessary to reach such an 
achievement should not be underestimated. It will take a lot of time, a lot of hard 
work and a lot of personal commitment by all involved. The end result however 
promises rich rewards. 
 
4.1 The SMC’s and DOC’s 
 
The government of the state whose flag the ship is entitled to fly – the 
‘Administration’ – is responsible for verifying compliance with the requirements of 
the ISM Code and for issuing the appropriate certificates. The requirements are set out 
in the new ‘Part B – Certification and Verification’ of the Code which has been 
significantly expanded in its scope following amendments in December 2000 by 
resolution MSC.104(73) – which entered into force on 1 July 2002. Section 13 deals 
with ‘Certification and Periodical Verification: 
 
PART B – CERTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION 
 
13 CERTIFICATION AND PERIODICAL VERIFICATION  
 
13.1 The ship should be operated by a Company which is issued a Document of 
Compliance or with an Interim Document of Compliance in accordance with 
paragraph 14.1, relevant to that ship. 
 
13.2 The Document of Compliance should be issued by the Administration, by an 
organisation recognised by the Administration or, at the request of the 
Administration, by another Contracting Government to the Convention to 
any Company complying with the requirements of this Code for a period 
specified by the Administration which should not exceed five years. Such a 
document should be accepted as evidence that the Company is capable of 
complying with the requirements of this Code. 
 
13.3 The Document of Compliance is only valid for the ship types explicitly 
indicated in the document. Such indication should be based on the types of 
ships on which the initial verification was based. Other ship types should 
only be added after verification of the Company’s capability to comply with 
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the requirements of this Code applicable to such ship types. In this context, 
ship types are those referred to in regulation IX/1 of the Convention.   
 
13.4 The validity of a Document of Compliance should be subject to annual 
verification by the Administration or by an organisation recognised by the 
Administration or, at the request of the Administration, by another 
Contracting Government within three months before or after the anniversary 
date.  
 
13.5 The Document of Compliance should be withdrawn by the Administration 
or, at its request, by the Contracting Government which issued the Document 
when the annual verification required in paragraph 13.4 is not requested or if 
there is evidence of major non-conformities with this Code.  
 
13.5.1 All associated Safety Management Certificates and / or Interim Safety 
Management Certificates should also be withdrawn if the Document of 
Compliance is withdrawn. 
 
13.6 A copy of the Document of Compliance should be placed on board in order 
that the master of the ship, if so requested, may produce it for verification by 
the Administration or by an organisation recognised by the Administration or 
for the purposes of the control referred to in regulation IX/6.2 of the 
Convention. The copy of the Document is not required to be authenticated or 
certified. 
 
13.7 The Safety Management Certificate should be issued to a ship for a period 
which should not exceed five years by the Administration or an organisation 
recognised by the Administration or, at the request of the Administration, by 
another Contracting Government. The Safety Management Certificate should 
be issued after verifying that the Company and its shipboard management 
operate in accordance with the approved safety management system. Such a 
Certificate should be accepted as evidence that the ship is complying with the 
requirements of this Code. 
 
13.8 The validity of the Safety Management Certificate should be subject to at 
least one intermediate verification by the Administration or an organisation 
recognised by the Administration or, at the request of the Administration, by 
another Contracting Government. If only one intermediate verification is to 
be carried out and the period of validity of the Safety Management 
Certificate is five years, it should take place between the second and third 
anniversary dates of the Safety Management Certificate. 
 
13.9 In addition to the requirements of paragraph 13.5.1, the Safety Management 
Certificate should be withdrawn by the Administration or, at the request of 
the Administration, by the Contracting Government which has issued it when 
the intermediate verification required in paragraph 13.8 is not requested or if 
there is evidence of major non-conformity with this Code. 
 
13.10 Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraphs 13.2 and 13.7, when the 
renewal verification is completed within three months before the expiry date 
of the existing Document of Compliance or Safety Management Certificate, 
the new Document of Compliance or the new Safety Management Certificate 
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should be valid from the date of completion of the renewal verification for a 
period not exceeding five years from the date of expiry of the existing 
Document of Compliance or Safety Management Certificate. 
 
13.11 When the renewal verification is completed more than three months before 
the expiry date of the existing Document of Compliance or Safety 
Management Certificate, the new Document of Compliance or the new 
Safety Management Certificate should be valid from the date of completion 
of the renewal verification for a period not exceeding five years from the date 
of completion of the renewal verification.  
 
The new Sections 14, 15 and 16 deal with ‘Interim Certification’, ‘Verification’ and 
‘Forms of Certificates’ respectively. 
The IMO originally issued a set of Guidelines on the Implementation of the ISM Code 
by Administrations by Resolution A.788(19). These Guidelines were replaced with 
Revised Guidelines, which were adopted by resolution A.913(22) in November 2001. 
This resolution revokes A.788(19) as of 1 July 2002. Some of the more significant 
issues have now been taken out of the Guidelines and incorporated into the expanded 
Section 13 plus Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the amended Code.  
 
There are therefore three bodies who might issue the DOC and SMC: 
 
• The Administration itself – i.e. the Flag State 
• An organisation recognised by the Administration – often referred to as an 
R/O (Recognised Organisation)  
• Another Contracting Government. 
 
Few Administrations would appear to have sufficient resources, expertise or possibly 
even the will to undertake their own verification and certification. The United 
Kingdom is one of the few who are undertaking these functions themselves, through 
the offices of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency.  As part of his initial research the 
author wrote to150 Flag States, care of their delegate who might attend IMO 
meetings, asking for information about their approach towards verification and 
certification – very few responses were received. Further attempts were made to 
obtain the information but still the vast majority of the Flag State Administrations did 
not provide any information.  
 
The majority of Administrations appear to have delegated the tasks of verification and 
certification to Recognised Organisations (R/O’s). Whilst there are a small number of 
Independent R/O’s, almost all of the delegation has been to the Classification 
Societies.  
As far as delegating to another Contracting Government is concerned, it would appear 
that the MCA, on behalf of the British Government, have occasionally undertaken 
such work at the request of other Governments and have, on even rarer occasions 
asked other Governments to undertake such work on board UK registered ships. 
The IMO have endeavoured to encourage flag State Administrations to face up to 
their responsibilities but with limited success. For example MSC.Circ.889 / MEPC. 
Circ.353 deals with ‘Self Assessment of Flag State Performance’ along with 
MSC.Circ.954 / MEPC.Circ.373 ‘Self Assessment of Flag State Performance: Criteria 
and Performance Indicators. It provides Administrations with guidance on measuring 
their performance and asks them to advise IMO how well they are progressing. As far 
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as can be established, the Administrations who are cause for concern do not tend to 
participate in such initiatives. 
4.1.1 Is the certification in place? 
 
This may appear to be a strange question to ask – however, it should be recalled that 
the survey was originally undertaken between the Phase I and Phase II deadline dates. 
The purpose of the question was to provide the possibility to establish whether there 
were any different perceptions between those who had already obtained their DOC’s 
and SMC’s and those who were still working towards full verification. 
In fact almost 90% of Seafarer respondents indicated that they already possessed their 
SMC on board. Only 6% admitted that they didn’t know whether or not they had such 
a certificate. Many of the Phase II ships on which respondents were serving would 
appear to have gone for verification and certification early. 
ISM Certification - SMC - Ships
Yes
87%
No
7%
Don't Know
6%
 
A little surprising from the ship operators side was that 16% of the respondents didn’t 
seem to know whether or not the Company had a valid DOC or the ships SMC’s. 
Apart from that, as would be anticipated, most Companies did hold a DOC and did 
have SMC’s for their vessels. 
ISM Certification DOC's and SMC's - Ship Operators
Yes
80%
No
4%
Don't know
16%
 
4.1.2 Who issued the Certificates? 
 
Because a significant number of the questionnaires were distributed to British 
Masters and officers through the Seaways journal and the NUMAST telegraph 
– it is probable that a disproportionate number of responses came from 
people working on board UK registered ships or ships flying affiliated flags. 
Therefore the results received may not accurately reflect the true global 
picture. 
The responses from the Masters and other Seafarers indicated that nearly two thirds of 
all the Safety Management Certificates were issued by the Classification Societies 
with nearly one third being issued by the actual Administration. 
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Who issued SMC - Ships
Flag State
30%
Classification 
Society
60%
Other 
Organisation
3%
Don't Know
7%
 
The responses from the Ship Operators, which also included the issuer of the DOC, 
mirrored very closely the results from the Masters and Seafarers with nearly two 
thirds of the documents being issued by the Classification Societies and one third by 
the actual Administrations. 
 
Who issued DOC's and SMC's - Ship Operators
Flag State
37%
Classification 
Society
61%
Other 
organisation
1%
Don't know
1%
 
Clearly the Classification Societies hold a very powerful position with regard to 
Verification and Certification of very substantial sections of the world fleet. In some 
respects this may help to introduce a level of standardisation and uniformity into the 
verification process but on the other hand some caution may be in order when so 
much power and authority is placed in so few hands. 
Other related problems, and causes of possible concern, were raised by various 
respondents.  An engineer shared his experiences: 
 
I was part of the 7 member team tasked with implementing the 
ISM code into Ferry operation between '96 and '99. We have 40 
vessels certificated and have passed our first verification audit 
from one of the leading classification societies. My concern is that 
the classifications societies are not strict enough when they note 
non-conformities. This seems a common problem in that the flag 
states, for the most part, are not up to speed and do not have their 
own auditors trained to carry out the verification audit on their 
own behalf. The classification societies do not want to be to strict 
with the hand that feeds them, and so we have created a "paper 
tiger", with no apparent claws. 
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4.2 Procedures manuals 
 
Supporting the SMS will be a set of Procedures Manuals and possibly other 
documents that should be the subject of formal document control. 
The individual company’s SMS should encompass all of the requirements of the ISM 
Code. The structure of the company’s documentation should be adapted to suit the 
company’s culture, size and the trading pattern of its ships. 
The SMS documentation should consist of both office and shipboard manuals. These 
manuals should be organised in a manner which allows all employees concerned with 
the SMS to readily refer to its relevant provisions in the satisfactory performance of 
their duties. 
The company should ensure that the relationship between the SMS and other shore 
and shipboard systems are properly understood, and that relevant references and 
interconnections are established. 
It would appear that many companies, for a variety of reasons, have ended up with 
documented procedures that maybe inappropriate and  too voluminous. 
 
The SMS documented procedures do not have to be voluminous or overly 
complicated. The ICS / ISF have provided a possible structure for an uncomplicated  
SMS documentation system (ICS / ISF Guidelines): 
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Possible structure for SMS Documentation 
 
On shore 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shipboard 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Chapter 7 we will examine, in some detail, a recent judgement handed down from 
the High Court in London relating to the vessel Eurasian Dream where the ship 
operator was very severely criticised because of the voluminous, and yet inadequate 
and inappropriate set of SMS procedures documents which they had put on board that 
ship. This actually contributed to the vessel being found to be ‘unseaworthy’ and, 
further, the carrier had failed to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy. 
 
It is not known just how many of the SMS documentation systems would fall into a 
similar category to that found on the Eurasian Dream. There would appear to be many 
that are far from adequate. A New Zealand Master gives one such example: 
Company Management Documentation 
(Main Company Manual) 
Objectives and Description of the Company’s SMS 
Including Top Management Decisions affecting 
Professional Line Managers and Employees 
 
 
 1 Office 
Management 
Documentation 
Tasks 
Descriptions 
Instructions 
Procedures 
Audit schedules etc. 
 
 
Contingency 
Plan 
(Shore based) 
Shipboard Management Documentation 
(Shipboard Manual) 
Description of Shipboard Management System 
Including directions for Ship Operations, 
Maintenance, Administration and Audit Requirements 
 
 
SOLAS 
Training 
Manual 
 
 
Safety 
Procedures 
(Safety 
Manual) 
 
 
 
Cargo 
Handling 
Procedures 
(Manual) 
 
 
Contingency 
Plan 
(Shipboard) 
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“I have recently sailed on a container ship which has had manuals 
developed entirely from ashore and it was terribly complicated to 
access information and any non-conformities to do with procedures 
documented in manuals were ignored due to the fact the author / 
DPA / safety manager could see no wrong with his work. This 
created a defeatist attitude with sea-staff to not bother to report or 
seek change.” 
 
Clearly, such a system has no value at all and is doomed to failure if the Master on 
board and his officers and crew have no confidence in the documentation. At the end 
of the day it is those very people who will need to bring the procedures alive through 
implementation – surely they are in one of the best positions to evaluate the 
effectiveness and appropriateness of the system. It is suggested that those on board 
must have their say in the design of the SMS and the implementation of corrective 
actions within the cycle of continual improvement if the system is to work. A manager 
from a ship operator’s office explained the importance his company put on this aspect: 
 
I believe the key for us in implementation was to involve sea staff as 
much as possible in preparing procedures and so on even although 
this slowed down the process it was worth the effort. 
 
Developing that sense of ‘involvement’, which in turn will lead to the sense of 
‘ownership’, has got to be worth taking the time to achieve properly. 
 
4.2.1 Who prepared / produced the procedure manuals? 
Following on from what has just been said, it is of crucial importance to consider who 
actually produced the procedures manuals. If care has not been taken in the 
production of the Manuals then it is almost certain that the SMS itself will never be 
successfully implemented. A Port State Control Inspector has taken the issue to its 
conclusion in two very short sentences: 
 
 “Very few Safety Management Manuals have been completed with 
assistance of ships staff. Most crews feel ISM unnecessary burden 
and merely a paperwork exercise.” 
 
Stories of ‘off-the-shelf’ sets of procedures manuals have abounded since the lead-up 
to phase one implementation in July 1998. So called ‘ISM consultants’ were, 
apparently, offering these ready made Safety Management Systems for sale and 
merely changed the name of the vessel on the front page of the document. 
Unfortunately many of the responses to the survey seem to confirm that such practices 
have been widespread. An Indian Master summarised his experiences in the following 
terms: 
 
“1. A major amount of benefit of the ISM system was to the 
consultants who made the manuals / drew up the ISM for the system, 
which in many cases was drawn up without any consideration to the 
type of operator (i.e. his commitment) – manuals are blindly copied 
from standard companies. Checklists are filled in just before 
inspection etc. without actually checking. 
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2. Though the advantages are obvious (i.e. only if implemented 
properly and with commitment) unfortunately it is looked upon (still) 
as a nuisance (due to the time restraints) 
3. Commercial pressure compels (there are many more people 
willing to take your job) you to do things well beyond the scope of 
the ISM.  Though on the first line in the manuals is ‘Safety will not 
be compromised due to commercial reasons’ – that is the first thing 
compromised (read as fatigue / rest hours etc.) 
 
The questionnaire therefore asked for information about who prepared or produced 
and wrote the ISM Manuals on board their ships. The available choices were 
structured to try and provide an opportunity to select from most permutations. 
 
Who Produced ISM Manuals - Seafarers
Member of Shore 
Staff
48%
Jointly Shore and 
Sea Staff
32%
Don't Know
6%
External 
Consultant
3%
Sea Staff
2%
External 
Consultant + 
Own Staff
9%
 
 
 
It would appear that well over a half of the Masters and Seafarers who responded 
believed that there was little or no involvement of the Sea-staff in the production / 
writing of the ISM procedures manuals and, presumably, in the development of the 
SMS which had been produced for their vessels. That is clearly serious cause for 
concern if true. Looking at the positive side though, one third of respondents claim 
that it was indeed a ‘team effort’ between sea staff and shore staff to develop their 
ISM Manuals and, consequently, their SMS. It is in that level of participation that the 
concept of ‘ownership’ of the system can start to take a hold. Once there is a sense of 
‘ownership’ of the system by those on board, and in the office, then the safety culture 
can take hold and, it is suggested, the full benefits can be almost guaranteed! 
 
The Ship Operators were asked to consider the same question. Interestingly the results 
were quite similar with perhaps a little greater emphasis on the thought that the bigger 
input in the development of the Manuals came from shore staff and external 
consultants rather than the involvement of the sea staff. 
Who produced ISM Manuals - Ship Operators
Shore staff
39%
Jointly shore +sea 
staff
37%
External + own 
staff
20%
Don't know
1%
External
2%
Sea staff
1%
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A comparison of views on the results of the answers to this question illustrate the 
similarities and differences of perceptions between the two groups: 
 
 
 
 
 
Who produced ISM Manuals - a comparison of views
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4.2.2 Does it really matter who produced the manuals? 
 
Not everyone would appear to agree though with the underlying idea that each 
Company should develop their own, ship specific, Safety Management Systems – 
which is one of the core ideas of the ISM Code. The Managing Director of a Greek 
ship owning company expressed his view in the following terms: 
 
“The ISM Code would be better succeed its proposal if a model 
manual with minimum requirements adopted by all parties 
concerned placed into force. The current status allows any party 
concerned to make own rules.” 
 
Of course the ISM Code, in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Preamble, makes it very clear 
that ship operators are encouraged to steer away from ‘model manuals’ and to ‘make 
their own rules’ – at least in the sense of developing their own system. Whilst the 
views of the Greek MD might be totally contrary to the clear and stated intentions of 
the ISM Code itself, it is suggested that we should not discard his thoughts out of 
hand. There appears to be a presupposition behind the ISM Code that every ship 
operating company and every ship will be able to develop a SMS in their own unique 
way and make it work for them. We should perhaps always be prepared to challenge 
any such presuppositions and consider whether that ideal situation is capable of 
being achieved in every instance. If it is not – is the only solution to force that 
company and those ships out of existence? Such thoughts should not be considered in 
any way as being defeatist – merely keeping an open mind and being prepared to 
look at all problems in a healthy and constructive way. 
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It is not just the Masters and Seafarers who have expressed concern about the dangers 
and utter folly of ‘off the shelf’ systems. A Port State Control Inspector shared the 
following observations: 
 
“Many companies (I feel) just go thru the motions, they must be 
seen to do the right thing. In many cases the ISM system is bought 
from somewhere else with no consideration to the specific ship in 
question. The result is a nightmare of papers and procedures that 
no person is able to use as it should have been. The crews are 
complaining about the mass of papers that bears no relevance to 
their daily work situation. Ashore they are probably happy, they 
have a "system" and certificates to prove it. I think that there is a 
difference between the ones audited by the Classification Societies 
and the Flag Authorities, in my opinion the latter is the better.” 
 
Clearly, in light of the Eurasian Dream decision any ship operator who does have 
such a system in place is steaming straight into very dangerous waters. The 
comments of the judge would clearly indicate that an inadequate / inappropriate set 
of procedures manuals may very well render a vessel  unseaworthy. As such the ship 
operator may lose any right to rely upon the Hague-Visby defences, for example. 
There must also be a risk that the ship operator may lose its right to limit its financial 
liability and may even lose its insurance cover. The full consequences and 
implications of an inadequate SMS should not be under-estimated.  
 
In the Eurasian Dream Judgement, which is considered in some detail in Chapter 7, 
the Judge created quite a long list of activities, all of which would no doubt be classed 
as ‘key shipboard operations’ as anticipated by Section 7 of the Code, and no doubt 
for another incident an equally long list could be produced. Clearly there is a danger 
of going over the top and trying to provide a detailed procedure for every possible and 
conceivable situation. That surely cannot be the intention since the number of 
volumes of procedures manuals would quickly be back up to double figures. A 
balance is needed to avoid the dangers highlighted in the following comments 
received from a Port State Control inspector: 
 
“The theory of ISM is excellent. Most Masters & Chief Engineers I 
interview express a frustration with the volume of record keeping 
they are required to maintain, while at the same time they state that 
ISM has definitely helped develop a more safety conscious culture 
which is good for the crews, vessels and environment. The two worst 
ISM systems are: 1) In which there is such a plethora of detail that it 
overwhelms the vessel's crew thereby creating problems, and 2) In 
which the system is so generaliized that it provides too little 
guidance for the crew and is virtually worthless. The best systems 
provide enough guidance yet do not snow under the crews with 
avalanches of forms. I regularly inspect vessels which use the ISM 
Forms but do so by rote, checking off items without really 
determining that the items have been properly addressed.” 
 
The importance of involving those on board, in particular, should never be under 
estimated. The full sense of ownership of the system will develop as a natural 
© Phil Anderson  
26/06/13 93 
consequence from direct involvement and active participation in all aspects. An 
Indian Second Engineer put forward a very useful four part formula which should 
help lead towards that feeling of ownership of the system and the development of a 
true ‘safety culture’: 
  
“Ship staff involvement should be given high priority for making 
company policies. 
Top managers on ship should be able to write each other’s reports 
in form of performance. 
Transparency of work on ship and office is of prime importance. 
Blaming attitudes should be avoided. 
 
It is very likely that some, maybe many, ship operators will have to look very 
carefully at the SMS documentation systems they currently have in place and 
recognise that perhaps they need to undertake a major overhaul. In some cases it may 
be a matter of starting again from scratch. It is strongly recommended that ship 
operators look at the development of their SMS as an investment; an opportunity to 
make their ships and their operation more efficient as well as safe. With that 
efficiency and increased level of safety will come a reduction in accidents, claims and 
other uninsured losses. It will be an exercise to plug the drains and stop all that money 
being allowed to flow away. However, to do it properly requires commitment from 
the top of the organisation and belief that it can work. Those who are going to be 
directly involved in the implementation of the SMS should be consulted and be 
involved in the design and construction stage.  
The greatest waste of money, time and other resources is to try and plough on with an 
inadequate / inappropriate SMS in the hope that nothing serious will happen and that 
there is sufficient in place to ‘pull the wool’ over the eyes of the Port State Control 
Inspectors – they are becoming more sophisticated and knowledgeable as each day 
goes by! 
4.3 The Designated Person 
 
The full significance of the role of the Designated Person (DP) is still far from clear. 
This was a new position created by the ISM Code although, apparently, the idea was 
not incorporated until fairly late in the drafting process of the Code. 
There is still much speculation about the role and legal exposure of the Designated 
Person amongst lawyers and academics but, as far as the author is aware, there have 
been no judicial decisions providing clarification of the areas of doubt. The author is 
also unaware of any prosecutions against a DP by the English Courts. 
4.3.1 The role of the Designated Person 
 
The Code defines the role of the Designated Person (DP) in section 4 where it states: 
 
4  DESIGNATED PERSON(S) 
 
To ensure the safe operation of each ship and to provide a link between the Company 
and those on board, every company, as appropriate, should designate a person ashore 
having direct access to the highest level of management.  The responsibility and 
authority of the designated person or persons should include monitoring the safety and 
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pollution-prevention aspects of the operation of each ship and ensuring that adequate 
resources and shore-based support are applied, as required. 
 
Interestingly there is no real suggestion or guidelines as to the actual qualifications or 
experience of the DP within the ISM Code itself. As the following surveyor points out 
– there does not appear, on the face of it, any specific requirements as to the DP’s 
qualifications: 
 
“There are no provisions on the ISM nor on the SOLAS and neither 
on the STCW 95 as regards to qualifications to be held by the 
Designated Person Ashore” 
Spanish Surveyor 
 
The ISM Code was incorporated into English Law through Statutory Instrument  SI  
1998 No 1561 – at Section 8 it provides some further guidance on the Designated 
Person where it states: 
 
Designated Person 
8. (1) The company shall designate a person who shall be responsible for monitoring 
the safe and efficient operation of each ship with particular regard to the safety and 
pollution prevention aspects. 
 
(2) In particular, the designated person shall – 
 
(a) take such steps as are necessary to ensure compliance with the company safety 
management system on the basis of which the Document of Compliance was 
issued; and 
(b) ensure that proper provision is made for each ship to be so manned, equipped 
and maintained that it is fit to operate in accordance with the safety 
management system and with statutory requirements. 
 
(3) The Company should ensure that the designated person – 
 
(a) is provided with sufficient authority and resources; and 
(b) has appropriate knowledge and sufficient experience of the operation of ships 
at sea and in port, to enable him to comply with (1) and (2) above. 
 
 
 
The ICS / ISF provide some further practical suggestions on the role of the DP (ICS / 
ISF Guidelines):  
“…The task of implementing and maintaining the SMS is a line management 
responsibility. Verification and monitoring activities should be carried out by a person 
independent of the responsibility for implementation. 
The designated person(s) should be suitably qualified and experienced in the safety 
and pollution control aspects of ship operations and should be fully conversant with 
the company’s safety and environmental protection policies. 
The designated person(s) should have the independence and authority to report 
deficiencies observed to the highest level of management. 
The designated person(s) should have the responsibility for organising safety audits, 
and should monitor that corrective action has been taken…” 
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A very important role, in the view of the author, and one which does not always 
appear to be fully appreciated – is as a crucial link between the office ashore and 
those on board ship (and vice versa). Whilst in many companies superintendents still 
perform an important function as a link between ship and shore – in many other 
companies that function would appear to be eroding away and in some cases almost 
non-existent. It is argued that a good ‘safety culture’ can only stem from a good 
‘company culture’. A good ‘company culture’ can only arise when there is a genuine 
feeling by everyone, both ashore and on board, that they are all singing from the same 
song sheet. To achieve that necessary culture it is crucial that there is a good and 
effective system of communication – particularly where issues of safety management 
are concerned. A good DP will be instrumental in building that bridge. 
 
4.3.2 Potential legal issues involving the role of the DP 
 
Whilst there does not appear to have been any prosecutions against a DP in the 
English Courts there would appear to be a few examples arising in other parts of the 
world. Possibly the most widely reported was the incident involving the vessel ‘Freja 
Jutlandic’. It would appear that criminal prosecutions were commenced by the US 
Federal prosecutors against the Owners, Operators, Master and DP of the vessel. The 
main allegation against the DP seemed to be that he had instructed the Master to 
conceal from the US Coast Guard some temporary and potentially hazardous hull 
repairs which had been carried out. It was further alleged that the DP had conspired 
with the Master to falsify log books and avoid expenses to maintain a safe and 
seaworthy vessel. The US Prosecutor alleged that there had been oily water discharges 
from the vessel which occurred during a number of port calls in the United States. The 
penalty facing the DP, if convicted, was up to five years imprisonment and a criminal 
fine of up to US$250,000 under each charge. 
The prosecution appears to have been frustrated for a number of reasons – partly 
because the owners and operators declared themselves bankrupt in Denmark. 
However, the principle had been well and truly established in the US that the DP is 
clearly identifiable and does have specific responsibilities for safety and pollution 
prevention. The DP is, therefore, exposed to being personally cited in both civil and 
criminal proceedings. 
 
4.3.3 Who is the DP? 
 
The survey tried to identify who had ended up assuming the role of DP. The list of 
choices was obviously not exhaustive but appears to have been adequate to catch 
almost all situations. 
The question also tested whether the seafarers really did know the identity of their 
own DP. The result indicated that only 6% of seafarers did not know the identity of 
their DP which is very encouraging. 
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Identity of Designated Person
- according to the Seafarers
Senior Executive
15%
Safety Manager
36%
Insurance / Legal 
Manager
0%
Operations Manager
16%
Other
8%
Don't Know
6%
Technical Manager / 
Superintendent
19%
 
 
In addition to asking the ‘Ship Operator’ category the same question – the opportunity 
was also taken to establish whether the respondent was indeed the DP for their 
company. It could certainly be anticipated that a questionnaire relating specifically to 
ISM implementation would tend to gravitate towards the desk of the DP and would 
tend to be of more interest to that individual. However, it was pleasing to see that the 
completed questionnaires were returned from almost equal numbers of DP’s and other 
members of management and staff from within the operator’s office. 
 
 
Designated Person 
- From Ship Operators Respondents 
Yes
56%
No
44%
 
Interestingly there was very close agreement on the identity of the DP between the 
two groups. For both Seafarers and Ship Operators there were 36% of cases where the 
DP was also the Safety Officer. There were 35% of instances from seafarers and 33% 
from ship operators where the DP was also an Operations Manager, Technical 
Manager or Superintendent i.e. line managers who probably have the task of 
implementing and maintaining the SMS. There were also a number of DP’s in very 
senior positions including the actual ship owner themself as well as MD / CEO.  
 
Identity of Designated Person - Ship Operators
Safety Manager
36%
MD / CEO
11%
Other
6%
Shipowner
3%
Don't know
0%
Middle / Junior 
Manager
2%
Operatons 
Manager
13%
Technical 
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Other Senior 
Manager
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Superintendent
11%
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Clearly the size of the company is going to have a bearing on the identity of the DP 
and what other functions that DP may perform. In a large ship management company, 
for example, there may well be a number of dedicated DP’s who do not have any 
other function or maybe incorporate safety officer. In a small two ship company 
where there might not be more than three people in total in the office then it is 
unlikely, in practice, that they can afford the luxury of a dedicated DP who would not 
have many other job functions. In an ideal world the DP should be free to devote his 
or her full time to monitoring the SMS and taking what steps might be needed to 
ensure that it is working efficiently. 
 
4.3.4 Potential difficulties for the DP 
When the ICS / ISF suggested that  “…The task of implementing and maintaining the 
SMS is a line management responsibility. Verification and monitoring activities 
should be carried out by a person independent of the responsibility for 
implementation…” they no doubt had in mind a potential conflict which might arise 
in certain companies between the technical and commercial operation of the ship and 
safety issues. This is hinted at by the following Safety Manager: 
 
“The position of D.P. should be revised to be outside the line 
management of the company, and be responsible direct to the 
highest levels of management (CEO / COO). Interference from any 
senior company management ashore, not interested in the SMS, 
reduces the effectiveness of the system.” 
British Safety Manager 
 
It is not difficult to imagine examples of the sort of situations that might arise. It may 
be that the ship has a very tight sailing schedule to maintain or an imminent cancelling 
date on the next charter to meet. The ships’ staff are not properly rested, the cargo 
compartments need cleaning and the vessel will need to proceed at full speed through 
some busy shipping lanes to reach the next port on time. Whether perceived or real - 
the Operations Manager may apply pressure to sail regardless, to meet the deadline. It 
may be that problems had been encountered with say the emergency fire pump which 
needed some new parts fitted as well as a complete overhaul. The Chief Engineer had 
submitted a report and request to the office but the Superintendent responds with 
advice that it will be included on the work schedule for the next dry-dock which is 
due the following year. 
In these situations the DP should have the authority, and be provided with the 
resources, to ensure that the safety considerations are given priority over commercial 
or other budgetary factors. Having said that, it was encouraging to note that the real 
intention and potential significance was being recognised by a number of enlightened 
managers – such as the following Operations Manager who was also the DP: 
 
“…ISM has different meaning for different people. We use ISM in 
an enhanced form to manage our entire operation, i.e. it is the way 
we work and relates to all aspects of operations not only safety & 
the protection of the environment. For us it is successful. Many 
companies, however, require only the certification and do not 
actively use their SMS to enhance their management. This attitude 
will change with time and therefore in the longer view the ISM 
Code will contribute to a better managed and more professional 
ship management industry. Many operate at a higher level already 
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but ISM will drag the base level higher. In summary we are better 
off with ISM than without it…” 
 
As time progresses and the full benefits of a properly implemented SMS are better 
understood and accepted then we should see less conflict / tension between the role 
of the DP and the activities of the line managers. 
 
 
4.4 Internal Audits 
The real purpose and meaning behind the internal audit was explained very well in the 
ICS / ISF Guide when it described the situation in the following terms: 
 
“In carrying out internal SMS audits companies measure the 
effectiveness of their own systems. Internal audits are potentially 
more important than external audits for controlling the effectiveness 
of the system, since companies stand to gain or lose more than the 
external audit bodies if the system fails. The company, its employees, 
shipmasters, officers and crews ‘own’ the safety management system 
and have direct interest in ensuring that it is effective. As a result, 
the internal SMS audit, which represents these interests, should be at 
least equal to if not exceed the thoroughness of the external audit 
process.”(ICS / ISF Guidelines) 
 
Indeed a Canadian ship operator put it very strongly – in his view: 
 
From my point of view the attitude, competence and perceived 
credibility of the Company’s internal auditors are critical to the 
whole process. They make it or break it! 
 
The requirements for undertaking internal audits are set out in Section 12 of the 
Code. The audit is a crucial part of the cycle of continual improvement to check 
whether those who are involved in implementing the SMS are actually doing what 
they say they are doing. 
 
COMPANY VERIFICATION, REVIEW AND EVALUATION 
 
12.1 The Company should carry out internal safety audits to verify whether safety 
and pollution-prevention activities comply with the SMS. 
 
12.2 The Company should periodically evaluate the efficiency of and, when 
needed, review the SMS in accordance with procedures established by the 
Company. 
 
12.3 The audits and possible corrective actions should be carried out in 
accordance with documented procedures. 
 
12.4 Personnel carrying out audits should be independent of the areas being 
audited unless this is impracticable due to the size and the nature of the 
Company. 
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12.5 The results of the audits and reviews should be brought to the attention of all 
personnel having responsibility in the area involved. 
 
12.6 The management personnel responsible for the area involved should take 
timely corrective action on deficiencies found. 
 
 
 
Something that is of crucial importance in understanding the function of the internal 
audit is that the self-regulatory principles of the ISM Code makes the role of the 
company paramount. Part IV of the ICS / ISF Guide sets out some ‘Internal Safety 
Management System Audit guidelines’. What is not at all clear from Section 12 of the 
Code is who exactly should  be conducting the internal audits on board ship. Should it 
be the seafarers working on board ship or should it be a Superintendent or similar 
from the office ashore? 
One thing it does say is that  ‘…each audit is to be carried out by personnel who, at 
the time of the audit, are independent of the area, office or shipboard department or 
activity being audited…’ (Section 12.4) The ICS / ISF Guide suggests that for the 
purpose of carrying out shipboard SMS audits, companies may find internal auditors 
from the following sources: 
 
• company managers, including safety, operations and technical managers; 
• masters, chief engineers and senior officers; and  
• third party SMS auditors 
 
It is suggested that the background of the auditor, from the above three options, can 
make an enormous amount of difference to the way in which the whole of the SMS 
functions. Before exploring the reasons why that might be – the results of the survey 
will be considered to see who in practice is conducting the internal auditing. 
 
The idea behind the ‘Company Verification, Review and Evaluation’ – and in 
particular the internal audits is to provide a means by which the Company can 
measure the effectiveness of its own systems. It has been suggested from the early 
days of ISM implementation (See for example the ISF / ICS ‘Guidelines Page 34) that 
internal SMS audits are potentially more important than external audits for controlling 
the effectiveness of the system. The important point to recognise is that it is the 
Companies who stand to gain or lose more than the external audit bodies if the system 
fails. The suggestion is therefore that the Company, its employees, Masters, Officers 
and Crew should develop and recognise an ‘ownership’ of the Safety Management 
System. In this way they will understand and appreciate that they have a direct interest 
in ensuring that it is effective.  
 
4.4.1 Who conducts internal audits? 
 
This question proved to be a little more difficult to answer than was first anticipated 
when the questionnaire was originally drafted. A significant number of both seafarers 
and shore-based staff appear to have found the idea of the seafarers actually 
conducting their own internal audits to be quite strange. Indeed it transpired from the 
survey that most internal audits are at least controlled if not actually conducted by 
staff from the office ashore. 
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Who conducts internal audits
 - seafarers
Company 
Auditors
30%
The Master
6%
Departmental 
Heads
6%
Other 
Departmental 
Staff
3%
Superintedents
22%
Don't Know
5%
No Internal Audits
1%
Combination of 
two or more of 
these
27%
 
 
The responses from the Ship Operators shore based staff mirrored the Seafarers 
account of the situation very closely. 
 
Who conducts internal audits - Ship Operator
Company Auditors
29%
Departmental heads
5%
Other department staff
5%
Superintendents
22%
Master
4%
No audits
1%
Combination
33%
Don't know
1%
 
 
The author would have to admit to being quite surprised that the internal auditing was 
so closely controlled from the office ashore rather than allowing the Master and those 
on board to conduct this most important function. 
 
An interesting observation was made by Captain Mike Shuker in a paper he presented 
at the INMAREST Conference in May 2002 when he drew attention to a list of issues 
which he suggests are not adequately provided for in the ISM Code itself: 
 
• Who should carry out these internal audits 
• The frequency of the internal audits 
• Who is responsible for overseeing the internal audits 
• Who allocates the non conformities raised during internal audits for corrective 
action 
• Who verifies the corrective action plan 
• How corrective actions are verified. (Shuker) 
 
No doubt some would argue that the ISM Code expects each Company to decide itself 
how such matters are dealt with in that particular Company and that these items will 
be dealt with quite differently by different Companies. 
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In practice there would appear to be some serious concerns being expressed about the 
way that auditing techniques are being developed. A Chief Officer put it quite simply 
in the following terms: 
 
The paper mountain generated – where will it stop! 
During audits, auditors seem only interested in correctly completed 
forms and certificates. Very rarely checking any of the physical systems. 
  
In addition to the company’s own ‘internal auditors’ – there may be many more third 
party auditors attending on board. They may be representing flag State Administration 
/ Recognised Organisation,  Port State Control, Charterers and many  other categories. 
The operations manager from one shipping company seems to hold some very strong 
views about these auditors and the ISM Code: 
 
…The ISM Code has only created a new industry or profession of ISM 
Auditors who are, more often than not, arrogant. They stride into the 
owners or managers office once a year for annual audits asking 
incompetent questions to persons who have been working for decades in 
the profession… 
 
Certainly the auditor should not adopt an arrogant attitude and it is unfortunate that 
this ship operator had encountered such a bad experience.  An auditor who is doing 
his / her job properly will be acting as a facilitator and helper to the company and the 
findings used in a positive way within the cycle of continual improvement. 
 
4.5 A ‘no-blame culture 
 
The idea of a ‘no-blame’ culture is seen by many as a crucial factor that needs to be 
developed if the fruits of the ISM system is to reach full maturity. It is amongst the 
most difficult of all aspects of ISM implementation to achieve. In some ways it seems 
to run contrary to our natural human instincts and the culture we have been brought up 
in. If we do something wrong we expect to be punished. As children at home, or at 
school perhaps, if we kicked our football through a glass window we could predict, 
with a fair degree of certainty, what the consequences would be if we were caught. If 
no-one had seen the incident and there was nothing to link us to ‘the crime’ – and if 
we thought we could get away with it – we may look the other way and pretend we 
knew nothing about it. It is a matter of self-preservation. A ‘no-blame’ culture would 
take us beyond the punishment factor – although that does not mean diminishing the 
responsibility factor – we would still be expected to pay for the replacement window 
(or at least make a contribution towards it). The ‘no-blame’ culture would anticipate 
the incident being used as a learning opportunity. Why did the window get broken? 
What could be done to prevent a recurrence? What would be the consequences of 
making changes to avoid a recurrence – i.e. it forms part of a risk management 
exercise. If we were not provided with that learning opportunity then we continue to 
have broken windows. 
Most people have been so conditioned by the ‘blame culture’ they really have 
difficulty even believing that anything else could possibly work. In addition, even if 
they did move into such a culture could they be certain that their superiors, who 
perhaps had the control of their careers and jobs in their hands, were also fully 
committed to that ‘no-blame culture’. These fears were echoed by Stuart Witherington 
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of the MAIB in a paper he presented at the IMAREST Conference in May 2002 when 
he said: 
 
‘…society’s blame culture instils into managers and seafarers a fear of 
blame and criminalisation. It encourages mistrust, preventing them 
from being open and honest, by covering up mistakes when things have 
gone wrong. Further, it can give a sense of anxiety to individuals who 
think that by taking personal responsibility, they may be held 
responsible for an accident simply by following the dictates of the ISM 
Code…’ (Witherington) 
 
Of the limited number of Safety Management Systems which the author has seen 
which are working very well – they will invariably be a long way down the road of 
having developed a ‘no-blame’ culture. From the authors own first hand experience a 
no-blame culture is quite rare and takes a long time to cultivate. It was quite a surprise 
therefore to review the findings of the survey when a majority of respondents, both 
Seafarers and Ship Operators office staff said that their companies really did operate a 
no-blame culture. 
Does the Company operate a 'no-blame' culture? - 
Seafarers perception
Don't know
3%
Yes
57%
Partially
13%
No
27%
 
 
 
 
Do you operate a 'no-blame' culture? - Ship 
Operators
Partially
4%
Don't know
14%
No
21%
Yes
61%
 
 
In fact the results from this question, and the next relating to the ‘safety culture’ were 
very difficult to reconcile with other answers provided for example in the sections 
dealing with reporting accidents, hazardous occurrences and near misses as well as 
many of the narrative comments generally. 
Interestingly, the questionnaire not only asked the Ship Operators whether they 
believed that they operated a ‘no-blame’ culture but also asked them to try and predict 
how their seafarers might answer that question i.e. do the seafarers believe that the 
company really does operate a no-blame culture. The following graph shows how the 
Ship Operators responded to that one: 
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Do your seafarers believe you operate a 'no-
blame' culture?
Partially
12%
No
37%
Don't know
14%
Yes
37%
 
The scepticism of the Ship Operators would appear to have been a little over 
pessimistic. This can be seen if we compare the actual responses from the seafarers 
alongside the perceptions of the Ship Operators.  
 
0
20
40
60
Yes Partially No Don't know
Does the Company operate a 'no-blame' culture - 
A comparison of views
Masters & Seafarers
Ship Operators view
 
These differences of perceptions between what the Seafarers seem to think and what 
their managers and superintendents ashore believe they think arises on a number of 
occasions during this study. The predictability of the differences of perceptions would 
probably point towards a problem with communications. 
We will re-examine whether seafarers really are working in a ‘no-blame’ culture in 
the next chapter. 
 
4.6 A ‘safety’ culture 
Sitting side-by-side with a ‘no-blame’ culture is the idea of a ‘safety-culture’ – these 
could perhaps be thought of as the two supports for the SMS. If one support is not 
stable and strong or otherwise crumbles then the SMS cannot stand and will also 
crumble. 
In his address at the 25th annual World Maritime Day on 26th September 2002 – the 
Secretary-General of IMO also stressed the importance of this issue in the title of his 
paper: ‘Safer shipping demands a safety culture’ (IMO Briefing 26 Sept 2002). Mr 
O’Neil drew attention to the fact that rules and regulations are not in themselves 
sufficient where safety and environmental protection are concerned. “Although the 
behaviour of individuals may be influenced by a set of rules,” he said, “it is their 
attitude to the rules that really determines the culture. Do they comply because they 
want to, or because they have to? To be truly effective in achieving the goal of safer 
shipping, it is important that the shipping community as a whole should develop a 
‘want-to’ attitude.” 
It is difficult trying to explain in words what is actually meant by a ‘safety culture’ - 
perhaps the most concise description known to the author is: ‘…the raising of safety 
to the highest priority…’ An interesting definition has been provided by Professor Jim 
Reason, who was possibly quoting a source from the CBI, who suggests that it is 
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‘…the way we do things around here…’ (Reason P.173) The Health and Safety 
Executive of the UK provide a somewhat more technical definition: ‘…safety culture 
of an organisation is a product of individual and group values, attitudes, competencies 
and patterns of behaviour that determine style and proficiency of the organisations 
safety programs…’ (HSE) What this means in practice is making sure, on every 
occasion, that the safety issues are considered and appropriate steps taken before 
undertaking any task or operation. If, having conducted such a ‘risk assessment’ the 
conclusion is that the task cannot be undertaken safely in the existing circumstances 
then it is not allowed to take place. Combined with the ‘no-blame’ culture – which 
would remove the pressure when taking such decisions – the probability of accidents 
occurring will be reduced considerably. If we think about how many accidents are 
caused because we ‘cut corners’ or ‘took risks’ because we believed that ‘getting the 
job done’ was more important than ‘getting the job done safely’. Often the reasons 
were because of actual or perceived pressure / threats from our superiors. For example 
a ship is operating on a tight sailing schedule – the Master and the Mates have not had 
any rest for 36 hours but the ship must sail to maintain its schedule. An assessment of 
the situation would quickly identify that the Master and Mates are tired / fatigued and 
it would pose a significant risk to allow them to navigate the ship to its next port. 
Within a ‘safety and no-blame culture’ options would be explored but if the risk was 
high then the decision to delay the sailing until the Master and Mates had been rested 
would be taken without hesitation and without fear of repercussions. Some ship 
operators, and indeed seafarers, would find such a suggestion quite unrealistic and 
quite outrageous – the answer to them is surely that if you think suffering the losses 
involved in failing to maintain a schedule will be expensive – try having an accident! 
Without doubt the development of a true safety culture, like the no-blame culture, will 
require a lot of time, effort and hard work to achieve. Many long established and 
inbuilt prejudices will need to be overcome – it really will involve a major culture 
shift. It was a further surprise to see that again a significant majority of both Seafarers 
and Ship Operators seem to believe that they do work within a safety culture:  
Do you work within a 'safety culture'? - Seafarers
No
27%
Don't know
3%
Yes
62%Partially
8%
 
 
Do you work within a 'safety culture'? - Ship 
Operators
Partially
5%
No
22%
Don't know
14%
Yes
59%
 
 
Again these answers do not seem to sit at all comfortably with other answers given 
elsewhere in the questionnaire and the narrative comments received. It is suspected 
that the respondents in answering these questions were perhaps indicating that, in their 
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view, they worked in a reasonably safe manner but does that really extend to feeling 
confident that the ship’s schedule can be interrupted if it was felt necessary to allow 
the crew to be rested? If it does then full implementation of ISM is probably closer 
than the author might suggest is the case in the Concluding Chapter of this book. 
A similar exercise was carried out with regard to asking the Ship Operators about the 
safety culture, as it was with the no-blame culture i.e. they were asked not only for 
their own views but also how they thought the Seafarers would answer that question. 
Again the Ship Operators were perhaps a little cautious and sceptical about the 
seafarers perceptions and views about a safety culture; 
Do Seafarers believe you operate a 'safety culture'?
Partially
6%
No
33%
Don't know
15% Yes
46%
 
 
Again to appreciate these perceptions in perspective it would be useful to compare 
them side by side: 
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The IMO have recently been highlighting the importance of developing similar ideas: 
 
In order to promote a no-blame culture the suggestions of the Committee to Member 
Governments was to: 
o review their regulatory and safety regime with a view to encouraging 
the reporting of near misses without fear of reprisal or punitive action; 
o urge companies operating ships under their flag not to penalise 
persons reporting near misses; and 
o urge companies operating ships under their flags to implement 
procedures by which persons should only report near misses to the 
designated person or persons and the designated person or persons 
should only pass on such reports in an anonymous form. 
            [IMO MSC/Circ.1015 ] 
 
Some of these issues relating to the development and implementation of no-blame and 
safety cultures will be considered further in subsequent Chapters. 
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4.7 Ownership of the SMS 
 
Another factor that many believe to be crucial to the possible success of an SMS is the 
idea that those who are most closely involved in its implementation should develop a 
sense of ownership of the system. This is a very strong motivational factor. 
If a ‘ready-made’ system is presented to the ship then there will be an immediate risk 
of engendering a sense of alienation, rejection and probable resentment. They will 
probably be perceived as yet another set of rules and regulations, along with a whole 
lot of paperwork, which is again being imposed on those on board. On the other hand 
if the system is devised with the active participation of those on board then it will 
engender a sense of identity and purpose. Those who will be involved in the 
implementation process will have had some say in its development. It will be ‘their’ 
system and they will, as a natural consequence, want to make it work. It has perhaps 
not yet occurred to some but the people who will benefit most from a properly 
implemented SMS will be the seafarers themselves. 
When asked whether they felt a sense of ‘ownership’ of the system the two categories 
of respondents were actually quite positive: 
 
Is there 'ownership' of the SMS - Seafarers
Partially
14%
Yes 
54%
Don't know
6%No
26%
 
             
                
Is there 'ownership' of the SMS - Ship 
Operators
No
12%
Partially
5%
Yes
67%
Don't know
16%
 
These responses also do not sit comfortably with the narrative comments received and 
other answers given elsewhere in the questionnaires. However, on the face of it, the 
perceptions of the Seafarers and the staff ashore seem to coincide quite closely as can 
be seen in the comparison below: 
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A sense of ownership of the Safety Management System can only come from an 
active participation and involvement in the system. Where there is such active 
participation then the results are clear to see. It really should come as no great surprise 
to find that when the sea staff themselves have been actively involved in the 
development of the SMS that it stands a very good chance of achieving success. The 
converse is almost certainly true. On the positive side there were some excellent 
illustrations submitted of how that sense of ownership was bearing fruit. It could not 
be expressed more clearly than the following received from an Australian Master: 
 
 “The SMS within the Company was developed by seafarers, for 
seafarers. The vessels feel a great sense of ownership because the 
procedures and work instructions, checklists etc. were all developed 
by the ships staff. This is indeed an enlightened approach and gives 
the ships officers a sense of ownership and relevance.” 
 
A great sense of pride and achievement can be gained on the road to developing that 
sense of ownership. For most companies there was actually little that was new with 
the ISM Code – they already had good safe procedures in operation within the 
company which had been developed over many years. The main difference was that 
now those good safe procedures would be written down in such a way that everyone 
in the Company could follow the same procedures in a consistent way. It is not 
difficult to empathise with those who prepared their procedures manuals in this way 
when they reflected and realised that they had been involved in developing and 
running some pretty good procedures and that now they were going to have the 
opportunity of passing on their knowledge, skills and experience to others through the 
Safety Manuals. A little of that sense of pride and achievement can be detected in the 
following report from a US Master: 
 
“Our Safe Management Plan was written by seasoned mariners who 
worked for this company by collecting processes from ships. Every 
possible process via educating officers to use flow diagrams – this 
information was consolidated and became our safe management 
system. 
I was one of those who contributed.” 
 
Not only must the ‘old hands’ feel that sense of pride and ownership – it must involve 
staff at all levels both on board ship and ashore and in every type of organisation. We 
may naturally think in terms of bulk carriers or tankers where there is a greater 
propensity for the relatively small ‘team’ who will be together perhaps for six months 
or more at a time on relatively long sea passages with relatively few port calls to co-
operate and work at developing the safety culture and the sense of ownership of the 
system. What about other craft though – maybe a fast-ferry operation – involving very 
frequent port calls with relatively very short sea passages between ports. Can an SMS 
really work on board such craft? Can any sense of ‘ownership’ of the system be 
developed? Clearly it can and one Danish Master makes the point very clearly: 
 
“The following has been my own way to succeed with the 
implementation and maintenance of ISM in a fastferry company in 
frequent service carrying more than 1,5 mio pax per annum. 
It is essential that the ISM system is designed and implemented in 
cooperation with all groups of ship/shore personnel and 
management. The staff must end up with a clear feeling and pride 
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that this is their system. They made it... 
Reporting procedures are the backbones of the system. Internal 
audits performed by inter-department staff must be scheduled for the 
full year and the schedule must be kept. The audit report must be 
published in full for everyone to learn from others mistakes. Policies 
and procedures must be reviewed in planned intervals and brush-up 
training in system management should be performed on regular 
basis.” 
 
Whatever the ship type, whatever the operation might be – the feedback received 
clearly demonstrates the need for the development of that sense of ownership of the 
system and a clear understanding of how that sense of ownership is achieved. 
Additional questions relating to the significance of ‘ownership’ will also be 
considered further in the following Chapters. 
 
 
4.8 Recruitment policy 
 
To complete a review of this section of the questionnaire – there was one further 
question that the Ship Operators were asked to answer and that related to their policy 
with regards to recruitment. This was requested to allow the author to consider 
whether there might be any connection between recruitment policy and attitudes 
towards ISM 
The results show that the majority of Ship Operator respondents were involved more 
in employing their staff directly or through their own captive manning agents rather 
than using external recruiting agents. 
 
Recruitment Policy
External manning 
agent
25%
Both
20%
Direct employment
55%
 
 
During the latter part of the 1990’s and into the new millennium many companies 
recognised the mistake that had been made in the past and realised that they again 
needed to start developing those vitally important  ‘bonds’ between employer and 
employee.  The  way in which manning agents are used in some companies can inhibit 
the possibility of such bonding taking place. 
The Ship Operators recognised that there most definitely was a correlation between 
the employer / employee relationship and a well run / safe ship. Unfortunately others 
are taking a little longer to realise this very important, fundamental, fact. Others 
recognise it but need persuading of its significance. A Mexican Chief Officer 
explained his experience in the following way: 
 
“Training on ISM is an important matter sometimes neglected by the 
company as most of the time they worried about the evidence that the 
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person went throughout the familiarisation on the subject, an easy 
exam and that’s forever…  
- no further interest on effectiveness of the system is checked or 
evaluated, only those which can be audited or required by the 
certified body (Class). 
keeping a permanent or continuous seastaff is also difficult as the 
company has officers and ratings going and coming and in this way 
you loose continuity on the purpose of maintaining a ‘safety culture’. 
- It is important that everyone considers the importance of the ISM 
Code and SMS even when the economic part plays a roll on the 
decision process.” 
 
The employers themselves also recognise the importance of continuity of 
employment and some of the implications and significance was explained by the 
following Swedish Operations Manager: 
 
“High turnover prevent SMS to work efficient. Training in basics is 
ever ongoing and never completed because it has to start all over 
again. Crews are too small to enable training on SMS, occupational 
work and do the work properly at the same time. Crew from manning 
agents not always taking company goals and objectives to their heart 
because they will be gone after a few trips. Lack of ownership 
because short employment. 
Others with long term employment recognise however the 
importance of a functional SMS because it makes their job easier by 
providing routines and the basis to train the newcomers.” 
     Swedish Operations Manager 
 
Not only is the continuity of employment issue important in itself – to provide a 
‘bond’ between employer and employee – it is also vitally important from a pragmatic 
and very practical reason, within the context of ISM, because people then have an 
opportunity of becoming familiar with one working system. Through that 
familiarisation they stand a chance of really making the SMS work – which would 
mean, at the end of the day, that ships really would get safer and seas really would 
become cleaner!  
 
It is almost inconceivable to think of any other industry where the owner of a plant, 
worth many millions of dollars, would hand over the management to individuals who 
were engaged on a ‘casual labour’ basis but that seems to be exactly what some 
people in the shipping industry did, and some continue to do. The ISM Code is, in 
many ways, a reaction to those unbelievable practices.  
 
The importance and full significance of having a clear formal policy on recruitment 
practices within the company will be made very clear when the recent court decisions 
are examined in Chapter 7. 
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5 Reporting accidents, hazardous occurrences and non-conformities 
 
The reporting of accidents has been quite a normal occurrence for many years and for 
certain accidents it has been mandatory to report. The Flag State Administration or the 
Port State may have a requirement and they may have specific forms that need to be 
completed and particular aspects that they require recording in the accident report – 
particularly if personal injuries are involved or pollution has occurred. 
Under the U.K. Regulations, Masters and Skippers of fishing boats must ensure that 
the circumstances of every accident and serious injury are examined. Under the 
Merchant Shipping and Fishing Vessel (Health and Safety at Work) Regulations 1997 
(SI 1997 No. 2962) the safety officer should conduct an investigation and the results 
must be sent to the Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents at the Marine Accident 
Investigation Branch (MAIB). Reports of accidents must be reported within 24 hours 
by telephone, fax, telex or e-mail, and reports of serious injuries must be sent to the 
MAIB within 14 days, using the quickest means possible. 
The Classification Society may also require certain accidents to be reported – 
particularly if the hull of the ship or its machinery has been damaged. The ship 
operators are likely to require accident reports – particularly if the accident is likely to 
lead to a claim either being made against them or a claim that they may need to make 
against their own insurers. Many of the accidents would be analysed although often 
the extent of the analysis and investigation would only go so far as establishing where 
legal liability might rest.  That said however, there have been a number of ship 
operators who have looked for causes of accidents as part of a process of trying to 
learn from those events and implementing some form of corrective action to prevent 
the same event happening again. 
The ISM Code does devote an entire section to reporting not only accidents but also 
hazardous occurrences and non-conformities. The requirements are set out in Sect 9: 
 
REPORTS AND ANALYSIS OF NON-CONFORMITIES, ACCIDENTS AND HAZARDOUS 
OCCURRENCES 
 
9.1 The SMS should include procedures ensuring that non-conformities, accidents and 
hazardous situations are reported to the Company, investigated and analysed with the 
objective of improving safety and pollution prevention. 
 
9.2 The Company should establish procedures for the implementation of corrective action. 
 
 
For the requirements of Section 9 to be complied with fully the author believes that 
the concepts of ‘safety culture’ and ‘no-blame culture’, which were discussed in the 
last Chapter, must have been developed to a fairly advanced stage. It is also the view 
of the author that if Section 9 is being complied with properly then there is a very 
good chance that the rest of the SMS will also be working well. Of course the 
proactive side of the SMS, utilising risk assessment tools, is very important – it is 
when the point is reached where ‘near misses’ can be comfortably and confidently 
reported, analysed and steps taken to implement corrective action that the SMS is 
clearly alive and dynamic. In 2001 IMO published a detailed paper under 
MSC/Circ.1015 ‘Reporting near misses‘ – which highlighted the importance of this 
level of reporting. 
It was Section 9 of the Code therefore which was to be the focus of the survey and 
which the author believes will provide a clear, and reasonably objective, insight into 
the current status of ISM implementation. 
© Phil Anderson  
26/06/13 111 
The survey not only attempted to establish which types of incidents were reported, 
and how many, but also the extent to which these incidents were analysed and any 
lessons learnt fed back into the system – within a cycle of continual improvement. It 
also attempted to establish whether there might be any reasons why people might be 
reluctant to report incidents. If there was then clearly such inhibitions could act as a 
brake to advancing the development of safety on board. 
An Indian Engineer put forward a very positive picture: 
 
ISM Code has drastically reduced the number of accidents, raised 
the standard of ships. Near miss reports are a valuable guideline to 
the ships personnel. ISM Code can eliminate the sub-standard ships. 
It will ensure safety of personnel, ships and cleaner seas 
 
It should also be recognised though that there is a very real possibility that both 
companies and individuals might not actually understand the basic principles of 
reporting incidents other than actual accidents. A Classification Society Auditor has 
touched upon this important issue: 
 
“Although most of the companies are doing their best to improve their safety 
and pollution prevention systems, people on board are not fully familiarised 
with reporting NCN, accidents, etc. maybe because they don’t have a clear 
idea of how to, and they feel that it represents extra admin work, which if not 
properly managed could give them more problems. 
I have also noted that there is confusion for both internal auditors and 
persons on board in distinguishing between a NCN and a technical 
deficiency. 
The most serious problem that I have seen is the lack of understanding of the 
real meaning of ‘corrective action’ normally because investigation and 
analysis of NCN is not adequately carried out, the instinct being to choose an 
‘immediate solution’ to avoid spending further time on the subject 
 
An Indian Pumpman made a very important point which is worth thinking about for 
many could perhaps learn an important lesson about investigating and analysing 
incidents: 
 
The reports of accidents on board should be made by enquiring 
about it from everybody on board and not only the heads of the 
departments. According to me this will bring out the proper picture 
of the accidents 
 
5.1 Which incidents are reported? 
 
The questionnaire adopted a position whereby it treated the incidents to be reported as 
falling into the three broad categories as stated in the heading of Section 9 of the ISM 
Code – i.e. accidents, hazardous occurrences and non-conformities. In an attempt to 
obtain an impression of the general attitude towards reporting the questionnaire asked 
the respondents to state, initially, what level of incident was reported for the three 
different categories. The respondents were given four options to identify the level of 
reporting: 
- Every incident was reported 
- Most incidents were reported 
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- Only serious incidents were reported 
- None – i.e. no reporting took place 
 
The respondents could also choose a ‘don’t know’ option. Some respondents chose 
not to identify any preference. 
 
For some individual respondents their answers may be very precise and to that extent 
objective – for example if it is the Master or Safety Officer who is completing the 
questionnaire then they should know exactly what they report. If it is some other 
member of the crew then their opinion may be based on what they have been told by 
someone else or otherwise be a perception, although given in good faith, and thus be 
subjective in nature. It is very important to realise that the responses provided by the 
‘Masters and Seafarers’ and the ‘Ship Operator’ categories should contain reasonable 
‘first hand’ answers or at least be close to the factual situation whereas the ‘Other 
Stake Holder’ category is almost certainly going to be expressing an opinion as to 
what they think the situation is. There is nothing wrong with that of course, since this 
category has the potential to adopt an impartial observer status, but it is necessary to 
keep that in mind when reviewing the graphs and considering the findings. 
 
The graphs below show the responses from the three different respondent groups to 
the three categories of incidents – the graphs are colour coded in accordance with the 
established convention. 
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Although every accident should be reported it would appear that the seafarers are 
being honest and recognise that perhaps not every accident that occurs really is 
reported. However, the vast majority claim that if not every accident then at least most 
accidents are reported. It is of concern though that over 250 seafarers indicated that 
only serious accidents were reported and 87 stated that accidents were not reported. 
Interestingly a very significant number of seafarers indicated that every or most 
hazardous occurrences and non-conformities were being reported. This is very 
important and its significance will be considered presently. 
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Which incidents reported? - Ship Operators
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The Ship Operators seemed less convinced that every accident was being reported but 
were satisfied that most were. They were even less in agreement that every hazardous 
occurrence and non-conformity was being reported when compared with the seafarers 
submissions. Whilst they indicated that most hazardous occurrences and non-
conformities were being reported they were starting to tend towards only the serious 
incidents end of the scale. 
 
Which incidents reported? - Other Stake Holders
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The Other Stake Holder category produced a very interesting perspective. It is 
important to remember that what is being reported here is the individual’s perception 
of the situation rather than being based on any factual evidence. Very few respondents 
in this category believe that every accident is reported and only about 50% of the 
remainder believe that even most of the accidents are reported. Few seem to believe 
that there is any significant reporting of either hazardous occurrences or non-
conformities. Understandably a larger number of this category registered that they did 
not know. 
 
 
It is when these findings are compared side-by-side, and expressed in percentage 
terms, that something very significant starts to appear: 
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The responses from the Seafarers and the Ship Operator groups were not too far apart 
in their perception of which incidents were being reported but the ‘Other Stake 
Holder’ category had formed a very different view all together. Why there might be 
such big differences in perception will perhaps start to become clear as we progress 
through this analytical process. 
 
Before we consider ‘how many’ incidents are reported it is perhaps worth reflecting 
upon an observation submitted by a Filipino rating on ‘which’ incidents are reported: 
 
Most officers report unpleasant incidents, occurrences or near 
misses if it’s the crew or ratings fault but indeed they are directly 
responsible. 
If it’s their own fault they just make up for it or put it in writing in 
case port authorities come on board. 
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In my own observations and experiences some vessels (including my 
present vessel) has already implemented ISM and with valid SMC 
but they don’t follow it religiously or honestly. Instead they just file it 
and make it ready for inspectors or Port Authorities. It’s only for 
formalities sake 
5.2 How many incidents are reported? 
 
The next question in the questionnaire asked the respondent to indicate how many of 
the different types of incidents were reported each year per ship. Again the degree of 
objectivity within the answer would clearly depend upon the actual knowledge of the 
individual respondent. No doubt the Master and Safety Officer and DP ashore would 
have a very accurate figure available whereas others might be guessing – although on 
the basis of their experiences on board. 
Because of the way the database had been set up it was not possible to allow 
respondents to choose a specific  number – rather they were given a choice from a 
range  of options as follows: 
- Zero 
- 1 – 10 
- 10 – 25 
- 25-50 
- More than 50 
 
And of course a ‘don’t know’ option. 
There was a considerable degree of agreement between all three groups and therefore 
individual group analysis results have not been reproduced here. Rather the 
comparative results, in percentage terms, are shown for each category of incident.  
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Approximately 80% of all respondents seemed to be in agreement that between 1 and 
10 accidents, hazardous occurrences and non-conformities were reported from each 
ship each year. There was a slight increase in the numbers of hazardous occurrences 
and non-conformities reported 
When we compare these results we can see that the numbers of accidents, hazardous 
occurrences and non-conformities were almost all falling into the 1 – 10 reported 
incidents per ship per year. 
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The indications are therefore, at least according to the Masters and Seafarers and Ship 
Operators that most / all accidents, hazardous occurrences and non-conformities are 
being reported and that there are between 1 and 10 of each type of incident being 
reported each year per ship. 
This is perhaps a good opportunity of considering the theory behind the ‘Accident 
Pyramid’. 
5.3 The accident pyramid 
 
It has been recognised for many years that there seems to be a clear relationship by 
way of a ratio between the number of major incidents, the number of minor incidents 
and the number of near-misses. Indeed it is this principle that is applied when, for 
example, the terms of insurance on a car are proposed. Usually there will be an 
‘excess’ or ‘franchise’ – typically the first £100 – which the insured will bear before 
the insurance company becomes involved. The reason is that the car insurance 
company will have conducted a risk assessment and concluded that the majority of 
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accidents tend to be small in nature – i.e. below £100 and they would prefer not to 
cover those smaller, frequent, accidents. The larger the excess the individual is 
prepared to accept – the lower will be the premium. The reduction in premium though 
is not at all linear, the curve is closer to being exponential in shape, which reflects the 
general idea of the probability of serious accidents compared to smaller type 
incidents.  
This idea has been frequently illustrated as an isosceles triangle or pyramid shape. 
There are a number of versions of the so called ‘accident pyramid’ or ‘safety 
pyramid’ – a typical example is shown in the figure below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If this pyramid or triangle theory is correct then we should expect to see significantly 
more hazardous occurrences and non-conformities than actual accidents. The survey 
results do not appear to support the theory – the numbers of accidents, hazardous 
occurrences and non-conformities all appeared to be equal. Even allowing for the fact 
that the numbers involved were a little vague i.e. somewhere between 1 and 10 – there 
still seems to be something not quite right. There are at least two possible 
explanations: 
1. the pyramid theory is wrong 
2. the ‘other stake holders’ were right and the Seafarers and Ship 
Operators were not reporting all hazardous occurrences and non-
conformities  
 
Whilst it may be the subject or some debate and disagreement as to exactly how steep 
the slope might be on any particular accident pyramid – few would challenge the 
general principle. A clear understanding of the implications of the accident pyramid 
must be understood if the full significance of reporting hazardous occurrences and 
near misses is to be fully appreciated. 
 
It is suggested that it is infinitely more cost effective and efficient to encourage near-
miss reporting and transcend the current blame culture. It is perhaps worth exploring 
therefore a little more of what is involved in near-miss reporting. 
 
1 
serious 
injury 
10 
minor injuries 
30 
property damage accidents 
600 
incidents with no injury or damage 
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5.4 Causal chains 
There are a number of theories about causation – the traditional view is that a causal 
chain can be identified whereby one event is the cause which leads to an effect and 
that effect then becomes the cause of another effect and so it goes on – cause – effect, 
cause – effect. The author believes this is too simplistic, and a somewhat misleading 
explanation – rather any major incident is the result of a whole series of multiple 
causal factors – small chains – all coming together at one particular geographical 
location at a particular point in time. The interruption of any one of these multi-causal  
events would prevent the particular incident happening when or where it did. It   may 
be that the occurrence of the major incident had only been postponed and therefore it 
is crucial to ensure that the remedial steps taken are significant in nature to reduce to a 
minimum the probability or possibility of the incident becoming an inevitability.  
 
Hazardous occurrences or near-misses, which constitute the base of the accident 
pyramid, occur much more frequently than more serious accidents. They are also 
smaller in scale, relatively simpler to analyse, and easier to resolve. Usually each 
major accident can be linked to a number of incidents that happened earlier. 
Therefore, by addressing these precursors effectively, large and expensive accidents 
may be avoided. 
 
The proposition is that if it were possible to examine and deal with the large number 
of incidents, or near incidents towards the base of the pyramid then the probability of 
occurrence of the serious incidents at the peak would be reduced considerably. The 
suggestion is that serious / major accidents do not just happen in isolation – they have 
causes which can be identified. Frequently, following a major incident, there will be 
an inquiry of one description or another – depending just how serious the incident 
was. With the benefit of hindsight it is usually possible for the investigators to identify 
a whole series of causal factors, frequently developing over a lengthy period of time, 
that eventually led to the major incident occurring.  
It has been difficult obtaining details of cost involved in the formal investigations – 
the National Audit Office were receptive, kind and helpful but did not have any 
figures. Through the offices of the MAIB it was possible to established that the cost to 
the British Government – or the British Taxpayer depending upon how you may wish 
to look at it, - of say the Derbyshire investigations up to and including the re-opening 
of the Formal Investigation are estimated as totalling between £9,000,000 and 
£10,000,000, including legal fees. The Bowbelle and Marchioness incident, including 
the current Formal Investigation, is estimated at some £6,000,000, including legal 
fees. 
The author would suggest that we do not need to wait for these major incidents to 
occur. Invariably warning signs would have been flashing up in advance of the 
incident actually happening. These warning signs are causal factors starting to 
influence events. All the causal factors have not yet come together at the same point 
in time in the same location. The causal factors are manifesting themselves as 
hazardous occurrences, near misses, non-conformities etc. We can actually explore 
and examine these causal factors by investigating and analysing them. By identifying 
and dealing with them, by  applying corrective actions they are removed from the 
equation and the major incident will be avoided. It is suggested that this has surely got 
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to be an infinitely better method of dealing with incidents than waiting for the major 
disasters to occur – with substantial loss of life or major pollution. That is why it is so 
important that near misses are identified for what they are and taken very seriously  
 
A ‘near-miss’ is an event that signals a system weakness that, if not remedied, could 
lead to significant consequences in the future. As such, a near-miss is also an 
opportunity – an opportunity to improve system structure and stability, and an 
opportunity to reduce risk exposure to potential catastrophe. (Wharton) 
If this theory is correct, therefore,  it is possible to identify and deal with the causal 
factors before the major incident occurs. It is the hazardous occurrences, near-misses 
and non-conformities which are providing the warnings and opportunities to 
implement the necessary corrective action before lives are lost, pollution occurs or 
other losses are incurred. 
 
5.5 Learning opportunities 
The concept and reason for reporting not only Accidents but also near misses and 
hazardous situations, as is required by the Code, is very clearly explained and 
brought to life by an Irish Master who reported: 
 
 All accidents / near misses / dangerous occurrences are reported so 
that all the other vessels in the fleet can maybe benefit from our 
experiences and visa versa. 
The majority of non-conformities can be dealt with on board quite 
soon and even these are promulgated throughout the fleet. 
 
Another good example of the system working as it was intended was reported by a 
Finnish Master who has clearly moved far away from the ‘blame culture’ and would 
now appear to live in a true ‘safety culture’. He describes the system in his company 
in the following terms: 
 
“In our ship, all accidents and incidents are reported. This is a 
standard procedure here and we have had no problems with that. 
We are receiving monthly, "Lessons learned" reports from accidents 
/ incidents, happened onboard our ships. These are also followed up 
very closely to avoid any further acc/inc. in the future.” 
 
To a significant degree ISM is about transparency – transparency at a number of 
different levels including reporting of hazardous situations and near misses. To 
achieve the level of transparency required it will be necessary to address the issues in 
the very way in which the SMS itself is structured and also in developing the 
confidence of personnel that they can operate without undue fear of reprisals in an 
open and transparent system. A British Master reflected the sort of general ‘feeling’ 
that is needed to start moving forward when he stated: 
 
I consider our system has promoted a more open approach to 
reporting incidents and the investigation and corrective action 
arising from such reports. 
 
There is probably a natural reluctance on the part of human beings to report 
something if there is a risk that somehow that same individual is perhaps going to be 
punished, blamed or otherwise criticised for the particular event. If the cause of 
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accidents is to be fully understood and if accidents are to be prevented before they 
happen then it is crucial that near misses and hazardous situations are reported, 
analysed and dealt with. In different parts of the industry a variety of ‘incentive’ 
schemes have been introduced to try and encourage compliance with the ISM Code or 
otherwise to develop a safety culture. 
 
Whether it be an Internal SMS Audit, or some other safety management audit by the 
ships own staff or some external body such as a Port State Control Inspector or Flag 
State / Recognised Organisation (usually a Classification Society) Auditor the 
opportunity will present itself for detecting non-conformities. The detection and 
recording of a non-conformity should not necessarily be considered as something bad 
or viewed in a negative way – it is basically providing a learning opportunity. For one 
reason or another the non-conformity is flashing a warning light that the system is not 
working as it was intended – or at least as it was defined or described in the written 
procedures. It may be that someone had misunderstood or misinterpreted the 
procedure – in which case some further training / familiarisation might be required. It 
maybe that the procedure itself was flawed in some way – in which case the corrective 
action may be to amend the procedure. It may be that an individual was deliberately 
refusing to comply and follow the procedure – in which case the individual would 
need to decide whether they would comply or otherwise they would have to face the 
consequences – which would clearly depend upon the severity of the non-compliance. 
It can be anticipated that even within the best structured SMS some problems will 
manifest themselves as non-conformities. That is fine – provided procedures are in 
place to pick up those non-conformities, to analyse them and determine why they had 
arisen and then to implement corrective action. In this way the SMS is the subject of a 
cycle of continual improvement – by a process of fine tuning the system will be 
getting better and better as time goes on. 
Of course there will be varying degrees of seriousness applied to non-conformities. 
What are being discussed here can be described as ‘minor non-conformities’ although 
they may indicate the development of a potentially serious situation if remedial action 
is not taken. 
A much more serious, and very different, situation arises when a major non-
conformity is identified. A definition is provided which will perhaps help distinguish 
this occurrence from the minor category event: 
 
• Major non-conformity means an identifiable deviation which poses a serious 
threat to personnel or ship safety or a serious risk to the environment and 
requires immediate corrective action; in addition, the lack of effective and 
systematic implementation of a requirement of the ISM Code is also 
considered as a major non-conformity.  
 
For present purposes the focus will be upon ‘minor’ non-conformities. Within the 
context of the present discussion the important point to recognise is that non-
conformities should be capable of being discovered through an audit process. Of 
course it may be possible to try and hide or disguise such non-conformities but an 
experienced auditor would probably discover irregularities which would certainly 
raise his suspicions.  
It may be that some of these non-conformities do, in themselves, represent hazardous 
situations. However, through the audit process those hazardous situation would be 
discovered and dealt with. It is suggested that the hazardous situations referred to in 
Section 9.1 of the ISM Code are events different from the non-conformities. 
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Although the ISM Code itself does not mention ‘near misses’ – this expression does 
throw some light on the type of event contemplated by the term ‘hazardous situation’. 
It is the accident which nearly happened. If things had been just slightly different – a 
few seconds in time or a few centimetres in distance – there would almost certainly 
have been an injury or some other damage or loss. A narrow escape we might say or a 
close shave is another expression which might be used. One or two examples might 
help to explain not only the nature of the ‘hazardous situation’ event but also the very 
real problem associated with reporting such events: 
 
Example 1. A seaman was assigned to paint some bulkheads on the outside of the 
accommodation. He couldn’t reach the upper part of the bulkhead and so he found a 
ladder which he leant against the bulkhead. As he started to climb the ladder the foot 
of the ladder slipped and he jumped off the second rung. He was not injured but a 
little paint was spilt.  
 
Example 2. A vessel is on passage between the third and fourth loading port – it is 
0230 hours and the second mate is alone on the bridge as the officer of the watch. The 
second mate had only managed to catch four hours sleep during the last two days 
because of rapid turn around in the load ports. He must have fallen asleep because 
when he looked up he saw another vessel crossing on his starboard bow about half a 
mile away. He immediately altered course and managed to avoid a collision. 
 
In example 1 whilst the seaman might be somewhat embarrassed at being careless and 
not following correct safety procedures – he would probably recognise the sense in 
telling the bosun or mate what had happened and ensuring that a second man was 
assigned to stand by the bottom of the ladder and / or ensure the ladder was otherwise 
secured before starting to climb or indeed whether it was safe to undertake the job – 
maybe the ship was rolling excessively. Whilst it may seem somewhat extreme to 
consider preparing a formal report for such an incident – the point is that this could 
very easily have resulted in a very serious accident or even a fatality. If that seaman 
could make the mistake then others might also make a similar mistake – better that the 
lesson be shared with as many others as possible to remind them to follow the correct 
procedures. That dissemination of information would naturally follow a report and 
analysis. That, in simple terms, is the logic and philosophy behind ‘near-miss’ 
reporting. 
Now, consider example 2. Is the second mate going to advise the Master of what has 
happened? If he did - how will the Master react? If the Master was advised and 
recognised that the second mate was suffering from fatigue, that he should not have 
been left in charge of a watch and certainly he should not have been alone on the 
bridge – is the Master going to advise the D.P. in the office ashore? If he did, how 
would the D.P. react? 
If put in the position of the second mate and asked that question - it is suggested that 
the reaction of many in the shipping industry, both shore based and seagoing, if they 
were honest would probably be that they would keep quiet about the incident if they 
thought they could keep it a secret. Clearly what is being advocated – and indeed 
required by the ISM Code is very much the opposite. The reason is not difficult to 
understand.  
If the second mate had not woken up when he did – maybe he slept for just two 
minutes longer – and maybe the second mate on the other ship was also not aware of 
the situation which was developing – the hazardous situation has possibly now 
become a major accident – possibly lives lost or personal injuries, pollution, 
explosions, serious damage to both vessels, maybe vessels sinking, damage to cargo 
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with consequent loss of time and earning capacity. In that case the facts would most 
likely come out in a formal inquiry and / or the subsequent investigations in 
anticipation of litigation or insurance claims. The fact that the second mate was 
seriously fatigued, that he was asleep and alone on the bridge would not only 
seriously prejudice the ship operators legal position but also have implications as far 
as the licence of the second mate and the Master are concerned. 
If the second mate and possibly Master and whatever other mates might be on board 
are working such long hours that they are suffering from fatigue at this level and there 
are not sufficient seamen to ensure that an additional lookout is maintained then that 
ship is not safe – indeed it is unseaworthy. There is a very serious problem on board 
which needs addressing. The near miss was a warning signal – such an incident must 
be reported immediately to the DPA and immediate steps must be taken to remedy the 
situation. It is suggested that such remedial steps would not include dismissing or 
otherwise disciplining the Master and second mate but rather provide them with the 
additional resources necessary to operate the ship safely i.e. if it was intended to 
maintain a very tight loading schedule then to put on board additional qualified mates 
sufficient to ensure that excessive hours were not worked by any one individual and 
consequently that fatigue was not allowed to take hold. Also additional seamen may 
have to be provided on board to provide adequate lookouts. Maybe some ship 
operators would argue that such ‘luxuries’ cannot be afforded in the current depressed 
market conditions – the point is to consider the cost of the alternative! 
The situation though is probably that the ‘culture of fear’ in which many seafarers 
seem to work would discourage them from reporting such an incident and take a risk 
that they might also get away with it a second time… The IMO has recognised the 
problem of the reluctance to report near misses and has issued guidelines on 
developing a ‘no-blame’ culture 
As previously discussed. 
 
Unfortunately there were a significant number of respondents who did not appear to 
have grasped the full potential value of accident or near miss reporting as a tool to 
prevent future incidents – indeed it would appear that the concept of a ‘safety culture’ 
may still be a little way off. For example the following passenger ferry Master seems 
to have resigned himself to the fact that accidents are inevitable when you carry large 
numbers of people and only very serious incidents could warrant the time needed to 
report: 
 
 “The figure of 50+ accidents must be viewed in the context of 
number of souls carried which on average is 3900 every day. 
Obviously we don’t expect to have corrective action reports for every 
minor sprain, burn and cut.” 
 
Of course sympathy must be expressed at the potential dilemma of such a Master who 
will not have unlimited resources available. However, for so long as the attitude is 
maintained that these ‘minor’ accidents will continue to happen there is a very good 
chance that they will! Once the cause of these incidents is investigated and analysed 
then there should be a very real chance that something can be done to prevent further 
incidents in the future. Admittedly it will involve additional work initially but once 
the problem is addressed and corrective action put in place then the actual work 
involved will reduce to a ‘maintenance’ programme. 
Another example of the nature of misunderstandings with regard to the purpose of 
near miss reporting can be seen from the following report from a British Master: 
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 “Not all agreed on what constitutes a ‘near miss’ e.g. chipping 
hammer head coming loose and dropping off its shaft was 
promulgated as a near miss!” 
 
Presumably from the way the Master has expressed his comment that he thinks such 
an incident is not a ‘near-miss’ and he seems to be suggesting that those who think 
otherwise have perhaps made a mockery of the idea. The author would suggest that 
such an incident is a very good example of a near-miss. The heads of chipping 
hammers should not come off! Presumably on the occasion referred to by the Master 
no-one was injured – but it could very easily have been otherwise. Surely, if the head 
of one chipping hammer has ‘dropped off’ it would make sense, good seamanship 
sense, to check the other chipping hammers to make sure none of the others are lose. 
To make sure that any defective hammers are repaired and made safe and to remind 
the Bosun, or whoever has the responsibility for such equipment, to make sure that 
they are regularly checked and that everyone who uses them are reminded to check 
them. Is that not just good seamanship – the way we had always worked? All ISM is 
doing is putting a little more structure into that good practice. If anyone was tempted 
to still say that we do not need such a formalised system then surely the facts of this 
case speak for themselves – that the informal system had, for whatever reasons, 
failed – the chipping hammer had not been maintained properly such that the head 
had been allowed to get to such a state that it ‘dropped off’. Fortunately, on that 
occasion no-one was injured – but a very important lesson can be learnt. 
Another observation was received from an Australian Second Engineer who was also 
not convinced that near miss reporting could serve any useful purpose. He had the 
following to say: 
 
“I work in the E/R compartment where you use hand tools (drills, 
grinders etc), machine tools (drill press – lathe etc), welding 
machines. 
The vessel moves – therefore we must move as well as carry out our 
work whilst using machinery. This in itself is dangerous – you can 
reduce the risk – i.e. correct PPE – ensure balanced – job held firm 
but still it is a hazardous work environment at all times. So to fill out 
near misses is pointless.” 
 
Of course the Engine Room of a ship is, potentially, a very dangerous environment 
and when the ship is at sea the risk of accidents happening is increased even further. 
The hazards will always be there and proactive steps must be taken to reduce the risk 
of those hazards developing into actual injuries, pollution or damage incidents. 
However, an analysis of almost all the many accidents that do still occur in many 
engine rooms on board ships every year will prove that the incidents should not have 
happened – they could have been prevented if certain steps had been taken. Since 
there are so many actual injuries and other incidents every year it is suggested that 
there will be many more hazardous situations and near misses. If these are looked for, 
identified, reported, analysed and corrective action taken then they will help 
considerably to reduce the number of actual injuries and losses. The fact that someone 
works in a potentially hazardous environment should make them even more acutely 
aware of the risk of accidents happening and they should be looking even more 
closely for learning opportunities to reduce the risk. Reporting hazardous situations 
and near misses provides an excellent opportunity to do this in a structured way and 
also pass on such experiences to others who might also benefit. 
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Yet another example of this ‘misunderstanding’ which seems to exist in some quarters 
with regard to the nature and value of reporting and the potential for learning lessons  
was submitted by a British Master: 
 
 “A lot of the C.A.R.’s (Corrective Action Reports) that stem from 
internal company ISM audits, are petty and serve no purpose to 
anyone. 
C.A.R.’s are raised against ratings who remain completely baffled by 
the whole exercise.” 
 
Surely if the ratings ‘remain baffled by the whole exercise’ then something has gone 
very seriously wrong with the SMS in that company and in particular with 
communications, training and familiarisation on board that ship. The Master, and the 
Company he works for, really do need to look very carefully at the way their SMS 
has been set up, the provision of training and familiarisation – in particular how the 
SMS works, the crews involvement in its operation and the importance of reporting 
as a cycle of continuous improvement. They may well find, as other Masters and 
Companies have done already, that by providing leadership and involving the crew in 
the SMS they can make a very valuable and positive contribution.  
 
The study from the Wharton School Risk Management Centre suggests that, apart 
from safety improvement through the identification and resolution of isolated near 
misses, there are additional safety and management benefits of a near-miss program. 
They say in their Phase 1 report of December 2000 that these include: 
 
1. Delegation of Safety Responsibility: An effective near-miss program shifts 
the task of identifying unsafe operations from Environmental, Health and 
Safety (EHS) management, to a much larger workforce that has intimate 
contact with process operations / equipment. By harnessing this larger 
workforce a greater number of safety related issues can be identified and 
addressed. 
 
2. Increased Safety Awareness: By making individuals more safety conscious 
and by shifting the responsibility of identification of near-misses, unsafe 
conditions and behaviour to each individual in the work force, both on and off 
the job – safety of employees can be improved significantly. 
 
3. Creation of an Information Pool: The collection and analysis of near-miss 
data can reduce accident frequency through a) identification of similar incident 
precursors at other facilities, and b) pattern observation and trend analysis over 
time. Such a knowledge base would reduce risk exposure in ongoing 
operations as well as future equipment, process and plant design. (Wharton) 
 
A fundamental question arises in this consideration of ‘near-miss’ reporting: ‘Is the 
identification of a large number of near-misses indicative of a safe or unsafe on 
board operation?’ Could it be validly claimed that the identification of a large 
number of near-misses suggests that there are serious problems and the whole system 
is unsafe? Alternatively, could it be argued that because there have been many near-
misses  identified that the seafarers have become more safety conscious. The point 
being that good safety management actively looks for near-misses, and accidents are 
resolved proactively before they occur. 
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If there is doubt about what the correct answer might be, consider the following three 
hypothetical  scenarios and suggest which ship is most probably operating an 
efficient, functioning SMS: 
 
1. Ship A appears to be operating close to perfection. It has submitted no reports 
of any accidents, hazardous occurrences, near-misses or other non-
conformities for the whole year. 
 
2. Ship B has submitted two separate accident reports – one in respect of an 
injury to a seaman who slipped on some spilt oil, broke his leg and was sent 
ashore to hospital, the second report related to a pilot who fell off the pilot 
ladder – seriously injuring his back. There were no other reports of any other 
accidents, hazardous occurrences, near-misses or other non-conformities. 
 
3. Ship C has submitted reports in respect of one major incident, five quite 
serious incidents, 21 minor incidents and 53 hazardous occurrences and near-
misses. 
 
It is certainly possible for a ship to operate without experiencing major, serious 
incidents and possibly to reduce minor accidents to small numbers but it is very 
unlikely indeed, so long as human beings are involved in the operation of ships, that 
there would be no hazardous occurrences or near-misses of one description or other 
during the year.  The results from Ship A therefore should probably be viewed with 
considerable suspicion – probably suggesting that there is no effective reporting 
procedure on board that ship at all and thus a malfunctioning or non-existent SMS.  
It would be very difficult for a ship not to report such serious accidents which resulted 
in a seaman being hospitalised and a pilot falling off a ladder. In addition to any 
mandatory requirement to report such incidents they are also very likely to result in 
claims against the Shipowner who in turn would look to his P&I Club for the 
appropriate insurance coverage. However, it is very difficult to imagine that if a ship 
had experienced two serious accidents, as in the case of Ship B, that these would have 
occurred in total isolation. It is much more likely that such incidents were indicative 
of  inadequate  considerations of safety issues and, consequently, one would expect to 
find many smaller incidents, hazardous occurrences and near-misses. Since none were 
reported one would be led towards a conclusion that reporting is limited to an absolute 
minimum and that there is probably little or no effective safety management on board. 
Is Ship C a floating disaster area? All those incidents and near-misses surely there is a 
serious problem on board this ship with regard to managing safety? Not so – Ship C  
is demonstrating a typical pattern of a vessel where the Safety Management System is 
starting to work. Provided all the incidents are the subject of proper corrective actions, 
the SMS is then fine tuned to prevent future recurrence then it can be expected that 
the numbers of accidents, hazardous occurrences and near-misses will reduce over 
time. 
 
It became apparent from a number of responses that reports are being sent in from 
vessels of accidents, hazardous situations and non-conformities but with no feedback 
from the office. Clearly nothing could be more demotivating and demoralising.  A 
British Master described the way things work in his company: 
 
As far as the ISM Code affects my operation the whole thing is a 
complete ‘paper chase’ and is seen as such by most of us. 
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We send in non-conformities and hazardous reports and 
invariably they are not answered, its all a question of cost. 
The audits are regularly done but most of the time its only going 
through the motions.” 
 
The audit system should of course be working both ways and in such a case there 
should be serious non-conformities raised against the office ashore and the DP. 
 
A similar alarming situation was reported by a Chief Engineer: 
 
We work for ‘An Oil Major’ (the name was supplied) and our working 
period is 90 days on 45 off – I feel that more safety aspects should be 
looked at as to who the person is who gives some of these lead audit 
people their certificates and try and make them into gods – which they 
think they are. At present time I should say 985 of our company employees 
are sick of having ISM Code rammed down our throats and nothing is 
done when we make reports. All our safety audit people do is cover their 
own backsides when it suits them. 
 
Clearly if that Chief Engineer was typical of the other 984 employees referred to then 
it is highly unlikely that there could be any semblance of a working SMS in place 
and it may well be in order to raise non-conformities against the auditors, the 
Company and the DP. 
 
For others there is clearly an understanding of what the ISM Code is trying to achieve 
but they are having difficulties balancing all the different pressures upon them. A 
typical example is the following Chief Officer: 
 
“There are a number of minor accidents and some near misses that 
go unreported. Many of these occur during the busiest times on a 
vessel and often the paperwork involved will take a very low priority 
over the pile of paperwork for operational and other requirements. In 
my opinion, although ISM is a good thing and has been embraced 
practically by my company it will always suffer from a ‘extra 
paperwork’ stigma being attached to it.” 
 
Clearly the dilemma is one of managing time and priorities. If the incident was not too 
serious and the drafting of the report can wait until the ship is at sea then that is 
clearly a reasonable thing to do. However, if the incident was serious, or potentially 
serious, then commercial pressures may have to come second place. It is going to take 
some time before the shipping industry will accept that approach. Many readers may 
well have found themselves sat in an airplane on the runway ready to take off only to 
be advised that a problem has been identified and the plane is going no-where until 
the problem is solved or the potential problem removed. Whilst it may be felt to be 
something of an inconvenience - few passengers on that plane would seriously 
suggest that the pilot should ignore the warning light, or whatever the problem might 
be, take a risk and fly the plane regardless! The question which arises is why, in the 
shipping industry are we prepared to tolerate taking a ship to sea when there is a 
known or perceived problem? Can commercial pressure ever be such that we are 
prepared to take those risks? No doubt many would say we have always taken those 
risks in the shipping industry – and that is part of our culture. Perhaps those same 
people should reflect a little though and consider to what extent those attitudes 
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actually led to the need for the ISM Code being developed in the first place. Perhaps 
some of the readers will recall the facts surrounding the Herald of Free Enerprise 
disaster in 1987? 
 
5.6 A cycle of continual improvement 
 
Within Section 9 of the ISM Code is a concept of continually improving the SMS and 
the management of safety generally on board by learning lessons from accidents or 
events which nearly became accidents. Of course all would agree that it would be 
infinitely preferable to prevent accidents happening in the first place – but if they do 
occur – or something serious nearly happens – then these events should be recognised 
as learning opportunities – opportunities to ‘fine tune’ the SMS such that corrective 
actions can be implemented to reduce to a minimum the possibility of such an event 
arising again. By this process of fine-tuning, and checking that the corrective action 
has worked, the SMS will lead progressively to a safer and safer ship operation. This 
concept can be illustrated in a simple flow diagram; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             
                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ISM Code does allow each individual Company and ship to develop systems 
which best suits their own requirements and the way they do things – therefore it is 
not possible to lay down one reporting system that would apply to every single 
Company and ship in the world. However, the above, rather simple flow diagram, 
illustrates the basic processes which should be followed. 
If an incident occurs on board – it doesn’t need to be an actual accident – it could be a 
hazardous occurrence or near miss or some other warning bell ringing or a non-
conformity that has been identified – then it should be noted and reported on board. 
Clearly the way in which things develop from there will depend upon the actual 
nature and circumstances of the particular incident. If it is a major incident then 
professional lawyers and investigators will probably arrive on board very quickly and 
will assist the Master with the investigation and collection of evidence. However, if 
we assume, for the purpose of this explanation, that the incident was relatively minor 
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– we can follow the various steps of the process around the cycle of continual 
improvement.  
 
1. The incident occurs – the most appropriate steps are taken to deal with the 
incident 
2. The incident is reported / noted  
3. An onboard investigation is undertaken to establish the causal factors 
4. The causal factors which led to the incident are analysed 
5. An immediate, temporary, corrective action plan is instigated 
6. A report of the incident is submitted to the Company – probably the DP 
7. The report is analysed by the Company 
8. Feedback to the ship is provided by way of a corrective action report (CAR) – 
this may confirm or amend the suggested corrective action – this may involve 
amending the formal procedures 
9. If appropriate, advice is circulated to the rest of the fleet in order that as many 
as possible can take advantage of the learning opportunity and ensure that 
there is not a recurrence 
10. The new procedure is formally implemented and communicated to all 
concerned 
11. After an agreed period of time, the relevant part of the system is audited to 
ensure that the corrective action has had the desired effect. 
 
The questionnaire went on to establish to what extent the cycle was being completed 
i.e. that, following reports being submitted to the Company, corrective action reports 
were being sent back to the ships and an audit process was in place to check that the 
corrective actions were having the desired effect. 
 
 
5.6.1 Corrective action reports 
 
From the responses received from both the Seafarers and even more so from the Ship 
Operators the majority of reports submitted in respect of accidents, hazardous 
occurrences and non-conformities do appear to generate corrective action reports – i.e. 
feedback from the office to the ship. An analysis of the Seafarers responses is shown 
in the following three graphs: 
Are Corrective Action Reports returned? - Accidents  - 
Seafarers
Never
3%
Sometimes
38%
Always
54%
Don't know
5%
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Are corrective action reports given? Hazardous 
occurrences
Never
4%
Sometimes
39%
Always
51%
Don’t know
6%
 
 
Are corrective action reports given? Non-conformities
Never
3% Sometimes
29%
Always
57%
Don’t know
11%
 
 
Both the Seafarers and the Ship Operator groups reported unequivocally that 
corrective action reports are always returned although approximately one third 
suggested the softer ‘sometimes’. The positive significance of this can perhaps be 
seen more clearly when we group the three types of incidents together – as in the 
following two graphs: 
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However, the ‘Other Stake Holder’ group was again in serious disagreement with the 
other two groups of respondents. The perception of the other stakeholder group 
seemed to be that only a quarter believed that corrective action reports were always 
returned. They were prepared to give some benefit of the doubt though and allow for 
the possibility that corrective action reports might be returned sometimes. 
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If the Seafarers and Ship Operators are being accurate in their recording that most 
reported incidents are the subject of a corrective action report then the ISM 
implementation process would appear to be at a much more advanced stage than had 
first appeared to be the case. 
An important aspect of ‘corrective actions’ is that they can be considered as the 
lessons to be learnt from a particular incident. Certainly feedback must be provided to 
the ship where the incident actually occurred but the lesson to be learnt should be 
shared around the fleet and even further if possible. This will then allow maximum 
advantage to be taken from an unfortunate incident. However, some caution does need 
to be taken as was pointed out by a Ghanaian Chief Officer: 
 
The ISM Code is being implemented by crews / officers from 
varied backgrounds:- hence internal auditors should not expect 
same occurrences on sister ships. A corrective action on one ship 
should only serve as a guideline when attempting to bring it to the 
notice of personnel on a sister ship. 
 
As with everything else related to ISM – common sense must always prevail. 
Everyone must keep their brains in gear – ISM does not expect people to stop 
thinking and become some type of robot. One of the aims is to introduce consistency 
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but if something is clearly not applicable or relevant to a particular vessel then it is 
difficult to understand how it could possibly contribute to improving safety. If there 
is a conflict then the matter should be taken up with the DP. 
 
 
5.6.2 Follow up audits 
 
The survey results with regard to the follow up audits were quite similar to the 
corrective action reports – except that there was a slightly less positive response with 
less respondents saying always, more saying sometimes and more saying never. 
 
Follow up Audits - Accidents - Seafarers
Never
9%
Sometimes
43%
Always
36%
Don't know
12%
 
Follow up Audits - Hazardous Occurrences
Never
10%
Always
32%
Don’t know
14%
Sometimes
44%
 
 
 
Follow up Audit - Non-conformity
Never
8%
Sometimes
43%
Always
40%
Don’t know
9%
 
When the comparative pictures are looked at we still see a very similar pattern with 
general confirmation from the Seafarers and Ship Operators that about a third are 
conducting follow up audits on all corrective actions and another half on some of 
them. The other stakeholder group continue to remains sceptical. 
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Do follow up audits take place? Seafarers
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It is quite possible that the importance and full significance of conducting follow up 
audits, within the context of the cycle of continual improvement, is not fully 
appreciated by some. An Australian ISM Consultant explained the importance very 
well: 
 
 Since the focus of the questionnaire appears to be NCs, accidents and 
incidents, I can honestly say that this is one area that few companies 
manage very well, and thus fail to reap the full benefits of the reporting 
system. Most have good reporting systems, but fail to follow up 
effectively. Firstly, there is a lack of timely corrective action and, 
secondly, there is usually no follow-up to see that the proposed 
corrective action was effective. Near miss reporting and follow-up is 
almost non-existant, even in the best of companies, usually due to lack of 
understanding and training.  
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On the basis of the answers given in the survey, at least as far as the Master and 
Seafarer and Ship Operator groups are concerned, everything would appear to be 
proceeding very well indeed towards compliance with Section 9. Consequently, if the 
author is correct in his assessment of the significance of Section 9 as an indicator of 
general compliance, then the majority of the respondents are well on their way to full 
compliance with the ISM Code including the implementation of no-blame safety 
cultures. 
Perhaps it would be helpful to recap where we have got to so far, as far as Master and 
Seafarers and Ship Operators are concerned: 
 
- The majority believe that the company they work for promotes a ‘no-
blame’ culture 
- the majority believe that they work within a ‘safety culture’ 
- the majority believe that they have ‘ownership’ of their SMS 
- almost all accidents, hazardous occurrences and non-conformities are 
being reported 
- corrective action reports are being returned for almost all of the 
reported incidents 
- most of the corrective actions are being implemented 
 
Many of these results / conclusions would appear to be contradicted by the answers 
given to the next series of questions in the questionnaire. They also appear to be 
contradicted by the narrative comments included at the end of the questionnaire. 
5.7 Reluctance to report 
 
It is certainly possible that objections and criticisms could be raised against the series 
of questions in the questionnaire asking whether there was any reluctance to report 
incidents. In one sense they were perhaps ‘leading’ questions but on the other they 
provided an opportunity for the respondent to ‘open up’ a little in his / her responses 
to the questionnaire. The responses provided to this series are extremely interesting 
and enlightening and perhaps start to provide a clearer insight into the current status 
of peoples real attitudes towards ISM and the implementation of the SMS as well as 
such things as the so-called ‘no-blame’ and ‘safety’ cultures. 
The questions were almost rhetorical in nature suggesting that if there was any 
reluctance to report incidents then why should that be. The questions provided ten 
possible reasons, plus an open box in which the respondent could insert a different 
reason. The respondents were invited to identify up to three factors, giving order of 
priority, of reasons why they were reluctant to report. The respondents were given the 
option to state that there was no reluctance to report. That option would clearly render 
the question academic as far as that respondent was concerned. However, what 
actually happened was that most of the respondents who had previously indicated that 
they were reporting everything and doing all that they were supposed to be doing 
actually identified a whole range of reasons why they were reluctant to report.  
 
Recalling the answers provided to the earlier questions about ‘no blame’ and ‘safety’ 
cultures, one could reasonably have expected that there would be no reluctance at all 
to reporting accidents at least and probably little reluctance to reporting hazardous 
occurrences and non-conformities. That did not turn out to be the case though. Rather 
surprisingly nearly 50% of the Seafarer respondents said that they were reluctant to 
report even accidents.  
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The way the Ship Operator’s version of the questionnaire was phrased meant that they 
were giving their view as to whether or not they thought there might be any reluctance 
on the part of the Seafarers to report. It was even more surprising therefore to find that 
almost two thirds believed that the Seafarers would be reluctant to report accidents. 
When it came to analysing how the Other Stakeholder category responded it was 
really quite staggering that only 10% believed that Seafarers would not be reluctant to 
report accidents. 
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Almost identical results were received with regard to reluctance to report hazardous 
occurrences and non-conformities. 
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The way the questionnaire had been structured was intended to give the respondent a 
choice – either they ticked the box to say there was no reluctance to report or to tick 
up to three boxes to indicate why there might be a reluctance to report. What 
happened though was that many respondents ticked the box indicating that there was 
no reluctance to report but then went on to tick further boxes indicating why there was 
a reluctance to report! Clearly this was contradictory in itself but it also seemed to 
contradict the earlier answers in which the majority of respondents seemed quite clear 
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that they believed their companies operated a ‘no-blame’ culture and they were 
working within a safety culture. 
It is important that we keep these apparent contradictions in mind as we now explore 
some of the reasons why the Seafarers are reluctant to report accidents as well as 
hazardous occurrences and non-conformities and why the Ship Operators and Other 
Stakeholders believe the Seafarers have reluctance. 
5.7.1 Reluctance to report – Views of Masters and Seafarers 
 
In answer to the earlier question almost all Seafarers said that they reported most if 
not every accident. It really is of considerable concern therefore that the same 
Seafarer respondents should now declare that they are reluctant to report accidents. 
An analysis of the reasons given, and the scale of the concern, is shown in the graph 
below which also includes a comparison with the reasons why there might be 
reluctance to report hazardous occurrences and non-conformities: 
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In the questionnaire the respondents who were to state that they were reluctant to 
report were asked to list up to three reasons and to rank them in order of priority. 
When constructing the graph the method used for determining a figure to use was to 
consider a first priority choice as 3 units, a second priority choice as 2 units and a 
third priority choice as 1 unit. In this way a total number of units were allocated to 
each option and the graphs drawn to show those units as a percentage of the whole. 
 
It becomes clear from the analysis of the results that Seafarers fear the repercussions 
that reporting might bring to their employment and career prospects. This could 
perhaps have been expected as far as reporting hazardous occurrences are concerned 
i.e. where one might be admitting a mistake which otherwise no-one else would have 
known about but being frightened of reporting actual accidents is worrying. Of course 
if there really was a ‘no-blame’ culture in existence then reporting all incidents would 
be seen as a rewarding experience, a learning opportunity, and any fears should have 
been dispelled long ago. It is important however to analyse the figures as they are and 
try and make sense of them. 
Certainly the fear of losing one’s job or seeing career prospects damaged did show up 
to be a significant factor. An ISM Consultant who did have first hand experience 
identified a particular incident of which he was aware: 
 
…Look at for instance chemical tankers in main ports such as 
Rotterdam. The officers and crew are working around the clock. 
This is well known to the Company, but if the crew complain they get 
no answer or ‘…if they don’t like the Company they could find other 
work…’ 
It will take many, many years yet before we will get a good safety 
system implemented in full.” 
 
A Filipino Master set out the problem and the solution very clearly: 
 
In my opinion, to maximise reporting of hazardous occurrences / near 
misses and to eliminate reluctance to report same, there must be some 
ways or provisions in the code that will guarantee the person who report 
that he / she will have no fear of adverse effect on career prospects, 
losing job and any prosecution. 
 
Another report from a Chief Mate proposed a similar need – this time based upon 
thoroughly disgraceful behaviour by his employers. He shared the following 
experience: 
 
There needs to be a guarantee of protection for the mariner who is 
reporting or is part of a situation being reported. 
I received a Letter of Warning from the USCG for not following SMS 
procedures over a Near Miss incident where it was discussed in a 
safety meeting and then a crewmember anonymously passed the 
information to the USCG. A piece of atmospheric test equipment 
failed, and personnel entered 10 feet into a cargo tank not fit for 
entry. These experienced people didn't like the "smell" of the tank 
and immediately exited with no harm. I got no support or backup 
from the company when I was approached by the USCG and the 
only way the details of this incident would have been available to 
anyone other than those involved was directly through the "near 
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miss" discussion. I was demoted to 2nd Mate and never promoted 
back up to my C/M position of 10 years. I am now sailing C/M with 
another company with another horrible SMS.” 
 
Hopefully the Chief Mate will eventually find an employer who is equally enlightened 
and will reward that type of reporting which would very likely help to save lives. 
 
The author had anticipated, when he first constructed the questionnaire, that if there 
was any reluctance to report then it would probably be because people were afraid of 
either civil or criminal prosecutions being commenced and the reports being used as 
evidence against the originators. That proved not to be the case at all – the survey 
results indicate that, amongst the Seafarers, there is little worry about such 
prosecutions and certainly that was not a concern that would make them reluctant to 
report the incidents. 
The extent to which Masters in particular, but also other Seafarers, are exposed to 
criminal sanctions – fines and even lengthy jail sentences for a wide variety of 
‘offences’ including non-compliance with the ISM Code is really quite staggering. 
A Chinese Master felt that the Master needed reassurance that he could rely upon the 
provisions of IMO Resolution A.433(XI) – Decisions of the shipmaster with regard to 
maritime safety and marine environmental protection – which was intended to give 
the master legal protection if he did carry out his job as he was supposed to do. He 
also felt that the ship operators should be exposed to criminal sanctions. His 
conclusion, and solution are set out below: 
 
After 3 years, my conclusion is ISM has not improved our marine 
safety and environment protection but makes worst.  
My suggestions:  
(1) national legislation should reinforce the spirit of IMO Resolution 
A.443(XI) which protects the masters from unjustifiable dismissal; 
(2) the shipowners, operators and DPs should be criminally liable 
for their wilful default or gross negligence, and the penalty should 
include imprisonment; 
(3) DP shall not be the same person as operation manager or 
anyone involve in the daily operating activities.” 
 
Under UK legislation the Ship Operator, DP as well as the Master and anyone else 
involved in the operation of the SMS may be exposed to a wide range of criminal 
sanctions for various offences relating to the implementation of the ISM Code. 
 
 
Personal pride was recorded as a factor that made some Seafarers reluctant to report 
incidents. This is a very human response – no one likes to admit that they fouled up, 
or nearly fouled up. However,  it is this factor which needs to be overcome in the ‘no-
blame’ culture such that these incidents are examined as learning opportunities. The 
most important issue is not to find someone to blame but rather to find out what went 
wrong and establish what needs to be done to prevent a recurrence. 
In some companies, in an attempt to encourage the development of a ‘safety culture’ 
they offer their staff various bonuses or other incentives by way of a reward if they 
reduce the number of accidents on board. This is a good idea in principle but could, in 
some cases, encourage the Seafarers to stop reporting incidents for fear that they 
would lose their bonuses. The accidents had not stopped – they had just been brushed 
under the carpet, so to speak. The fear of losing the accident free bonus was therefore 
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included as a possible option that the seafarers could choose. In fact it turned out to be 
not an issue at all. Very few respondents indicated any concern with accident free 
bonuses. 
Similar schemes involve actually rewarding seafarers if they do send in reports. Such 
a scheme was described by the safety manager in a Greek shipping company: 
 
I believe that one useful ‘tool’ in fighting the fear of reporting should be 
the adoption of an ethical reward scheme to ships that come forward 
with their non-conforming conditions and we should then focus on how to 
rectify this (possible) unsafe condition instead of focussing solely on the 
correctness and exactness that the reporting form has been completed. 
 
This is possibly an excellent scheme which could work very well and achieve the 
desired results if managed properly. However, again it could be open to abuse in that 
spurious or irrelevant reports were being submitted – purely to obtain the reward. 
 
One of the most significant issues was the feeling that there just was not enough time 
to report. This was repeatedly the subject of detailed narrative comments received 
from a wide range of respondents. The inference being that if there was more time, 
and perhaps other resources, then reporting would be undertaken without reluctance. 
There seems to be an understanding amongst many in the industry that the SMS has to 
be paper-based. The author has had difficulty understanding this perception since 
there is no reason in his mind why the SMS should not be run on an electronic system 
– provided it was adequately backed up and the people who needed to access the 
system could actually do so. Indeed there are some very good software programs 
available on the market that would allow a ship operator to construct their own 
electronic SMS.  Such an electronic system could help reduce the labour intensive 
paper based reporting considerably.  A marine surveyor raised this very issue : 
 
The ISM code has made management ashore more aware of the 
operational difficulties encountered on board their vessel(s), however, 
many masters complain about the volume of reading material and 
paperwork.  Many ship's officers allege the company they work for 
operates no differently from before ISM was implemented.  This Surveyor 
believes the ISM code has had a beneficial effect, but the expectations 
may have been greater than the actual result.  What may be more useful, 
than the volumes of ISM code books found in the shipboard offices, 
would be a software package, employing computers now found on board, 
which would simplify the mandated reporting procedures, supplemented 
by an Email protocol.  Most ocean-going vessels now employ this 
technology and it should be used more effectively in a real time reporting 
environment. 
 
On a related matter, the author is aware of a very exciting project which is at an 
advanced stage of development which allows the use of portable and fixed electronic 
recording devices to be used to directly enter data into a PC and thus creates records 
and reports almost automatically. The officer must still physically undertake the 
checks  but uses the electronic device as a labour saving tool. As of September 2002 
the system is undergoing trials onboard a number of different types of ships. 
 
Of considerable concern was a relativelysignificant number of Masters and Seafarers 
who stated that they were reluctant to report because, basically, they considered 
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reporting to be a waste of time. There were two other groups, although smaller, who 
seemed to believe that the company did not want or expect reports and that there was 
no interest from the company. 
There are probably a number of very different reasons why certain seafarers felt so 
negative – maybe it was a reflection of their own attitudes towards ISM – maybe it 
was a true reflection of a company who really didn’t care.  Clearly these groups are 
probably going to be the most difficult to persuade that reporting is a very important 
factor in the successful management of safety.  
 
A reason for reluctance to report incidents which had not occurred to the author at the 
time of constructing the questionnaires was racial intimidation. It is not known how 
extensive this problem might be but the following was received from a Filipino rating 
working on board a Norwegian Flagged vessel: 
 
There is a reluctance report anything because of racial discrimination – there 
is no democracy. 
 
Certainly there were many comments received from ‘OECD’ Masters and 
Officers which could be easily interpreted as having racist undertones. Reports 
from the Seafarers International Research Centre based at Cardiff University try to 
suggest that racism is not an issue at sea since the industry has achieved a 
relatively high level of ‘globalisation’ – from reading some of the reports 
submitted the author very much doubts that that reflects the actual situation 
(SIRC).  
 
5.7.2 Reluctance to report – Perceptions of Ship Operators 
 
Let us now consider how the Ship Operators responded to these issues. Remember 
that the Ship Operators are not expressing their own views about any reluctance they 
may have about reporting – rather they are giving their views on why they think the 
Masters and Seafarers might be reluctant to report.  In some respects they were quite 
accurate and mirrored the Seafarers responses quite closely – in other respects they 
differed quite significantly:  
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Certainly they recognised that the seafarers did have concerns about possible 
repercussions with regard to their employment and career prospects. Somewhat 
surprisingly the Ship Operators agreed that the Masters and Seafarers would not be 
unduly concerned about possible civil or criminal prosecutions. 
One of the big differences came with ‘personal pride’ – the Ship Operators perceived 
this to be a major factor that might inhibit reporting. The perception of inadequate 
time and other resources was also identified by the operators. The other major factor 
where the Ship Operators seemed to be even more pessimistic than the seafarers 
themselves was the idea that reporting was just a waste of time. 
Interestingly, the Ship Operator respondents appear to have considered it almost 
inconceivable that the seafarer could think that the company did not want or expect 
reports and certainly not entertain the idea that the company might not be at all 
interested in any reporting procedure. 
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5.7.3 Reluctance to report – Perceptions of Other Stakeholders 
 
Finally, let us consider the perceptions of the Other Stakeholder group – what 
reluctance did they think might inhibit the Master and seafarers from reporting? 
Interestingly many of their perceptions coincided quite closely with the Masters and 
Seafarers own reservations. Perhaps the biggest difference was that the other 
stakeholder group put a much greater significance on the potential effect on 
employment and career prospects: 
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Generally the responses received from the Masters and Seafarers in this section 
seemed to be much more in line with many of the narrative comments that were 
received compared with the answers which had been provided earlier about the levels 
of reporting and ideas of no-blame and safety cultures. 
In an attempt to encourage seafarers to report incidents the Port State Control Officers 
are actively discouraged from close examination of the actual contents of reports 
according to Captain Olle Wadmark of the Swedish Maritime Administration who 
said: 
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‘…the PSCO may ask for records of the most recent internal audits … (but) 
should not normally scrutinise the content of any non-conformity notes…’ 
(Wadmark) 
 
The situation does appear to be that there is reluctance to report – to a large extent 
this reluctance is understandable but if ISM is to work then we need to find ways of 
overcoming that reluctance. The issue was stated very well by a superintendent from 
a shipping company who said: 
 
…The old concept of keeping everything wrapped up onboard and hidden 
from eyes outside needs to disappear and a system of transparency needs to 
be developed where crew are in a position where they can, with confidence 
and pride, report anything on board that is not right and needs to be 
rectified… 
 
A related observation was submitted by an ISM Consultant: 
 
 
Seafarers will only enter fully into the reporting process if they are 
confident of having the backing of Management, including timely replies 
and evidence of action taken. While many feel insecure in their jobs and are 
faced with either apathy or sometimes antagonism from Management, one 
can understand their reluctance. 
 
 
Without a doubt this whole issue of transparency within a no-blame / safety culture is 
likely to be difficult for some companies and individuals but, eventually, it will 
become ‘…the way we do things round here…’ 
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6 Is ISM Working? 
 
At the very end of the questionnaire for Masters and Seafarers and Ship Operators, 
and near the beginning of the version of the questionnaire for Other Stakeholders – 
two big questions were posed: 
 
“In your view have the number of accidents, hazardous occurrences and non-
conformities reduced since implementation of the ISM Code?” 
 
“In your view has the ISM Code achieved its objectives?” 
 
The way these questions were phrased was in anticipation of a somewhat subjective 
answer reflecting more a general perception by the individual respondent rather than 
any objective / factual statement. In hindsight the questions may, in certain 
circumstances, be flawed. This applies to the first question in particular.  
The question possibly includes a presupposition that there were occurrences of 
accidents, hazardous occurrences and non-conformities prior to ISM implementation 
that could be reduced. The second question may make an assumption that it was 
possible to make ships safer.  A number of respondents seemed to hold the view that 
they were already operating close to perfection as far as safety was concerned and 
therefore the ISM Code had nothing to offer. The author can only apologise to those 
who were at that extreme end of perfection but, working on an assumption that there 
were probably not too many companies or ships operating without any accidents, not  
having a single hazardous occurrence and with such perfect systems in place that non-
conformities just did not happen – then it is possible that the questions are not too 
seriously flawed. 
The questions were really intended to solicit a view from the individual respondents 
as to whether, in their experience, the ISM Code was starting to work / starting to 
manifest measurable results. 
When the first wave of questionnaires started to be returned, mainly the blue ‘Master 
and Seafarer’ forms, there was an unexpected and worrying surprise. The answers to 
these two ‘big’ questions and the narrative comments that were included suggested a 
very negative attitude indeed to the whole concept of ISM. It had certainly been 
anticipated that there would be some negativity but  the apparent condemnation which 
was coming in was much worse than expected. Initially this took the author by 
surprise and it took some time before he started to understand what was happening. 
As time went on more and more positive and supportive replies were received and 
fewer and fewer outright negative responses. Still the explanation for this strange 
phenomenon eluded the author. Before exploring that further though, let us consider 
the overall results of the survey.  
 
 
6.1 Have incidents reduced since Phase I implementation? 
 
The respondents were given the opportunity to choose from four specific statements – 
at one extreme they could say ‘no definitely’ or opt for the much softer, middle of the 
road ‘no – not noticeably’ and, at the other extreme end to report ‘yes - significantly’ 
to the weaker ‘Yes – slightly’.  They could also declare that the ISM Code did not yet 
apply to their own situation and therefore they could not offer a point of view. They 
© Phil Anderson  
26/06/13 145 
were also given the option to state that they did not know the answer. The analysis of 
the 3000 questionnaires that had been submitted produced results as per the following 
graphs: 
 
 
On the whole there was a reasonable level of agreement between the three 
participating group – although the Masters and Seafarers were a little more biased 
towards the positive end. The overall result though was a fairly classic distribution 
curve with the bulk of the respondents somewhere near the middle, without strong 
views, and a smaller number of strong views at each extreme end. The general view 
seemed to be that the number of incidents had probably not changed significantly 
since Phase I implementation – although more than 30% of Masters and Seafarers and 
a little under 20% of the other two categories considered that there had been 
significant reductions. In the end only 10% of respondents felt that there had 
definitely been no reduction of incidents. 
Because of the way the database had been set up, it had been possible, without too 
much difficulty, to watch this curve develop during the period of the research. In the 
early stages the bias was very much towards the left, negative, side – only in the later 
stages did the strong shift towards the right start to occur. It was not immediately 
apparent why this shift was occurring.  
 
6.2 Has ISM achieved its objectives? 
 
The next question, asking whether ISM had achieved its objectives, produced quite a 
similar result - although with a stronger bias towards the positive end of the scale. In 
hindsight perhaps the question was too strongly worded – it made an assumption that 
it was possible for the ISM objectives to be achieved in the time scale since July 1998. 
The question perhaps should have been phrased in such a way that the respondent was 
being asked to comment on the trend towards achievement rather than having actually 
reached the goal. However, it would appear that few people took the question too 
literally and seem to have had the trend rather than the end result in mind. 
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Considering the answers to the two questions together it is interesting to see that the 
respondents seem to be suggesting that a reduction in incidents is not necessarily 
required in order to make progress towards achieving objectives. This is probably 
correct, in the early stages, since the setting up of the systems – and even more 
difficult the setting up of a new way of working i.e. no-blame and safety culture, will 
not happen overnight. However, having considered results from companies who have 
started to approach the end of the tunnel – the rewards will start to follow as a natural 
consequence; accidents and claim will reduce.  
Having said that, it is perhaps worth reflecting upon the views of some external 
observers. It is certainly possible that their views may be much more objective – since 
they should be impartial although they may not have the benefit of detailed 
knowledge of the full workings of the systems. A number of pilots submitted 
observations and, interestingly, many were quite critical of what they had seen. The 
following were two quite typical examples: 
 
1. Working as a Pilot (mainly tankers) I am not directly involved in the 
operation of the ISM Code. 
Boarding ships of various owners and nationalities gives a good 
opportunity to observe standards on board and get the views of masters 
and officers. 
Since the ISM Code was introduced there has been no noticeable 
improvement in standards. We see the same ships and the same people on 
them, all that has changed is that ships staff are further burdened by a 
mass of paper work. 
The success of the Code seems to depend on companies operating within 
the 'spirit' of the Code but the companies which really needed the Code 
are hardly likely to enter in to this spirit and just see the code as another 
bureaucratic obstacle to overcome or circumvent. 
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2. As a marine pilot I see about 400 ships a year. 
ISM may be working on some ships, but unfortunately from a pilot's 
perspective it seems many times to be a check off ritual only. Often I see 
Pilot Cards as photo copies with the bow thruster box ticked as fully 
operational and the ship does not even have one!  Training still seems 
deficient in many ships - there is a perception that many personnel are 
just going through the motions.  All the mate wants to do is obtain your 
name, sign the pilot card and whip it away from you, before you can even 
read it. 
 
One pilot was based in North Western Europe and the other in Australasia – the 
similarity of their observations and perceptions is therefore of even greater concern. It 
may be worth further research amongst pilots to establish exactly how widespread the 
pessimistic perception and poor experiences of ISM might be. 
 
6.3 Cultural / National differences of perceptions 
 
In the middle of 2001 the results of a BIMCO / ISF survey into manning was 
published (BIMCO / ISF 2000 Manpower update – The worldwide demand for and 
supply of seafarers – Main Report – IER University of Warwick + abridged report in 
ISF annual report 2001). The survey looked at the current situation with regard to 
where the Masters, officers and crew who were manning the world fleet were 
presently coming from. It looked at the status of recruitment and training and made 
certain predictions about where the seafarers of the future would be coming from. One 
of the main purposes of the report though was to establish whether there were going to 
be an adequate and sufficient labour force in the future and, if not, what the short-fall 
was likely to be.  
The author read the report as a matter of academic interest – not realising initially that 
it was going to have important relevance to his own research. 
The BIMCO / ISF survey split the World’s seafarers into broad national / regional 
groups. Their findings suggested that the Officers of the world fleet, split according to 
those groups, was as per the graph below: 
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In the questionnaire the respondents had been asked to state their nationality – and it 
occurred to the author to see if there might be any national / cultural differences to 
experiences and perception about ISM.  It was somewhat labour intensive, slotting 
each individual into his or her correct group but the end result was well worth the 
effort.  
The Masters and Seafarers who had responded to the survey, and who had indicated 
their nationality, produced the following split: 
 
 
This result did not map perfectly onto the BIMCO / ISF result – there was a greater 
number of OECD and Indian respondents and less Far East and Eastern Europeans. 
However, it was felt to be reasonably close enough to the current world manning 
situation to be worth proceeding with an analysis. 
Before considering the results of that analysis, it is also worth identifying another 
interesting and relevant factor which came out of the BIMCO / ISF survey. It had 
established that 50% of the Masters and Chief Engineers, i.e. the command / most 
senior officer positions on board ships of the world fleet were still from the OECD 
countries. The other 50% coming from the ‘developing nations’ – particularly India, 
the Philippines and the former Soviet Union countries. 
 
 
That fact in itself was not so important – what was much more significant was that 
almost all the OECD Masters and Chief Engineers were over 50 years of age who 
ISM Survey Sample
Far East
15%
Africa / 
Latin 
America
1%
Eastern 
Europe
8%
Indian 
sub-
Continent
21%
OECD
55%
Current Position Re Masters and Chief Engineers
OECD
50%
Other 
Nationalities
50%
© Phil Anderson  
26/06/13 149 
would be retiring within the next ten years and there were very few OECD nationals 
following behind to take their place when they did retire. From the late 1970’s until 
the late 1990’s very few potential officers were recruited or trained from OECD 
countries. The significance is that, within a decade, almost all the ships of the world 
will be commanded by Indians, Filipinos and individuals from the former Soviet 
Union. Of course there will also be Masters and Chief Engineers from other 
developing nations. 
 
In order to avoid too much clutter in the diagrams and to ensure a reasonable sample 
size, it was decided to compare the views of the three largest groups of respondents 
from the Master and Seafarer categories. These were the OECD nationals, the Indian 
sub-continent (mainly Indians) and those from the Far East – primarily Filipinos.  
When these groups were separated out – the result was quite amazing: 
 
 
 
 
The responses from the OECD Masters and Seafarers shows a very classic 
distribution curve with a slight bias towards the negative – approximately 60% saying 
no - definitely or no – not significantly in answer to the question whether incidents 
had reduced since Phase I implementation. However, the results from the Indians and 
the Filipinos, which were almost identical, showed an enormous swing towards the 
positive side of the scale. They were not just going for the ‘softer option’ of ‘yes – 
slightly’ but over 60% had gone for the much stronger ‘yes – significantly’. Very few 
opted for the ‘no-not significantly’ option and there were almost none who went for 
the very negative ‘no –definitely’ end of the scale. 
An almost identical picture emerged when the answers to the other ‘big question’ 
were split in the same way – although the OECD respondents were shifting a little 
towards the positive. 
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The mystery of why the trend had been shifting during the course of the survey was 
starting to make sense.  The initial distribution of the bulk of the questionnaires was 
with the Nautical Institute journal Seaways, the NUMAST Telegraph and the IFSMA 
bulletin. As such the first recipients would have been the shore-based seafarers in the 
UK. Whilst some of these may have been seafarers on leave or working on ferries or 
other short sea vessels – many would be retired seafarers or otherwise people who 
were working ashore but who felt that they did not fit into the ‘Ship Operator’ or 
‘Other Stakeholder’ categories.  The next wave of responses were from other OECD 
nationals, particularly from Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States 
who were perhaps from similar backgrounds. It was difficult to establish, in many 
cases, what their recent seagoing experience was or whether they had actually sailed 
with ISM systems. The group did however indicate a strong negative attitude towards 
the concept of the ISM Code. It was sometime later that much more varied responses 
started to be returned. Allowing for the time lapse - this was probably the deep-sea 
seafarers who were actually working on board ships who were starting to get their 
questionnaires returned. As more time went by the completed questionnaires were 
increasingly coming in from non-OECD nationals – particularly Indian Masters and 
officers and, later still, Filipinos.  
If these results were accurate i.e. that Indian and Filipino Masters and seafarers were 
having a much more positive experience of ISM, or otherwise had a much more 
positive attitude towards it – then this would have, potentially, a very significant 
impact bearing in mind the conclusions of the BIMCO / ISF survey.  If the Indians 
and Filipinos were going to command, and man, a large section of the world fleet 
within the next few years, and if they were so positive about ISM, this would surely 
provide much hope for the future successful development of the Code. The big 
question was: were the Indians and Filipinos being honest and accurate when they 
answered the questionnaire. This may sound like an unfair, rather arrogant and 
perhaps even racist question to raise. However, if the results of this survey were to 
stand up to the criticisms which were bound to follow – that question had to be asked 
and the possible answers fully explored. 
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There would appear to be at least four possible explanations: 
 
1. The respondents were deliberately lying  
2. they had totally misunderstood the questions 
3. they were providing what they believed were the ‘correct’ answers 
4. they really did believe that the ISM Code was working 
 
 
1. There were so many individuals involved that the idea of all those individuals 
each deciding to deliberately submit misleading answers has no logical 
justification at all. There is no evidence what-so-ever that there was some sort 
of plot or conspiracy on the part of whole national groups to sabotage the 
survey by deliberately submitting misleading answers. There would be no 
purpose to be served by lying and any such idea is untenable. 
2. Almost all Indian Masters and officers speak and read excellent English and, 
invariably, have had the benefit of a good basic education before they 
embarked upon a seagoing career. Whilst English is much more of a second 
language for Filipinos – their command of the language, particularly at senior 
levels, is very good. There is no justification therefore to suggest that the 
respondents did not understand the questions or the answers they were giving. 
3. Whilst it is perhaps wrong to stereo-type people – particularly by national 
groups – the author would venture to say that, in his experience, both Indians 
and Filipinos tend to be courteous and polite people. It does not seem to be 
within their character to want to deliberately cause offence – they would rather 
please. There are many Europeans who have perhaps sailed with Indian and 
Filipino seafarers who would tend to go even further in their psychological 
profiling of these groups. At its most basic they would say that Indians, and 
more-so Filipinos, would tend to tell you what they think you want to hear. 
This is not done to deceive you but rather because the individual wants to 
please you or make you happy – whereas the truth would possibly make you 
worried or upset. Such an analysis may sound very patronising but it is a 
perception very widely held by Europeans. Could it be that the respondents, 
when they were working through the questionnaire, were looking for the 
‘correct’ answers i.e. which answers would give most pleasure to the 
researcher and which answers would result in disappointment?  
The author has a number of highly respected and valued Indian friends – some 
are still actively involved in seagoing careers, others are ex-seagoing and now 
working ashore in the shipping related industries. Their views were sought on 
this possible hypothesis – knowing that they would provide honest and 
objective answers. They all felt that there may be a little of that attitude of not 
wanting to cause offence by ticking the most appropriate box but, on the 
whole, they believed that the responses were accurate and could be relied 
upon. The author did not have similar direct contact with Filipinos but through 
intermediaries did solicit similar views and received similar answers. 
4. This leaves the fourth, and final, option – that they might actually be telling 
the truth and actually believe that the ISM Code can and is working. From 
reviewing narrative comments received and discussing the issue further with 
many individuals it would appear that many Indian and Filipino Masters and 
Officers see the ISM Code as providing a structure – a frame work – onto 
which they can build and secure their management systems. The way their 
systems are structured is such that the manuals tell them what they are 
supposed to do, they have access to and are directed towards relevant sources 
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which tell them how to do it and they have a system that will tell them whether 
they have done the task or performed the process correctly. 
 
These initial findings were published as part of a preliminary report. Interestingly, a 
European instructor who had been running a training centre in the Philippines for 
many years contacted the author with confirmation that he agreed with the basic 
conclusions. Even more interesting was an observation / suggestion he went on to 
make, that if a similar analysis was undertaken by splitting the groups by age rather 
than by national backgrounds then a very similar result would be achieved.  The 
questionnaires did not ask the respondent to declare their age and therefore such an 
exercise was not possible. However, a review of some of the most negative responses 
received would indicate certain clues that would suggest that the individual had been 
at sea for many years and in some cases probably already retired. 
The theory is perhaps supported by comments received from other respondents such 
as this Australian ship manager: 
 
…my personal observation is that the ‘old timers’ are slowly coming 
around whereas the younger seafarers are much more open and 
accepting of safety management principles as it’s covered at colleges 
and is also very much part of the working culture at least in other 
Australian industries… 
 
If the theory of this European instructor from the Philippines is correct then again it 
perhaps creates additional hope for the future success of the ISM Code.  
 
Another interesting experience was shared by a respondent who had first hand 
experience of both commercial shipping and the offshore industry. More than that 
though, within the context of this section, he had recent experience of providing 
safety-related training to non-OECD seafarers. He submitted the following report: 
 
I have just completed a … training programme - where I essentially 
presented an ISM/SMS and FSA appreciation programme with a number 
of our Far Eastern and FSU affiliates and inspectors (predominantly 
Polish, Russian, Ukrainian, Croatian and Filipino). Quite a number of 
these men/woman had recent experience as master and officer in a broad 
range of ships. There was almost unanamous support for the ISM/SMS 
regime throughout my courses. Their enthusiasm was striking. All gave 
evidence of its benefits and interestingly many noted that it facilitated 
greater interaction with owners/managers/superintendents. Again - 
without exception they experienced worthwhile involvement of the 
management of their working environment.  
Their enthusiasm unfortunately contrasts with the understanding of 
European seafarers as I have generally experienced it - the latter on the 
whole remaining skeptical of the benefits of ISM. I remember having 
similar feelings offshore before I had my "road to Damascus" - i.e. before 
I first recognized the real benefits of total safety management under the 
"safety case" regime offshore. Some of the cynics were shipmates - when I 
was deck apprentice and officer with …(various British shipping 
companies) 
 
As was suggested elsewhere – more research would appear to be warranted into 
the apparent differences in perceptions of ISM by various cultural groups. 
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7 Recent court decisions 
 
In an attempt to bring alive the potential impact of some of the issues arising out of 
ISM implementation, in a practical way, it may be interesting to consider three recent 
court cases. These cases start to address some of those issues – in particular: 
 
• ISM as the bench-mark against which operational good practice will be 
measured, 
• Evidence and audit trails 
• The test of ‘reasonableness’ 
 
The three cases to be considered are: 
1. The Eurasian Dream  
      QBD (Com. Ct.) (Cresswell J) 
- 7 February 2002 
2.  The Torepo 
      QBD (Admiralty Ct.) ( Steel J) 
- 18 July 2002 
3. The Patraikos II   
           Singapore High Court 
           - 9 May 2002 
 
All three cases were cargo related liability incidents where the issue under 
consideration was the question of ‘seaworthiness’ and whether the respective ship 
operators had exercised due diligence to make their ships seaworthy within the terms 
of the Hague Visby Rules. 
To put this into context – let us first remind ourselves of the relevant section of the 
Hague Visby Rules - Article III Rule 1 and 2 which read: 
 
1. The carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the voyage to 
exercise due diligence to –  
a) Make the ship seaworthy. 
b) Properly man, equip and supply the ship. 
c) Make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts of 
the ship in which goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, 
carriage and preservation. 
2. Subject to the provisions of Article IV, the carrier shall properly and carefully 
load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge the goods carried. 
 
The initial burden will be upon the cargo claimant to establish a prima facie case of 
unseaworthiness and to demonstrate that they have suffered a loss as a consequence 
of that unseaworthiness. Article IV Rule 1 of the Hague Visby Rules provides that 
the carrier shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from unseaworthiness 
provided they can demonstrate that they ‘exercised due diligence’ to make the vessel 
seaworthy. What this means in plain English is that if the ship owner did all that they 
reasonably could to make sure that they provided a ship and crew that should have 
been able to deliver the cargo at destination in the same condition as it was in when 
loaded, then they will be entitled to rely upon certain exclusions and defences. There 
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is a list of 17 exceptions set out in Article IV Rule 2 – part of which is set out below 
with the exceptions most relevant to the case studies: 
 
2. Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising 
or resulting from – 
(a) Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or servants of the 
carrier in the navigation or the management of the ship. 
(b) Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier. 
(c) Perils, dangers and accidents of the sea or other navigable waters….. 
 
…(q) Any other cause arising without the actual fault or neglect of the 
carrier, or without the fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the 
carrier, but the burden of proof shall be on the person claiming the benefit 
of this exception to show that neither the actual fault or privity of the 
carrier nor the fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier 
contributed to the loss or damage. 
 
The author believes that all three cases have direct relevance to ISM and provide 
valuable guidance from the courts on the way in which they will examine cases in 
light of ISM. However, it should be pointed out that the ISM Code was not mandatory 
on the Eurasian Dream or the Torepo at the relevant times when the incidents actually 
occurred. It would appear from reading the law reports that the respective Judges 
clearly had ISM principles in mind when considering the cases and when arriving at 
their judicial decisions. In the Eurasian Dream judgement it is said of the ISM Code 
that it is  “…a framework upon which good practices should be hung…”  and “…a 
prudent manager / master could very well organise their companies vessels work 
following those guidelines…” (Eurasian Dream judgement paragraph 143) 
 
The factual information in the Case Studies below is based entirely on the respective 
law reports. Clearly by their very nature such reports must be selective in what factual 
information they include. It is always possible therefore that there may be some slight 
errors in fine detail – for which the author extends his apologies. However, the author 
believes that the main principles, which are the important features, are accurately 
represented. It is important to appreciate however that the case studies set out below 
are not intended to represent a full review of any of the incidents and anyone wishing 
to obtain full details of the judgements are referred to the relevant law report. 
 
7.1 Case Study 1 – The Eurasian Dream 
 
Brief Facts: 
o The Eurasian Dream was a pure car carrier – of the large ‘box-shape’ design.  
o She was discharging a cargo of new motor vehicles in Sharjah in the United 
Arab Emirates. 
o A fire started in car deck number 4. 
o The crew were unable to contain the fire. 
o The ship was abandoned and towed off the berth. 
o The ship and all the cargo were a total loss 
o There were no serious injuries to personnel. 
 
The basis of the claim: 
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o The cargo owners / subrogated underwriters were claiming for the damage to 
their cargo and other losses which they suffered as a consequence of the fire.  
o The basic argument was that the ship was unseaworthy and that the 
carrier had failed to exercise due diligence to make the vessel 
seaworthy. 
o Specifically, they argued that the ship was unseaworthy on many 
counts, including: 
- vessels equipment 
- competence of master and crew 
- adequacy of documentation 
 
Before undertaking an evaluation of the evidence it is perhaps worth reviewing briefly 
what happened and what went wrong – the significance of the judges criticism should 
therefore make more sense. 
During the relevant period the vessel was discharging cars. The third officer (3/O) 
was the duty cargo officer and he had an Able Seaman (AB) on duty with him. Both 
the 3/O’s and AB’s stories changed, on a number of occasions, as to exactly where 
each was at the time when the fire started – some versions said the 3/O was on the car 
deck and witnessed the fire start whilst other versions had him in the mess-room 
taking a snack. The 3/0 did have a walkie-talkie radio but the other three sets on board 
were being used by the engineers who were involved in a bunkering operation. The 
3/O had no means of contacting anyone else on his radio. 
The cars were carried with minimum amount of fuel in their tanks and with their 
batteries disconnected. In order to speed up the discharging operation the shore 
stevedores had adopted a very bad and unsafe practice of pouring a small quantity of 
petrol into the carburettor of the vehicle and then jump starting the car from a 
powerful battery on the back of a pick-up truck. Invariably fuel gets spilt in such 
operations and with the sparks being generated from the battery leads there is a very 
high risk of a fire.  Clearly such practices should be totally prohibited – there was no 
evidence that any attempts were made to stop the stevedores from carrying out this 
very bad practice.  
It was not proved conclusively but the conclusion reached by the fire experts was that 
the fire probably started when some spilt fuel ignited. If a working fire extinguisher 
had been available then the fire should have been capable of being extinguished fairly 
easily and quickly. There were a number of partially discharged fire extinguishers 
found near the seat of the fire by the fire investigators – they concluded that the 
extinguishers had probably not worked properly. 
It took a significant length of time before the alarm was raised and then there was 
much confusion as to where the fire was or what to do about it. By this time the fire 
was quickly spreading. The master ordered fire hoses to be run out – this proved to be 
ineffective. Breathing apparatus sets eventually arrived on the scene but these were 
too few in number and probably defective. It transpired that no serious or informed 
emergency practice drills had been carried out on board – particularly on the most 
basic of all potential emergencies – how to fight a fire. Eventually, the Master decided 
that the fire was out of control and he decided to get everyone ashore. Almost as a 
parting gesture he ordered the CO2 bottles to be discharged – since the very large 
loading door was open this smothering gas would have quickly escaped and would 
have been of no use. Local tugs pulled the burning vessel off the berth and allowed 
her to burn out in the relative safety of the outer harbour. 
The method of fighting a fire on these types of vessels is very different from 
conventional cargo ships or bulk carriers. The ship is divided up into car decks 
vertically with a number of transverse bulkheads. In these bulkheads are gas tight 
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doors such that, in the event of a fire, the gas tight doors can be closed across adjacent 
bulkheads to completely seal small sections off. Of course any personnel in the 
compartment must be evacuated prior to closing the doors. Once the section is sealed - 
CO2 is injected  and any fire would be very quickly brought under control. 
There do not appear to have been any instructions on board on this procedure or how 
to operate the CO2 smothering or the gas tight doors. It does not appear that the 
Master, Chief Engineer or anyone else knew about the procedure or how to operate 
the CO2 system or the gas tight doors. 
 
Evaluation of the evidence: 
o The witnesses: 
In a court case such as this there will be two main types of evidence to be 
presented – written / documentary evidence and witnesses. The witnesses will 
be either witnesses of fact – i.e. people who were actually involved in or 
around the incident, and expert witnesses – who are people with specialised 
knowledge or skills who can provide the benefit of their superior knowledge 
for the court to take into account when considering the evidence. The 
impression that a witness makes upon the judge can be very important indeed. 
If the witness starts changing his story during cross examination or for other 
reasons the judge starts to consider that the witness is not telling the truth 
then this will, inevitably, be very prejudicial to one side of the case. 
Witnesses can be put under considerable pressure during cross-examination – 
barristers / advocates are skilled in extracting the truth from witnesses. 
Consequently, the only way to be sure of successfully withstanding the 
interrogation of cross examination in the witness box is to be completely 
truthful and stick to the truth and the facts. Witnesses must avoid being drawn 
down the road of subjective speculation – however tempting that might be. 
In this case the Master, as well as a number of officers and crew from the ship 
and the Designated Person from the office ashore, were called as witnesses of 
fact. A lecturer from a maritime academy, who taught fire fighting as one of 
his subjects, appeared as an expert witness appointed by the carrier and a Car 
Carrier expert was appointed as expert witness on behalf of the cargo 
claimants.  
In his judgements the judge had the following comments to make about the 
different witnesses who had been presented from the ship operators side: 
 
- The Master – Unsatisfactory 
- Third Officer – Profoundly unsatisfactory 
- Chief Engineer – Profoundly unsatisfactory 
- Able Seaman – Profoundly unsatisfactory 
- Designated Person Ashore – Most unsatisfactory 
- Expert witness – Did not have relevant expertise. 
 
During the cross examination of the witnesses a number of them started to 
significantly change their original stories to such an extent that the Judge was 
left wondering what he could or could not believe. In addition it started to 
become apparent that deliberate attempts had been made to tamper with 
important pieces of evidence – including an instruction from the ship 
manager’s office to the Chief Engineer to return on board after the fire had 
been extinguished to adjust the position of certain valves before the fire 
investigator got onboard. Once a judge starts disbelieving witnesses it will 
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then be very difficult to restore sufficient confidence to resume a position of 
trust. 
 
o Vessels equipment 
During the course of the investigation and court hearing it became apparent 
that a number of important pieces of fire fighting appliances probably failed 
and other pieces of safety equipment proved to be inadequate. One of the 
major problems for the Ship Operator in defending the claim was that there 
were no records available of when fire extinguishers, for example, were 
examined or tested or recharged. This applied to a number of other items of 
equipment such as gas tight doors and CO2 smothering equipment. The expert 
witness who was put forward by the claimants was able to convince the judge 
that there was significantly fewer walkie-talkies on board than was actually 
needed. The same applied to Breathing Apparatus sets. There was no evidence 
of any risk assessments ever having been carried out which might have picked 
up on these deficiencies.  
  
o Competence of master and crew 
 
The Master’s certificate of competency does not appear to have ever been 
called into question. However, his ability and qualifications to command a car 
carrier certainly were. The judge found the recruiting practices of this 
company incredible – to say the least. Apparently the ship managers needed a 
Master for Eurasian Dream and so they sent word to their manning agents in 
Manila to find one. It did not seem to concern anyone at the time but the 
Master they found had not sailed on Eurasian Dream before, or any sister 
ships, indeed he had never sailed on car carriers before – in fact he had never 
sailed with that company before. Apart from the manning agent, he had not 
met anyone from the company – he was just instructed to go and join the 
vessel. The only instructions he received from the company was a letter 
basically telling him to read all the manuals when he got on board. It 
transpired that there were well over a hundred manuals that he would have had 
to read. It was estimated that if he did nothing else apart from read manuals 
then he would need 2 to 3 weeks to complete the task. He was apparently 
given no specific instructions about safety procedures with regard to loading, 
carrying or discharging motor vehicles, he was given no instructions on how 
the CO2 system worked and, apparently, he wasn’t even told of the existence 
of the gas tight doors or their purpose or how they worked. The ship operators 
were unable to produce evidence to describe any adequate procedures they 
might have had in place to provide relevant familiarisation or training. There 
was no evidence that the crew had ever undergone any meaningful emergency 
drills or exercises – such as fire fighting. A detailed quote from the judgement 
is set out in the subsection on the adequacy of documentation below. 
It also became apparent during the examination of the witnesses and the 
documentation that none of the other officers or crew members had what could 
be described as an adequate knowledge or understanding of safe cargo 
operations on this type of vessel. 
The judge concluded that the Master and crew were ignorant of: 
- Fire hazards in car carriers 
- The need to supervise stevedores 
- Procedures for dead car operations 
- CO2 procedures 
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- Gas tight door operation 
 
 
o Adequacy of documentation 
As was stated above, at the time of the incident the ISM Code was not 
mandatory for this type of vessel. Car Carriers are ISM Phase II ships and, 
consequently would have until the 1st July 2002 deadline to comply. The 
incident occurred on 23rd July 1998. 
However, the particular ship managers who were operating Eurasian Dream 
also operated Phase I ISM ships and they had produced procedures manuals 
for those ships. It would appear that these were generic manuals apparently 
produced with the intention that they would apply to all of their vessels. It 
would appear that copies were put on board all their ships. 
In his judgement, Justice Cresswell discusses this documentation in some 
detail. Although it is a rather long quote it is felt worthwhile setting it out in 
order that the full significance of what the judge was saying can be fully 
appreciated: 
 
“151(12) – (18) …It was of fundamental importance that the vessel be provided 
with a ship specific manual dealing with fire prevention and control. No such 
manual was provided to the Eurasian Dream. 
The vessel was provided with a large amount of irrelevant and / or obsolete 
documentation. Such documentation related (for example) to vessels other than 
car carriers. Such documentation was potentially misleading. For efficiency and 
competence of response, only one code or set of procedures should have been 
prescribed for the Master of a pure car carrier. 
The documentation placed on board by Univan was too voluminous to be 
digestible. 
The Master was directed by a standard form Briefing Letter to read all the 
literature on board the vessel. This was an inadequate means of instructing the 
Master for the following reasons:- 
(a) it was not given to the Master in advance of his attendance upon the vessel. 
(b) it did not cater for the special position of Captain Villondo, who had no 
prior experience of car carriage, car carriers, the Eurasian Dream or 
Univan. 
(c) the direction of the Briefing Letter required the Master to read a vast 
amount of documentation, including Univan manuals which ran to hundreds 
of pages and about 100 technical equipment manuals. 
(d) the task of reading the Univan manuals would have occupied 2 to 3 weeks of 
the Master’s time whilst on board the vessel. 
(e) the Briefing Letter ought either to have summarised all the key guidance to 
be given to the Master in relation to emergency procedures or to have 
directed him in a focused manner to the relevant manuals or parts of 
manuals dealing with such matters. 
The Emergency Procedures Manual (and the other Univan manuals) failed to 
give guidance as to: 
(a) the supervision of stevedores; 
(b) the importance of gas-tight doors as fire-fighting equipment; 
(c) the efficient use of the CO2 system (including the speed with which it should 
be deployed and the steps to be taken to permit such deployment); 
(d) the evacuation of personnel. 
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Instead the Manual contained guidance for fighting fire on other types of 
vessels. Such material was irrelevant and the Manual was ‘put to one side’ by 
the Master on this basis. However, if acted upon, the Manual was misleading 
and dangerous: it stated (for example) that, in the laden condition, there was 
little that the Emergency Response Team could do in the event of a fire and 
made no mention of any steps which might be taken to fight such a fire. 
In accordance with SOLAS, fire-fighting instructions and procedures in 
particular should have been concentrated in one concise and clear manual, 
catering specifically for the Eurasian Dream. The Master himself complained of 
the fact that he had not been given such a manual. Univan should have provided 
the vessel with clear checklists of the essential actions to be taken in the event of 
fire: (a) at sea (b) in port. 
The vessel was not, but ought to have been, provided with specific 
documentation dealing with:- 
(a) the characteristics of car carriers in general and the Eurasian Dream in 
particular; 
(b) the carriage of vehicles in general and on the Eurasian Dream in 
particular; 
(c) the danger of fire on car carriers; 
(d) the precautions to be taken to avoid fire on car carriers, including: 
(i) instructions for the safe handling of second-hand vehicles; 
(ii) instructions for the supervision of stevedores and the prohibition of 
hazardous activities by stevedores or others, such as simultaneous and 
proximate jump-starting and refuelling operations in the same area or 
on the same vehicle. 
(e) the importance of gas-tight doors in fire fighting; 
(f) the importance of using CO2 as a front line defence and without delay in the 
event of a deck fire and simple instructions for its use; 
(g) procedures for evacuating the fire zones or keeping personnel out of such 
zones. 
A reasonably prudent owner, knowing the relevant facts, would not have 
allowed the Eurasian Dream to put to sea with the Master and crew, with their 
state of knowledge, training and instruction. 
 
Even though the vessel did not have to comply with the ISM Code, the judge would 
appear to have adopted the position that since the procedure manuals had been put on 
board then there must have been an intention on the part of the ship operators to use 
them as the basis of setting up a SMS. Indeed at paragrapg 151(12) the judge actually 
says that a fire fighting manual (which was not on board) should have been. The judge 
also seems to have adopted the view that the ISM Code had already set the standard as 
to the minimum level of ship operation and therefore adopted the general principles as 
a sort of benchmark. To what extent that is the case or whether it is speculation is 
somewhat academic now since the Phase II deadline has passed. In any event there 
can be little doubt, following a reading of the judgement, that the judge had the ISM 
Code very much in mind when he considered the evidence and the operational 
practices in this case. 
The message which the judge is clearly sending out is that those ship operators who 
dump ‘off-the-shelf’, stereo-type manuals on their ships or otherwise pay only ‘lip-
service’ to ISM had better look out. The courts are clearly alert to the intentions and 
philosophy of ISM as well as what it should be achieving in practice. Inadequate and 
inappropriate manuals may very well render the vessel unseaworthy. In paragraph 127 
of the judgement, Justice Cresswell said: 
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 “ Seaworthiness must be judged by the standards and practices of the industry at 
the relevant time, at least so long as those standards are practical and reasonable”. 
 
The standards and practices of the industry in this respect are now the ISM Code. 
It is also clear from this judgement that the Managers have a responsibility to ensure 
that the Master and crew are properly familiar with the ship and the cargo to be 
carried. In addition, the managers do not discharge their responsibility by simply 
providing large volumes of documents for the master to read. 
The judge was very critical of the ship operator as well as the staff, both ashore and 
on board the ship. The judge concluded that the vessel was unseaworthy on account of 
an accumulation of serious problems to do with: 
 
- The vessel’s equipment 
- The competence of the master and crew  
- The adequacy of the documentation 
 
On that basis the judge allowed the cargo owners to succeed with their claim. 
 
 
7.2 Case Study 2 – The Torepo 
 
 Brief Facts: 
 
o Torepo was a product tanker 
o On a loaded  voyage from Argentina to Ecuador via Patagonian Channel 
o Vessel grounded 
o Vessel had to be salvaged 
o There were no serious personal injuries 
o There was no pollution or loss of cargo 
o The cargo owners attempted to recover their contribution to the salvage. 
 
 
The basis of the claim 
 
o The cargo owners / subrogated underwriters were claiming for a recovery of 
their contribution towards the general average / salvage expenses incurred in 
the refloating operation. 
o The basic argument was that there had been a breach of the contract of carriage 
in that the ship was unseaworthy, and the ship operators had failed to 
exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy. 
o Specifically they argued that there were many factors which contributed towards 
that unseaworthiness, including: 
 
- no proper bridge team management, 
- no proper system for instructing crew in navigating in confined waters, 
- no proper passage plan for that part of the voyage during which the 
incident occurred, 
- the vessel was not equipped with adequate charts 
- the echo sounder was defective. 
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If the cargo claimants were successful with their arguments they would be entitled 
to recover their contribution to the general average and salvage expenses. 
 
The case was heard before the Admiralty Judge – the Honourable Mr. Justice 
Steel – a very experienced lawyer and judge in shipping related matters. It is 
interesting to note that, in his judgement, the judge was clearly very critical of the 
way in which the claimants had set out their claim and their allegations. On the 
whole they were unspecific and unsubstantiated. 
The judge was also very critical of the expert witness that the claimants had 
produced to comment specifically on the navigation systems and practices on 
board Torepo. Basically the judge considered the navigation expert to ‘lack 
realism’. This is actually a very interesting, important and enlightened observation 
on the part of the judge. The expert witness put forward a case for almost absolute 
perfection – Justice Steel – made it clear that neither he, nor the court, nor ISM 
expects perfection – but best practice will be expected. It again comes back to the 
old problem of reasonableness and what might be reasonable within the context of 
this particular case. 
 
Before we venture off to evaluate the evidence, let us look a little at the 
background to this incident which happened in July 1997.  
Torepo was a product tanker of about 25,000 tons deadweight and was more than 
20 years old. She was, apparently, in relative terms – bearing in mind her age- a 
well maintained and well run ship – this was confirmed by 50 or more vetting 
inspections by oil majors which the ship had been subjected to during the three 
years prior to this incident.  
On this particular occasion the vessel was close to Buenos Aires in the Argentine 
and was to load a full cargo of gasoline for Ecuador. It was recognised by the 
Master on board, and his navigator – the second mate, that there were at least three 
routes which the ship could take. They could go North and through the Panama 
Canal – this would certainly provide the best weather option at that time of year 
(mid winter in the Southern Hemisphere). They could go South which would 
provide at least two options: they could sail far South and go round Cape Horn – 
this would almost certainly involve bad weather. The third option was to cut 
across the tip of Chile and go through the Patagonian Channel. Up until the time 
of sailing the charterers would not make a decision as to which route they wanted 
the vessel to take. The second Mate prepared the passage plans for each of the 
three possibilities. However, he realised that they did not have on board all the 
appropriate navigation charts – in particular the British Admiralty charts that were 
being used on board did not adequately cover the Patagonian Channel. The charts 
required were local Chilean Charts. The master attempted to order the charts from 
the local chart agent in Buenos Aires – but without success. The ship managers 
tried to obtain them in Europe and the Master tried through the local British 
Admiralty chart agent in Montevideo, Uruguay.   However, all these efforts were 
in vain – it transpired that these charts were only available inside Chile. 
Torepo loaded the cargo and set sail – heading South. Eventually the charterers 
confirmed that the vessel was indeed to proceed through the Patagonian Channel. 
Local agents were appointed and the master ordered local pilots and also asked 
that the pilots bring with them copies of the relevant charts. 
 
 
Evaluation of the evidence: 
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o The witnesses 
The main witness of fact was the Master of the Torepo. The Master had served   
with the company for six years and had sailed previously on Torepo as Chief 
Officer. The voyage in question was the Master’s first trip in command. It 
would be quite normal in such circumstances for the Master to try his very best 
to make sure that everything ran smoothly during the voyage. He would expect 
people, both in the office ashore and on board ship, to be watching him very 
closely and he would want to demonstrate that the decision to promote him to 
Master was a correct decision.  
The judge found the Master to be “…an intelligent and capable man who 
responded to cross examination in a straightforward manner…” 
The Master had clearly made a favourable impression on the judge who tended 
to believe him. 
 
o Competence of Master and crew 
As was explained above, the Master had sailed with the company for a number 
of years prior to the incident – and consequently he was familiar with the way 
the company ran their ships. He had sailed as Chief Officer on board Torepo 
and therefore knew the ship very well before he took command.  
The cadet who was acting as lookout had three years experience at sea. 
One week before the incident a vetting survey had taken place on behalf of an 
oil major. In addition to other things, the inspector noted: ‘…competence of 
personnel is no problem…’ 
 
o Vessel’s equipment  
The only item of equipment which the claimants drew attention to and alleged  
was not working was the echo sounder. They did not produce any evidence to 
substantiate that allegation. On the other hand the ship operator was able to 
produce documents to show that the equipment had been overhauled in dry dock 
only a week before the incident occurred. A certificate had been issued by the 
Classification Society confirming that there were no outstanding items and a 
detailed report of the dry docking had been prepared by a technical manager 
from the ship operator’s office. 
 
 
o Procedures and systems 
The oil major vetting inspector who had attended the vessel the week before  
noted in his report: ‘…the standard of record keeping was very good with 
everything readily available… operational procedures on board were good…’ 
The Master wrote up standing orders and night orders and generally ensured that 
the company policy was being followed. 
The officers of the watch seemed to be aware of the company policy and also 
read and signed the standing orders and night orders.  
A ‘Navigational Procedures Manual’ was in use on board along with the ‘Bridge 
Procedures Guide’ published by the International Chamber of Shipping. 
Proper passage plans had been prepared to cover the possible alternative routes 
that the vessel might take. 
When the vessel sailed from Buenos Aires she did not have the correct charts on 
board for the Patagonian Channel – however, these were brought on board by 
the local pilots who had been engaged to advise the Master during that passage. 
The passage plan and general exchange of information between Master, Pilots 
and Officers of the Watch did take place. 
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Prior to the incident the Chief Officer had been monitoring the progress on 
passage including plotting the vessel’s position on the chart at regular intervals 
and using ‘Parallel Indexing Techniques’ on the radar to check distances off the 
nearest land.  
 
 
The Incident 
 
At 0600 hours, on the day of the incident, the vessel was proceeding on her 
passage through the Patagonian Channel. Everything was proceeding smoothly. 
The Master was in his cabin resting – he had left night orders to the effect that he 
should be called if the Officer of the Watch was in doubt about anything or 
otherwise needed the Master. The Master was intending to return to the bridge at 
about 0800 hours when the ship would be transitting a particularly difficult part 
of the Channel. On the bridge was the Chief Officer, one of the two local pilots 
(the second pilot was also resting), a helmsman and the cadet officer / lookout.  
During the course of a few short minutes a whole series of mistakes were to 
happen. 
A major alteration of course was being approached. The Pilot went to mark the 
ship’s position on the chart and to transfer the position onto the next chart. As he 
did that he realised that the latitude and longitude positions did not coincide with 
the position of adjacent land and islands – in fact there was a difference of one 
mile. There is nothing particularly unusual about this sort of thing happening – 
often the surveys on which original charts had been drawn took place many years 
before and precise positions may have been difficult. However, this was 
sufficient to distract the pilot’s attention for a few minutes. The Chief Officer 
realised that the alteration position was being approached but, presumably, by 
this time had developed a certain amount of confidence in the pilot and had 
assumed, wrongly, that the pilot must have been delaying the commencement of 
the turn on account of some local current or similar. The cadet / lookout saw a 
light open (become visible) but did not report this. In fact this was the light that 
should have indicated to the pilot when he should turn. By the time the pilot 
realised that he had over-shot the alteration position the vessel was closing quite 
rapidly on an island dead ahead. If an attempt was made to alter course at that 
stage then there would be a serious risk of ripping the side out of the ship which 
could result in loss of life or personal injuries, an explosion / fire, pollution, loss 
of cargo and possibly loss of the ship. Instead the correct course of action was 
taken, apparently without panic;  as much speed as possible was taken off the 
vessel and she was driven straight onto the island. The greatest strength in the 
ship is in her bows where there are stiffening frames plus a collision bulkhead.  
The vessel ran aground at a speed of about six knots. No one was injured, there 
was no explosion or fire, there was no pollution and no loss of cargo.  
There was damage to the ship structure at the forward end but a salvage tug was 
able to safely pull the vessel off the island with no further loss or damage. 
 
In his conclusions the Judge stated: “…the claimants have failed to establish that 
the casualty was occasioned by causative unseaworthiness …their claim 
accordingly fails…” 
 
The witnesses and the documentary evidence were sufficient to satisfy the judge 
that, although relatively old, this was a well run ship with a company and crew 
who were trying hard to implement and follow good practices i.e. trying hard to 
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make their SMS work. In fact this incident occurred ahead of the Phase I ISM 
compliance deadline and therefore the preparations were still being made to have 
a fully verified ISM system in place. The author is in little doubt, having studied 
the judgement, that the judge did have ISM principles very much in mind when 
evaluating the evidence and considering what might be the correct level of 
operational practice. 
What had happened  in this case was a series of mistakes, human errors, which all 
occurred at the same time in the same place. They were errors in the navigation / 
management of the vessel. There was no evidence to indicate that similar errors 
or mistakes were a regular feature on board this ship – rather what happened was 
a most unfortunate, sequence of mistakes. Whilst these are the authors words and 
not those of the judge it is clear that whilst human being are employed on board 
ships they will, occasionally, make mistakes – to err is human! Neither the courts 
nor the ISM Code expect perfection – mistakes will be made. We must use these 
mistakes as learning opportunities to make sure similar things do not happen in 
the future. Provided everything else indicates that those involved are trying hard 
to implement proper safe systems then they should not be punished because of an 
isolated mistake. 
 
Of course it may not always be possible to exonerate someone who has made a 
mistake – particularly in cases of ‘strict liability’ – for example pollution 
incident. However, even in such cases, if a ship operator is able to produce 
witnesses and documentary evidence that, ordinarily, they have very good 
pollution prevention procedures in place and these are very carefully followed – 
such that the present incident really was a ‘one off’ then the fine that may be 
imposed is likely to be at the lower end of the scale. 
 
 
7.3 Case Study 3 – The  Patraikos 2 
 
This case was heard in the High Court of Singapore. The relevant facts of this 
particular case are quite short and again whilst this cannot be accurately described 
as an ISM Case – it does have a number of very important ISM related 
implications. 
 
Patraikos 2 was a large container ship that ran aground on what is probably the 
most powerful lighthouse in the Southern Hemisphere – Horsburgh Lighthouse. 
The vessel was aground for 103 days and then taken to Singapore for repairs. She 
remained in Singapore for another three months. Repairs cost approximately 
US$4 million. Most of the lost time would probably not have been insured. 
 
The cargo owners were claiming for various categories of loss and damage to 
their cargo as well as their contribution to the General Average / Salvage costs. 
They claimed that the vessel was unseaworthy at the commencement of the 
voyage on account of the utter incompetence of the second mate who was 
navigating the ship at the time of the incident. The ship operators argued that they 
were entitled to rely upon the error of navigation as a defence under the Hague-
Visby Rules. The cargo claimants went further  and argued that the vessel owner 
had failed to exercise due diligence in checking on the background, training and 
qualifications of the second mate before he was appointed. 
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The ship operators were unable to produce any meaningful procedures in which 
their recruitment policy was set out. Nor were they able to produce any evidence 
to show that they followed good and safe practices in the recruitment of the 
second mate in question. 
The second mate was called as a witness in the High Court and the judge had this 
to say of him… “(he was)…clearly incompetent whose testimony in the witness 
box shifted like the sands when washed by the tides, depending on his moods…” 
[see Owner of the cargo laden or lately laden on the ship or vessel Patraikos 2 v 
The owners of the ship or vessel Patraikos 2, Admiralty in Rem No 81/96, High 
Court of Singapore, 9 May 2002 ) 
The court held that the vessel owner failed to exercise due diligence in checking 
on the background, training and qualifications of the second mate before he was 
appointed. 
As such, the vessel owner was not entitled to claim the ‘Error of Navigation’ 
defence. 
 
 
7.4 ISM Lessons to be learnt 
 
These three case studies will help put into context the full significance of ISM 
implementation. They will hopefully clarify a number of the misunderstandings 
and misconceptions that arose during the research behind this book. 
By a process of extrapolation from the cases – the author would suggest that the 
following are the major issues to come to light: 
 
• The court will scrutinise the SMS and the documented systems very closely – 
anyone who believes they can get away with only paying lip service to ISM is 
seriously mistaken. 
• It is unacceptable for a Shipowner / Shipmanager to dump ready made 
procedures manuals on board a vessel and just expect those on board to  ‘… 
get on with it…’ If any Company, or individual believes that this applies to 
them then they will need to consider their position very carefully and 
implement major corrective action immediately. 
• Voluminous, and particularly irrelevant manuals are likely to be criticised by the 
court – if any Company or individual, on reflection, believes that their 
procedures and checklists and such like would be criticised by a court because 
of this reason then immediate corrective action needs to be put in place. 
• The recruiting, vetting, familiarisation and training of sea staff is likely to come 
under very close scrutiny – particularly when an incident occurred because of 
some ‘human error’. A Company needs to examine its own human resource 
systems and procedures and satisfy itself that they are tight enough to 
withstand detailed interrogation should an individual Master’s or seafarer’s 
actions lead to a court case – whether in a civil or a criminal action. What 
evidence is likely to be available to prove that  proper vetting, familiarisation 
and training procedures were indeed followed on each occasion? 
• The evidence which will be required will not be limited to the particular 
incident – rather evidence will need to be produced that good procedures were 
in place and that, for most of the time, those procedures were being correctly 
implemented and followed. That the incident that had arisen was an 
unfortunate accident – an isolated incident - a one off. The Company needs to 
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ensure that proper records are kept in such a form that they could be produced 
in court if needed. 
• Neither the Courts nor the ISM Code expect perfection – people will still make 
mistakes.  However, provided the Ship Operator can demonstrate that they  
had good systems in place and all involved were doing their best to properly 
implement their SMS then they should not be punished or penalised 
unreasonably by the Courts. The extent to which a Company or an individual 
can prove this will depend almost entirely on good accurate records having 
been maintained. 
• Altough not specifically addressed in the Court cases under consideration, it is 
suggested that the court will not only expect certain things to be produced as 
evidence but will also expect audit trails to be capable of being followed. The 
audit trails should prove whether or not the correct procedures were being 
followed. The audit trail should bring to light what went wrong with the 
system and, consequently, why the incident occurred. Reports of similar 
incidents – whether they be accidents, hazardous occurrences or non-
conformities will be examined – as well as the corrective action taken will be 
scrutinised. If such reports exist and the proper corrective action was taken, 
even though another incident has still occurred, these reports should help the 
Ship Operator’s defence. If the claimants / plaintiffs produce evidence of 
previous incidents which had not been reported then this will be seriously 
prejudicial to the Ship Operator’s defence – since it would demonstrate that 
there must be acute problems with the SMS itself. 
 
The view of the author – based on a study of these recent court cases, is that the Court 
recognises that accidents will still occur. If a Ship Operator has made a proper 
commitment to ISM, including motivating the personnel who will be implementing 
the systems and can demonstrate that they are doing their best, then ISM will be the 
best friend they could possibly have.  If the Ship Operator has bought an ‘off the 
shelf’ system – or otherwise put on board an unmanageable system and / or failed to 
motivate the personnel into implementing the system, then ISM will be the worst 
enemy they could ever imagine. 
 
In an attempt to bring this matter into some sort of context, consider this next report 
from an Indian Chief Officer who described in a very honest and open way the 
meaningless rituals he goes through to suggest on paper that the SMS is being 
implemented, whereas in practice it is just a fudge or façade. He describes the 
situation this way: 
 
It is no doubt that ism has improved working standards in the ships, 
but still the paperwork that ism requires (especially our company 
wants a work-plan, work-done weekly, bimonthly and monthly) most 
of the time we tend to fill up the papers rather than actually checking 
things or verifying. In this process, I feel there is no use of ism if 
people are going to find loopholes in this system and still do things 
in their own way. I believe this paper work req by the company is 
little too much that many times I make work plans for those work 
which never existed and again make work-done reports for those 
work done (which actually were not) this is because of fast 
turnarounds. Since I work in Indian company, and also come to 
know that many of the Indian companies follow the same procedure. 
The very basic safety policy of the company if u see will be the same 
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for most of the companies whereas it should be specifically made for 
each companies by the shore staff. Even the words are so same, 
many companies just copy the safety manuals from some other 
company's and sometimes forgetting to erase that company's name 
and put their name. I sincerely hope that this situation will be 
changed soon and something will be done about this, otherwise like 
the IMO chief said "don’t make ism just a paper work" will be 
continuing. 
 
A number of obvious and logical questions arise:  
Does the Ship Operator actually know that such practices are taking place? 
Does the Ship Operator approve / condone such practices? 
Has the Ship Operator tried to persuade the seafarers to behave in a different way? 
 
Presumably audits would pick up the irregularities. Clearly such practices go to the 
very root of the SMS and even though DOC’s and SMC’s might exist as pieces of 
paper they are meaningless – indeed such a SMS must be considered seriously 
deficient and non-compliant. The potential consequences for the ship operator could 
be very serious indeed. If an incident did occur which necessitated professional 
investigators to look at what may have led to the incident and they uncovered the 
practices being revealed by the Chief Officer – it is the ship operator who would 
have a lot of questions to answer. A court or inquiry would almost certainly conclude 
that, if causative, the ship was unseaworthy and the ship operators had failed to 
exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy. The ship operators would, 
probably lose their Hague-Visby defences and maybe even their insurance cover. It 
would be no excuse to say that they did not know what was going on onboard their 
own ships – their system should have brought the irregularities to light at an early 
stage. 
 
 
There are still many issues which the Courts need to address in connection with ISM 
to perhaps demonstrate the full significance and potential consequences of a Ship 
Operator, and those involved in the implementation process, failing to comply with 
the requirements of the ISM Code. There are two scenarios, which are closely 
connected, which the author anticipates will be issues to be addressed by the courts in 
the not too distant future: 
 
1. The question of whether a Shipowner who has been found to be in 
serious breach of ISM requirements will still be entitled to rely upon 
his right to limit his financial liability on a tonnage limitation basis – 
or will they be exposed to unlimited liability? 
2. The question of whether a Shipowner has breached the terms of his 
insurance cover – whether H&M or P&I – as a result of serious non-
compliance with the requirements of the ISM Code. Could a 
Shipowner find that he is exposed to a very large claim and has no 
insurance cover? 
In both cases it is quite possible that the role of the Designated Person – and in 
particular the implied state of mind of the ‘highest levels of management’, will come 
under very close scrutiny and will need to be considered by the court. 
In addition to the above two ‘civil actions’ it can easily be imagined that if another 
major pollution incident occurs – or worse still a major passenger ship or ferry 
incident with loss of life, the ISM systems will again come under very close scrutiny 
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by the Criminal Courts and Corporate Manslaughter is a very real possibility. A whole 
host of other criminal sanctions - potentially involving very large fines and lengthy 
prison sentences await those convicted. The Ship Owner and senior levels of 
management, as well as the Designated Person, are probably exposed as well as the 
middle managers and superintendents in the office and the Master and officers on 
board ship. This will clearly vary from one jurisdiction to another. The point is though 
that the court will look at the way in which the ISM systems had been set up and 
implemented. For the very same reasons as those identified in the civil action cases – 
the ISM Code will be the best friend a Company or an individual could possibly have 
or the worst enemy they could ever imagine.  
 
Each Company and each individual needs to look carefully at the ISM system with 
which they are working, even though they may have the DOC’s and SMC’s proudly 
displayed on the bulkhead, and ask themselves whether it complies with the following 
mantra: 
 
• Say what you do 
• Do what you say 
• Show that you have done what you said that you do 
 
If the answer is an unhesitating YES then fine – such a Company or individual 
probably has nothing to worry about. If the answer is NO – or there is SOME 
hesitation – then very serious thought needs to be given to consider what corrective 
action is needed without further delay. 
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8 Conclusion 
 
Many of the findings of the survey could perhaps have been predicted in advance. 
Many Companies, and individuals, are experiencing difficulties with their 
implementation of ISM – paperwork and lack of resources are particular problems. 
However, the research has brought to light a number of new and relevant issues that 
can provide the basis on which future progress can perhaps be built. Some of the 
national / cultural issues are of particular potential interest. There were also areas of 
considerable concern which have been highlighted – serious misunderstandings about 
the Code which seem to be widely held by many seafarers – particularly from the 
more ‘traditional maritime nations’. 
One fact which should never be lost sight of is that seafaring is, by its very nature, a 
dangerous occupation. An article appeared in the medical journal The Lancet on 17 
August 2002 which drew attention to some recent research by Dr. Stephen Roberts at 
Oxford University. It concluded that fishermen and merchant seafarers have by far the 
most dangerous jobs in Britain. The researchers found that people working on the sea 
are up to 50 times more likely to die while working than any other occupation. 
It is a sobering thought to realise that seafaring is not only more hazardous than 
construction and manufacturing industries but also a lot less safe than working for the 
police, army or fire brigade! 
Dr Roberts analysed official death statistics from a range of different professions 
between 1976 and 1995 – his ‘top ten’ most dangerous jobs – in decreasing order of 
severity were: 
 
1) Fishermen 
2) Merchant seafarers 
3) Aircraft flight deck officers 
4) Railway lengthmen (sic.) 
5) Scaffolders 
6) Roofers and glaziers 
7) Forestry workers 
8) Quarry and other mine workers 
9) Dockers and stevedores 
10) Lorry drivers 
  
(The Lancet) 
 
8.1 The Good, the Bad and the Ugly 
One thing that the survey confirmed is the very wide spectrum of compliance that 
exists across the industry. It would appear that most Companies and ships which 
require DOC’s and SMC’s do have their pieces of paper but few would actually seem 
to have a properly functioning Safety Management System. 
In a paper presented at the IMAREST Conference in May 2002 Brian Orrell of the 
UK based officer’s union NUMAST made the following observation: 
 
We believe the implementation of the ISM Code today has merely served 
to confirm that the good ships are good, mediocre ships are mediocre 
and the bad ships remain bad.  
(Orrell) 
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A similar experience was reported by Jorg Langkabel of DNV who found that after 2 
½ years post Phase I implementation three types of companies emerged after 
certification: 
 
• Those with perceived benefits (e.g. improved operational performance; 
reduced volumes of insurance claims, improved efficiency, reduced 
costs) 
• Those simply meeting requirements in an average way 
• Those who struggle and / or could not see the purpose. 
(Langkabel) 
   
One further example of a very similar observation was received from a marine 
surveyor on the West coast of the USA: 
 
The better shipping companies have probably become better as the routines 
have been refined and as each occurrence has been investigated and action 
taken to prevent/minimize recurrence. 
The inferior companies have become worse, cutting corners with poorly 
trained crews and where the senior officers are counting the days to come 
ashore and/or retire. 
Commercial pressures to meet schedules in the North Pacific override good 
seamanship all too regularly. 
Container ships are scheduled to arrive at a terminal by the hour. 
 
There are individuals who seem to hold the view that ISM is the greatest curse ever 
inflicted on the shipping industry whilst others believe that it has been the greatest 
blessing. There were many in between. What the survey has hopefully demonstrated 
is that questions such as whether or not the ISM Code is, or can, work are really not 
the appropriate questions to ask. The ISM Code is identical, word for word, for every 
Ship Operator, every ship and every seafarer around the world. What is different and 
what the questions should focus upon, is the individual, specific, Safety Management 
System. It is the SMS which differs from Company to Company and from ship to 
ship. It is quite clear from the results of the survey that there are some very good 
SMS’s in place and working, thus producing some excellent results, apparently, 
including increased profitability. On the other hand, there would seem to be other 
SMS’s which probably have no chance of ever working and which should be 
consigned to the ocean-deep.  
A tanker Master shared his nightmare experience: 
 
Questions answered basis last vessel 40,000 mt DWT product 
tanker. 
Absorbed into management 5 months ago. Previous operators – 
Greek. Now crewed by British Captain and Chief Engineer, all 
others Ukrainian. 
None of the crew familiar with the company. Vessel operated on an 
interim SMC provided within a leading Classification Society 
[name of society was provided] . Vessel in extremely poor 
condition, illegal in all aspects of Marpol regulations due failed 
equipment. All Class certificates valid despite serious defects. 
Vessel should not have been trading. Ukrainians do not have any 
concept of a safety ethos. Function of ISM was nil and 
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impracticable. ISM detracts from safety on that vessel due to the 
time required of master. 
 
A number of similar horror stories were sent to the author. Clearly a related matter of 
great concern also immediately arises as to why the seafarers, professional mariners, 
felt obliged to sail on such a ship. There was certainly no indication from the report 
that the situation was brought to the attention of the Authorities. The suspicion would 
have to be that we are again back into the fear and blame culture in a big way. 
 
It is interesting to consider the views of some external observers – such as this pilot 
who seems to have formed a most unfortunate view of the way in which many 
companies may have implemented their SMS: 
 
… my overriding impression of ISM (and similar safe ship management 
systems for non ISM ships) is that, with a few honourable exceptions, 
they are regarded as a means of "demonstrating" that shore based 
management has done their bit and that if anything goes wrong it must be 
the fault of the Master and crew. 
 
Much more needs to be done to track down the good SMS’s – to analyse them and 
understand what it is about them that makes them good. How have those Companies 
managed to motivate their team to embrace their SMS and fully implement it. When 
we read a claim from the chief executive of a shipping company such as this – we 
should hope that he and his company would be prepared to share some of their 
experiences and achievements for the benefit of the whole industry:  
 
Ships staff now understand that they are listened to and are eager to 
learn and do the best that they can. They own the ISM system and are 
part of the management team. 
 
Perhaps we need to be able to quantify the improvements in efficiency and 
profitability to persuade some parts of the industry that it really is worthwhile making 
the commitment. There are many lessons that can be learnt from others within the 
shipping industry. Having said that, it is not the view of the author that any one 
company should slavishly copy the SMS of another company. The suggestion is that 
we can learn and understand the methodology adopted and see whether that can be 
applied to our own situation. 
There would appear to be a need to improve the standard of education of some of the 
very concepts behind the ISM Code to many seafarers as well as Ship Operators – 
particularly to those who are perhaps outside of, or beyond, the formal learning 
systems i.e. those who are unlikely to be attending college or other training 
establishments.  
Further research will be necessary to understand fully the apparent major differences 
in perception of ISM between different national / cultural groups. If the findings of 
this survey are confirmed then the opportunity must be taken to capture and develop 
the enthusiasm for ISM, as shown particularly by Indian and South East Asian 
seafarers. 
Of course ISM cannot, and was never intended to be, a substitute for employing 
experienced and well qualified people – but it was intended to complement such ideas 
in an industry which might have experienced a shortage of such individuals for a 
while. Whilst the author might not fully agree with everything this Chief Engineer 
says – he has certainly identified a key issue: 
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ISM I feel has been introduced to bring standards up for flag of 
convenience vessels. 
For vessels already operating safely I feel it is another layer of 
inspections / paperwork. 
Different standards between countries appear to exist. 
It is reducing the ability of the individual. Relying more on the 
system. 
At the end of the day it’s the ability of the individual that counts and 
when people realise that to employ the right people will ultimately 
cost more but save money in the long run – then a safer environment 
will occur. 
 
An investment in people is an investment in safety – and an investment in both has to 
be extremely good for business. 
On a similar theme – there are some who believe that ISM is trying to replace already 
good systems – as the following Staff Captain of a Passenger ship explains: 
 
“When I first went to sea in Elder Dempster Lines (in 1952) they 
had a Blue Book which all company officers had to follow to the 
letter. This included distances off various points like Finesterre 
where there was heavy traffic / fishing boats. Companies courses 
and a host of sensible instructions, which you ignored at your peril. 
In other words a bible of common sea sense. Now the ISM Code in 
my opinion is so onerous and long winded, that it causes good 
officers to cook the books to get it over with. Voyage planning 
becomes a joke if destinations are constantly changed as on this 
vessel, work / rest hours is also a joke. The officers seem to be just 
paper work donkeys who become exhausted physically / morally on 
this triumph of fantasy over reality. 
 
There is little doubt that some old established shipping companies had some very 
good systems and procedures already in place which pre-dated ISM by many years. 
Those Companies should have experienced very little by way of change when they 
had to formally adopt ISM. A few ‘t’s crossed here, and ‘i’s dotted there. If 
substantial changes have been made to systems which were already ‘good’ – 
particularly if they were already structured on written procedures - then questions 
should be raised as to why it was felt necessary to make substantial changes and on 
whose instructions such changes were made.  
The problem was that many of the newer companies and seafarers didn’t have a pre-
existing ‘bible’ and some didn’t even come from such a tradition. It was therefore 
necessary for those companies to write down their best practices or, in appropriate 
cases, identify what is industry best practice and create a new bible. Of course such 
written procedures must be under constant scrutiny and must be adjusted or changed 
as part of the cycle of continuous improvement. 
 
There was also a perception, amongst some, that it is not the ISM Code at all which is 
the real cause for improvements in safety - or any other IMO influenced legislation – 
rather it is because of other commercial influences. An Indian chief officer on board 
LPG ships explained it as follows: 
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More than ISM it is the commercial pressure that has made my ship safe – 
In one years time we have about 3 Port State Control inspections and 8 oil 
major and terminal inspections. 
 
This is certainly an interesting point – for sure Shipowners realise that if they do not 
meet the safety and quality standards of the potential charterers then their ships are 
not hired, if they are not hired the Shipowner doesn’t earn any money. Whatever the 
underlying motivating factor might be, perhaps isn’t that important compared with the 
realisation that the same end result is achieved. Presumably, those Shipowners who 
operate ships which are not subject to oil major and terminal inspections but have still 
successfully implemented a functioning SMS had other motivating factors which 
encouraged them to comply. 
 
Those who may still believe that they can get away with only paying lip service to 
ISM will need to take careful heed of recent judgements being handed down by the 
courts. No one seriously expects the ISM Code to prevent every single accident. 
Whilst human beings are involved in operating ships there will still be occasional 
accidents. A properly implemented SMS will help to reduce accidents to a minimum 
but it is part of a cycle of continual improvement. However, neither the courts nor the 
ISM Code expect perfection. Provided serious attempts are being made to implement 
a good SMS, and this can be proved, then the ISM Code will be the best friend a Ship 
Operator could hope for. If the Ship Operator is doing nothing more than the 
minimum in order to obtain a DOC and SMC then the ISM Code is likely to be the  
worst enemy a Ship Operator could ever imagine. 
 
8.2 Overcoming conflicts 
 
It became very clear as the research progressed that in many ship operating companies 
there seems to be a divide – an ‘us-and-them’ type attitude. Clearly the need to have 
common objectives between the ship and the shore is crucial to ISM having any 
chance of being successfully implemented. Presenting a paper at the INMAREST 
Conference in London in May 2002, Captain Barry Cuneo, a serving ship master, 
described one major conflict in the following, very powerful terms: 
 
Ask any Manager what his company’s objectives are … they would be 
something like: 
1. Profitable business 
2. Efficient operation 
3. Minimum breakdowns 
4. Minimum accidents 
5. Zero pollution 
6. Minimum costs 
Ask any modern, international crew member employed through manning 
agents worldwide, how their priorities stand. They would most surely state: 
1. Good pay, on time, relatively better than compatriots on other 
vessels 
2. Good food, plentiful in supply without restrictions 
3. Mail / e.mail on time and accessible 
4. Leave when due, without delays due to lack of relief 
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We must of course keep matters in perspective and never lose sight of the fact that 
Merchant ships are usually part of a commercial venture. The Shipowner uses the ship 
to earn freight or hire by carrying cargoes or otherwise generate funds by carrying 
passengers or some other gainful activity. There is certainly nothing wrong with this – 
indeed the author and probably the vast majority of the readers of this book derive 
their livelihood, either directly or indirectly, from this simple economic reality. Most 
ship operators are not themselves charitable organisations – they are invariably in 
business to make a profit – but not necessarily at any cost.  
Of course in the operation of their business and their ships they must comply with a 
very wide range of Rules and Regulations – often involving safety related issues. The 
more perceptive ship operators realised that, irrespective of any Rules and 
Regulations, it actually makes good business sense to operate their ships safely. 
Consequently they could see that making adequate resources available to ensure that 
their ships were operated safely represented a good investment. Some ship operators 
may still need to be convinced of the wisdom of such prudence. The ISM Code 
however, makes it a requirement that adequate resources are made available. Section 
3.3 states: 
 
Company responsibilities and authority 
 
3.3     The Company is responsible for ensuring that adequate resources and 
shore-based support are provided to enable the designated person or 
persons to carry out their functions. 
 
Of course in the real world ship operators do not have bottomless pockets – freight 
rates and charter hire rates have been seriously depressed in many markets for a 
considerable length of time. Resources are finite and they are limited. Many ship 
operating companies have invested heavily in developing and implementing their 
SMS – others may have paid only enough to buy a set of manuals and a DOC and 
SMC from a friendly Flag State. Of course the costs involved with ISM are not 
limited to the initial setting up costs. The SMS needs to be constantly maintained - 
which will require adequate funding. There were many respondents, particularly 
seafarers, who were suggesting that the limited funding which was being made 
available for implementing or maintaining the SMS was not being made available 
where it was most needed – i.e. on board the ship. There was a certain amount of 
consistency in the comments coming from many individuals quite independent of 
each other and it would perhaps be worthwhile considering some of their comments 
below: 
 
 “ISM has increased the number of superintendents ashore, whereas 
number of people on board remains the same or reduced. 
Without increasing the number of people on board (specially in the 
short sea trading area) the objectives of ISM cannot be achieved. 
Authorities should understand that small ship and short sea passage 
does not mean small number of people to run. Hours of monitoring 
the ship is still 24 hrs. a day, 7 days a week…” 
 (Second Mate – small tanker) 
 
“ISM has generated a mass of additional paperwork which has 
necessitated employment of an additional manager ashore, but no 
relief from the extra burden on board.”  
(Second Engineer) 
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“In my opinion, looking at the overall picture, implementation of the 
ISM Code has meant an incredible increase in paperwork and 
workload, with very little improvement in safety, and quality of work 
/ services etc. Yet again the seagoing staff have an extra workload 
whilst offices ashore employ additional staff for implementation / 
management of ISM Code.” 
(Second Engineer) 
 
Whether these perceptions are fair or not is somewhat irrelevant; the fact that they are 
so widely perceived at all is cause for concern. The question which obviously arises is 
where the management resources are being channelled, whether more needs to be done 
to explain to the Seafarers the rationale behind the decisions as to where the resources 
are allocated and whether indeed the Seafarers might have a very valid point. 
A few years ago, on the administration side, it was not unusual to carry a Purser or 
Chief Steward who would undertake much of the ships paperwork. Such individuals 
started to be made redundant and the Radio Officer started to undertake much of the 
paperwork – in due time that rank was also considered surplus to requirements and a 
‘luxury’. The paperwork and additional administration tended to end up with the 
Master and possibly shared amongst other officers who remained. The technical side 
of the Radio Officer’s job was also shared out amongst those remaining. The 
Electrician was to share a similar fate on board many ships. A passenger ferry master 
not only laments such events but questions the economic justification: 
 
…there is a lot of extra paperwork for the master and no one to help. 
If the Radio / Electronics officer were back – he could help with all 
this as well as saving the company lots of money by being able to 
maintain electronic systems which most electrical officers cannot fix. 
 
A Canadian Master has a few additional hats he is expected to wear:  
 
Along with being the Captain, chief steward, 3rd Mate, radio officer, 
writer I am now expected to be the ships political officer and lately 
cruise director (e.g. how do you motivate your crew re-ISM) 
 
 
The author does not have sufficient information to determine how extensive these 
sorts of perceptions might be. What he would say though is that they should be taken 
very seriously because they are the source of feelings of conflict and lead on very 
quickly to engendering a sense of ‘us and them’ which is not at all healthy when the 
movement should be towards team building. Such attitudes can be divisive and 
distract attention away from the serious matter of managing safety. It may well be 
that resources really did have to be directed towards sponsoring shore based 
positions – if that is the case it would be much better to share the reasoning with the 
sea-staff rather than allow allegations of ‘cronyism’ to fester. 
Interestingly, with regard to the clerical / secretarial issue - the author was advised, by  
two quite independent sources, that a cost effective and viable solution had been found 
to this problem. The companies concerned had started to employ Indian clerks who 
had been trained within the Indian Civil Service, or similar background. The Clerks 
had excellent secretarial skills, were methodical, efficient and meticulous and were 
able to take the burden of routine paperwork off the shoulders of the Master and other 
officers and allow them to get on with running the ship. In relative terms the clerks 
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were well paid compared with the salaries they could expect at home but were modest 
when compared with the salary of a qualified officer. This is not intended to be any 
sort of statement by the author on the moral / ethical issues which might be involved – 
only pointing out that at least two shipping companies have gone down this route and 
it has apparently contributed significantly to their ability to more effectively 
implement their SMS and consequently make their ships safer. When we hear the 
desperate pleas of some of the respondents, such as the British Master quoted below, 
the industry must take these matters very seriously indeed: 
 
The paper work brought about by the code, QA, etc. has reached a point 
where their very existence is causing a burden upon ship masters, 
particularly in coastal trading, and certain areas need to be rationalised 
to stop the proliferation of forms, surveys, audits etc. It seems to be 
forgotten that on manning scales that exist, ship masters have to be 
bridge watchkeepers as well and do not have the time to be full time 
office type administrators. 
 
One of the serious conflicts, which had been anticipated and which was confirmed was 
‘self preservation versus public interest’. Public policy demands safer ships and 
cleaner seas – and the author would suggest that the overwhelming majority of the 
World’s seafarers and ship operators would like to achieve that noble goal. However, 
we seem to live, or at least we perceive that we live, in a world of blame and 
punishment. The ISM Code can provide an opportunity to achieve that noble goal of 
safer ships and cleaner seas – but to get there we need transparency and an openness 
which will allow us to identify where the real problems are and to deal with those 
problems. The perception, on how to deal with the problem, of many in the society in 
which we live, is to punish the apparent offenders rather than looking at the real causes 
and dealing with the problem at that level. The ship operators and even their Masters 
and officers are fined and sometimes imprisoned by the authorities and the courts 
when an accident occurs. Masters and officers are sacked or demoted or overlooked in 
any future promotions – or at least they perceive they will be. As a consequence some 
are finding it very difficult to get through that deeply entrenched barrier to start 
moving towards the development of a no-blame safety culture. One of the leading 
headline articles in the October 2002 issue of Fairplay reported on a very prestigious 
ship management conference which had just been held in Cyprus where most of the 
leading Shipmanagers of the world were either speaking or attending as delegates. An 
extract from that article appears below: 
 
ISM is dog's breakfast, says Grool 
"ISM is a dog's breakfast," Wallem group MD Rob Grool insisted this 
morning on the final day of Ship Management 2002 in Cyprus. His 
speech yesterday caused such discussion that today's chairman, V.Ships 
MD Peter Cooney, invited him back to face more questions from the 
floor. "If a safety management system concentrates on documentation 
and covering backsides, it is a loser," Grool told delegates yesterday. "I 
do not agree with the way ISM is turning into a fault-finding thing that 
can be used against you in a court of law," he said today. Martin 
Hernqvist, loss prevention officer of the Swedish Club, said: "We've 
handled thousands of claims since 1998, but we haven't seen any 
punished because of ISM." Cooney asked delegates whether they 
believed the Code has been successful, and the vast majority thought it 
had. "I look forward to [North of England P&I Club associate director] 
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Phil Anderson's study on whether ISM has made shipping a safer 
industry," said Grool, "but I have my doubts that it has." 
 
It would be very easy to quote Mr Grool out of context and to possibly 
misunderstand what he intended by such comments. Indeed, one might ask, 
how can any ISM system possibly work within a ship management company 
where the chief executive appears to have such negative views – particularly 
in light of paragraph 6 of the Preamble to the Code: ‘The cornerstone of good 
safety management is commitment from the top.’ The author has had the 
privilege of exchanging some views with Mr Grool on some of these issues. 
The impression made was that Mr Grool was not criticising the ISM Code per 
se but rather he is drawing attention to these conflicts which exist as a result 
of pressure from ‘the authorities’, potential claimants and their lawyers. He 
sees these pressures as being so great that they are basically stifling any 
possibility of the transparency and openness which would be required from 
ever developing – people and companies proceed automatically into self 
preservation mode. 
In July 2002 the Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents at the Marine Accident 
Investigation Branch (MAIB) in the UK – rear Admiral John Lang retired and in 
his farewell message, in the foreword to the 2001 Annual Report, he said that 
he had one overriding regret: 
It is with great sadness to note how few other flag states around the 
world have full-time marine accident investigation organisationa that 
are able and prepared, to conduct independent in-depth marine 
accident investigations and make their reports publicly available. 
I think safety at sea, and the lives of everyone afloat including 
passengers, could be improved if steps were taken to correct this 
weakness as a matter of some urgency. 
 
Admiral Lang believes that the reluctance on the part of many flag State 
Administration to do more stems largely from the lack of transparency in the 
international shipping community. 
He also refers to a climate of ‘fear’ operating within the industry. An ambition of 
Admiral Lang had been the establishment of a facility for confidential reporting of 
safety issues which he believed would help overcome such fear and allow a level of 
transparency in.  The Admiral went on to say: 
 
The blame culture is prevalent throughout the industry, and mariners are 
genuinely freightened that if they were known to be reporting safety 
deficiencies they would almost certainly lose their jobs… This climate of 
fear is not conducive to the establishment of a safety culture at sea… 
 
Admiral Lang would certainly appear to be correct in many respects – although the 
author would again reiterate the important point that a number of shipping companies 
and individual seafarers appear to have transcended that barrier and moved into the 
more enlightened state.  There is another very important issue which links to Admiral 
Lang’s comments, although the criticism could probably not be levelled at him or the 
MAIB. There is a very clear policy within the MAIB, indeed it is written into its 
constitution, that its purpose is not to pass judgment or apportion blame but rather to 
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establish causality and derive lessons to be learnt.  This policy may not always be 
appreciated by seafarers or shipping companies and certainly in many other countries 
the policy of the investigators is quite different. The experience of having investigators 
on board is likely to be a very frightening and intimidating experience. There have 
been many cases reported around the world – including the UK, other parts of Europe 
and the USA where the Master and other members of the ship’s crew have been 
arrested and taken ashore to be locked up in prison cells. Seafarers are, in some cases, 
treated in humiliating and degrading ways and denied the rights and privileges of 
ordinary citizens. They are treated as criminals and often used as scapegoats – 
particularly if there has been an incident involving a loss of life or pollution.  The 
ships, the individuals and the companies are often fined very large amounts of money 
in respect of alleged violations and the individuals or the ships are detained until such 
time as the fines are paid. 
If ISM is to work it requires more than just the seafarers and the shipping companies 
to move towards the development of no-blame safety cultures – the whole industry 
and related Administrations, legal bodies and professions must also mature and move 
in that direction. Society needs to also mature and move in that direction. Once that is 
achieved – and can be clearly seen to have been achieved - then the progress within 
the shipping industry will surely be accelerated. The judgment of the Honourable Mr 
Justice Steel in the Torepo  case is, in the view of the author, a great stride in the right 
direction. Hopefully his colleagues within the judiciary, both in the UK and elsewhere, 
will learn important lessons from that judgment. People will still make mistakes, 
irrespective of the ISM Code, but provided they are trying their best to properly 
implement a working SMS and it was possible to demonstrate that the incident was a 
‘one off’ then little would be achieved by punishing those who made the mistake, or 
their employers. In a properly functioning SMS the appropriate lessons would have 
been learnt from the incident and corrective action put in place to reduce further the 
chances of such a mistake being made again. 
 
Some quite bizarre ‘conflict’ situations were reported by both seafarers as well as 
shore based staff. Perhaps one of the most alarming was received from a British Chief 
Engineer: 
 
My owners are not interested in ‘Safety’ etc. only in how cheap the 
ship can be run. 
Have received instructions from owners to refuse permission for 
PSC, USCG, etc to board the vessel. 
However, I report defects to authorities when crew safety, etc. is at 
risk as this is often the only way the owners will carry out the 
repairs. 
 
This would certainly prompt a potentially interesting, and perhaps entertaining, 
situation – the mind boggles! One wonders if the owners provided any suggestions as 
to what should be said to the USCG officer who was on his way up the gangway to 
tell him that he would not be allowed on board.  
In case there is any doubt in anyone’s mind – the author would strongly recommend 
that seafarers do not attempt to refuse permission for PSC, USCG to board the 
vessel! 
 
There are many potential conflict situations which can arise between those working 
on board ship and those in the office ashore. Often these are very difficult to 
overcome since individual’s wills and egos are invariably involved. There were a 
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number of examples of incidents submitted whereby the instructions from the office 
ashore were contradictory and conflicting and placed those on board in an impossible 
position. A classic example was that reported by a Lithuanian Chief Officer: 
 
On board ships of our manager we are in between two fires: safety 
and quality department (SQD) and technical department (TD). 
SQD telling us that you must carry out work according to the 
manuals. 
TD telling that you must do some works despite manuals, because 
they cannot provide necessary (not gas free, lack of safety tools and 
equipment), owing extremely tight budget and we are working safely 
as possible, because we need this job. So ISM Code can’t change 
nothing in Companies with tight budget – and most hate thing is 
paper work, paper work, paper work for nothing (ISM Code!) 
 
An Indian Chief Officer explained how he felt utterly intimidated by certain 
members of the office staff who were acting contrary to company policy. He 
described the situation in the following terms: 
 
It is very important to state that this ‘no blame’ culture has not 
permeated into the organisation. There are a few personnel in the 
shore staff who still intimidate on board personnel when incidents 
are reported – although the top management is totally committed to 
a ‘no blame’ policy. 
It is still a problem to implement this policy and there should be 
methods devised to ensure proper reporting in the Company – 
maybe not to department directly concerned (at least for the present 
when personnel may feel that they maybe victimised). 
 
Reports were received of ‘cost cutting’ by the office which sent clear messages to the 
seafarers with regard to the company commitment to safety. An Australian Master 
produced a ‘classic’ where the safety improvements required would have cost very 
little money to implement. He draws the worrying conclusion that if the Company 
was not prepared to deal with such a small matter adequately what hope will there be 
for dealing with something major! He explains what happened in the following 
terms:  
 
“ISM is practiced because they (the Company) have to do it. This 
makes it a good thing in my opinion. But if it costs money no action 
is taken. 
One of the more ridiculous examples was where the welder was 
getting burnt hands due to inferior quality welding gloves. The safety 
officer recommended quality European ones. He was told to forget it 
and cancel the report or his job was at risk. If the above is valid for 
small costs, imagine the reaction to serious costs.” 
 
 
One of the roles and functions of the DP should be to allow such a problem to be by-
passed and the DP should have the ear of the highest levels of management. However 
if the DP is amongst those doing the intimidating then a serious problem does exist. 
It is quite possible that the very senior levels of management would be genuinely 
horrified if they were aware of such a situation or at least that such perceptions 
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existed. The sorts of problems the last Chief Officer was probably alluding to was 
maintenance which needed doing and which was being cut back by Engineer 
Superintendents who were trying to keep costs down, excessive hours being worked 
by staff on board which the HR department would rather not hear about, or the need to 
reduce speed in restricted visibility when the operations department may have very 
clear ideas about the importance to maintain ETA’s and schedules. 
 
Sometimes the potential conflict is where to draw the line of reality. Although it may 
be ‘stating the obvious’, it is very important that everyone realises that successful 
implementation of ISM involves partnerships. No matter how much the shore 
management of the Company may have genuine desires to see the SMS work – they 
will achieve nothing if they have not persuaded the Master and seafarers on board that 
it is something worth doing and to making a full commitment. Similarly, it is very 
unlikely that much will be achieved, even if the Master, officers and other seafarers 
are great exponents of ISM, without the support from the office ashore. The whole of 
the ISM anticipates and requires the ‘organisation’ to operate as one team. In this way 
a strong and healthy safety culture can be developed and the management of safety 
and pollution prevention will follow as a natural consequence. 
This very simple principle was described by the Safety Manager of a Turkish 
Shipping Company: 
 
“The success of SMS depends on the dissemination level of the safety 
culture on Company and on the ships.” 
 
An important part of that partnership involves a mutual respect being established 
between the parties and an appreciation of each others problems and possible 
constraints. Again the problem, and its solution, lays in the ability to ‘communicate’ 
with each other.  The frustrations which can be experienced, from a failure to develop 
mutual respect and to communicate with each other, is perhaps highlighted in the 
following report from a British Second Mate: 
 
“The ISM Code and indeed a company’s SMS will only be  effective 
if the vessels officers and the management company strive to make it 
work. Often I find myself fighting with management over simple 
matters, because they seem to want only perfectly completed 
paperwork and not reality. Despite our attempts to reduce the files 
in our SMS, over the last 2 ½  years our system has gone from 65 
files to 80, and that’s only on the deck side. I no longer consider 
myself a deck officer but a seagoing secretary – constantly under 
pressure to complete paperwork.  
We have just successfully completed our intermediate external audit 
from the MCA receiving only 3 minor non conformities – However, 
if they had time to dig deeper, for sure we would have conceded 
dozens!” 
 
We can surely hear a plea to be listened to coming from this Filipino Master: 
 
Also some company could have improved their ISM system if they 
will accept feed-back from ship.” 
 
An ISM Consultant with a very keen eye for this vitally important aspect shared the 
following thoughts and reflections: 
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“There is a lot of concern with safety. Huge investments are done in 
better equipment, ships, computers, etc., but it is always the trend to 
give less and less to the "human element" (the seafarer): less 
payment, less leisure time, less vacation time, less people on board. 
And the "human element" knows it, feels it, and its hurt because of it. 
Doesn’t feel very good on board and that is against safety. I believe 
it will be more productive investing in people more money instead of 
only in machines.” 
 
It does often seem that some companies, who perhaps believe they are doing the right 
thing, spend considerable amounts of money on sophisticated electronic equipment 
and computerised systems. They fail to realise that if a part of their budget and time 
was spent addressing the real human element issues then they would see a much more 
productive return. Too often it seems that shipping companies are run by accountants 
who have very little, if any knowledge or understanding of life on board a ship or 
what sort of things might motivate seafarers to perform better. Life on board ship is a 
strange environment and certainly very different from that which many of the shore 
based staff in the office could ever imagine. A Filipino Chief Engineer describes what 
is almost despair with the way seafarers are treated and provides a possible solution 
which many would be advised to reflect upon and try and understand what this Chief 
Engineer is really trying to communicate:   
 
“The ISM audits focused too much on operational safety and 
environmental protection. Crews tasked to perform this function 
should have clear state of mind and therefore a happy ship – 
meaning crew on high morale tends to perform better. Ship 
managers should look into putting some emphasis on masters 
carrying out this responsibility to form part of the audit. Although 
there are no statistics to prove this point, a happy crew hopefully is 
an added advantage and crew welfare is a case in point.” 
 
Clearly he is not really suggesting that the audits should not focus on operational 
safety and environmental protection – for after-all that is exactly what the audits 
should be doing. Rather he is trying to draw attention to the fact that we are dealing 
with human beings and not computers or machines. If the SMS is not working as it 
should then there is a good possibility that there will be a ‘human’ element involved 
somewhere and may even be the primary cause of the problem with the system. The 
audit needs to be able to pick up these human element issues and find corrective 
actions in a human way. 
 
At the end of the day many of the problems can be traced back to basic economics – 
the ship operator has a finite amount of money coming in and cannot, for any 
sustainable period, continue paying out more than that amount. A crucial question 
that needs to be asked is whether there can be any justification at all for leaving the 
whole responsibility and cost of implementation on the shoulders of the Shipowner? 
The last question could perhaps be rephrased by asking whether it would be 
reasonable to expect other interested parties to participate in the management of 
safety on board – or at least create a situation whereby the Shipowner could provide 
what is necessary or whether those other parties would be prepared to contribute 
towards the cost of developing and maintaining a system to manage safety 
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management. At its basic level the real question is addressed in this comment 
received from a New Zealand Chief Officer: 
 
If cargo owners are not held responsible for the quality of the ships 
that they use, then there will never be the financial resources from 
freight rates sufficient to materially improve ship operations 
worldwide. 
 
The full significance of what is being said here should not be missed. If it is 
necessary to increase the ship operators income – so that the SMS can be properly 
funded – by increasing freight rates and charter hire rates then we are all going to 
have to share in the consequences. Basically the cost of fuel for our cars, the food on 
our table, the clothes on our backs and most other things we need to purchase in our 
day-to-day existence will increase. Many of the consumable products we use have 
arrived from overseas by ship and even goods produced locally will have had to be 
transported using fuel and possibly vehicles which have arrived by sea. If the 
transportation costs increase to the importer or merchant then those costs will have to 
be passed on down the line to the final consumer. 
When a major maritime accident occurs on our shore line, particularly if there is loss 
of life or a major pollution – or if a seagull is injured or a pretty village is perceived 
to be threatened – then the newspapers and television news reports quickly whip up a 
public outcry against these ‘substandard ship operators sailing their rust-buckets 
around and flying these terrible flags of convenience’. Maybe they have a point but if 
they were asked to agree to a 10p per litre increase in the cost of their petrol, or an 
extra 15p on their pack of Corn Flakes – how many would  happily say Yes? How 
many would even understand the relevance of the question? 
All the Oil Majors and many other substantial chartering organisations make very 
high demands with regard to safety and the management of safety on board the ships 
they take on charter. This puts pressure on the ship operators to ensure those 
standards are met in order to obtain the business – this in turn assists those on board 
in seeing those standards realised. The situation is described by a British Master in 
the following terms: 
 
“The ISM Code has failed to address the participation of charterers, 
terminal operators, port authorities etc. Without their involvement at 
times unnecessary commercial pressure is put on the Master. 
 
A Second Engineer goes even further to explain the stark reality: 
 
Generally whilst the correct noises are made, it comes to a grinding 
halt as soon as the cost of improvements is realised, unless 
charterers or Classification Society demands it, then it is a case of 
how high do you want us to jump!! 
 
What is not addressed here is the fact that the Charterers will pay the minimum they 
can get away with in Freight or Charter Hire. Of course they are working in a hard 
commercial environment in the same way as everyone else. The shipping industry is 
of course subject to the basic economic laws of ‘supply and demand’. The reality is 
that if one ship operator is not prepared to accept the ‘going rate’ for freight or 
charter hire then there is probably another ship operator around the corner who will 
be prepared to accept what is offered. In this way the shipping industry itself is 
contributing towards the depressed market conditions. There are basically too many 
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ships, many of them very old, available for too few cargoes and ship operators seem 
too willing to cut each others throats in the competitive market. In this potentially 
dangerous commercial market the temptation to cut corners can be considerable. 
The conflicts, whether perceived or real, can also be the cause of moral dilemmas to 
individuals such as this Indian Chief Engineer: 
 
“In the face of commercial pressures, fast turn arounds, tight 
budget controls, continuous breakdown of machinery, old vessels, 
strict and sometimes conflicting legislation, individual 
interpretations of codes, personal whims and fancies of auditors, 
implementation of ISM Code on board the vessel becomes a sort of 
‘nuisance’ inspite of knowing that these codes are for the 
betterment of industry and for the safety and well being of 
sailors.” 
 
 
One of the keys to the successful implementation of any management system as well 
as overcoming potential conflict situations is good communications. This involves 
communication at all levels – internally within the ship as well as between the ship 
and the office ashore. Of course any communication must be a two way process. 
Once that two-way communication has been established then it should be possible to 
perceive a noticeable improvement in the general attitude of individuals towards the 
successful implementation of the SMS. One of the major causes of problems and a 
failure of the entire system is poor communication. The enthusiasm and positive 
attitude from individuals such as the following Bulk Carrier Chief Officer will 
almost guarantee the success of the system: 
 
“The significant factor is the inclusion of all members of the ship’s 
complement into the safety culture. Every member is kept informed 
of all developments both positive and negative, and as a result, 
everyone is aware that their actions and opinions matter to the 
overall result.” 
 
Every one is on the same ‘song sheet’ as it were – everyone on the same team – all 
pulling together in the same direction. By working on, and developing, 
communications in this way the Safety Management System should grow from 
strength to strength. Communication helps to ensure everyone’s participation in the 
management of the safety management system. An Australian Second Mate 
described what was happening on board his ship: 
 
“ISM is working well. Everyone has a voice via safety committees 
and ship management meetings. 
People on board and ashore are more aware of their responsibilities 
to themselves and others.” 
 
Clearly on board that ship people were working together and participating in the 
SMS. A report received from a Chief Engineer, who was involved at a relatively 
early stage of implementation, suggests that the staff in his company had appreciated 
the importance of good communications and had built this concept into their initial 
verification stage:  
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 “At present we have a SMS on board – although we are still to be 
certificated as ISM compliant. The SMS has been in place since 
early 2000 with one internal audit in August 2000. The SMS appears 
to be working well with management and sea going staff 
communicating effectively. Since the internal audit we have not 
identified any non-conformities.” 
 
Clearly no one should underestimate the importance of good communications and 
should ensure that maximum effort is put into developing those good 
communications if conflicts are to be overcome. It is also important to remember to 
‘include’ as many people as possible in the communications – each person will have 
their own contributions to make. Let us listen to a Filipino sailor: 
 
Meetings should be conducted more often with consultation from 
lower ranks without fail so that they can express their feelings / true 
feelings without fear or harassment. This is due to the fact that it is 
with our Filipino culture not to speak out. I believe in true form of 
ISM is a very good for Filipino seaman. Only it will take time before 
we can eliminate the feelings of fear. In overall look ISM lower the 
incident of death and near misses. 
 
 
8.3 Standardisation and policing the systems 
Many of the reports received as part of the survey drew attention to very significant 
differences in standards – not only between ship operating companies – but also 
between different flag State Administrations, port State control authorities, 
Classification Societies and indeed between different individuals working within the 
same organisation. Some reports indicated corruption and coercion – although the 
indications are that such activity is not rife. Many more reports pointed towards 
inexperienced, unskilled and unqualified individuals who were involved in auditing or 
inspecting the SMS. 
The frustrations that result from this were expressed by an Indian Chief Engineer who 
was clearly speaking from the heart: 
 
“The initial good intentions of the ISM Code did not produce the 
expected results for the following reasons: 
Various regulatory authorities / interested parties, involved with 
the shipping industry (e.g. classification Society / Port State 
Control of various countries / different Oil Majors / USCG) 
miserably failed in formulating a uniform international standard 
which should be feasible for the Shipowner to comply with 
minimum fuss and expenses. In practice none of the above 
mentioned ‘parties’ have anything in common with each other 
although all of them expect compliance of all their million 
regulations from the shipowner or operator if their ships has to 
continue trading. Because of innumerable inspections in all almost 
every port by these above authorities, sometimes the owners / 
operators as well as the people manning the ships get a distinct 
feeling that by virtue of operating or working a vessel a ‘major 
crime’ has been commited  and penance is required therefore, 
which is really a very sad state of affairs, as the whole world and 
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the people in it must realise that without seatrade the civilization 
can only proceed towards annihilation. I have not seen any attempt 
being made anywhere by the above mentioned ‘regulatory 
authorities’ to inform the people at large regarding the ‘seatrade’ 
and people working in ships and making the trade possible and the 
companies, owning / managing these ships. 
 
A Classification society surveyor and auditor drew attention to a range of ‘standards’ 
of application which he comes across and suggests that the core problem is different 
parts of the world seem to be prepared to tolerate very different standards. He 
described his own experience in these terms: 
 
“As an ISM Client Co-ordinator, dealing with active vessels 
auditing and reviewing cases for this region perhaps the following 
comments may be of use. 
It is difficult to generalise all companies together, we see / audit 
companies of the highest standards, that are seen as guiding lights 
in the implementation of ISM.  Also we see on a regular basis in 
this area companies that look upon ISM as just another piece of 
paper to appease PSC, and buy such off the shelf for as little as 
possible. This type of owner will always strive to cut costs on the 
back of safety. On some vessels, on which certification was refused 
examples of conditions harking back to the days of when 
malnutrition was more common cause of death than drowning at 
sea! 
Unfortunately the situation, although becoming more rare has not 
improved for some seafarers at all with the introduction of ISM.  
However, it is not the Code itself , or other certification but the 
enforcing of world wide standards across different cultures that is 
the problem.” 
  
The IMO Guidelines (A.913 and MSC Circ 890 / MEPC Circ 354) attempt to 
introduce a level of standardisation, guidelines within the MOU’s and the 
Classification Societies also attempt the same exercise. These do appear to be having 
an effect and the situation does seem to be generally improving. However, there 
would still seem to be a long way to go. Part of the problem might be that there is no 
one organisation that is monitoring or policing standardisation. 
It is the view of the author that an Inquiry should be undertaken, at an international 
level, to establish whether a more structured approach is needed to encourage 
standardisation in the verification, certification and compliance procedures. This may 
involve, for example, a requirement that all inspectors / auditors – whether they be 
acting directly for a Government or Classification Society – must undergo a formal 
course of academic study and practical training in the ISM Code to be followed by a 
formal examination. The syllabus, courses and the examination to be conducted by 
organisations independent of the employers of the candidates. The individual would 
become certificated / licensed to conduct ISM verification audits and to issue DOC’s 
and SMC’s. The most obvious body would be, perhaps, the IMO itself.  
It may also be appropriate to devise a system to license flag State Administrations – or 
at least Recognised Organisations to issue internationally recognised DOC’s and 
SMC’s with the possibility of having such a license cancelled, revoked or otherwise 
suspended if it transpired that such an organisation had authorised the issue of 
certificates for systems which did not meet minimum standards. 
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In addition, the Inquiry could consider the possibility of setting up a team of 
inspectors who could attend a shipping company’s office or on board a ship – 
immediately following a verification or interim verification audit to ‘spot check’ that 
the verification had been done to an acceptable level and the certificates had been 
properly issued. If discrepancies were found then various levels of penalties could be 
imposed with the ultimate sanction of cancelling or withdrawing the individual 
licence of the inspector and possibly the operating / issuing licence of the organisation 
involved. Again an obvious body to undertake such a task would perhaps be the IMO. 
8.4 Managing safety in other high risk industries 
This has been a very wide ranging survey but, inevitably, it is incomplete. There are 
many additional issues which require exploring. It had been the author’s intention to 
conduct a detailed investigation into how safety is managed in other high-risk 
industries. Having looked at that aspect he came to realise quite quickly that such an 
exercise would require an entire research project in its own right. Interesting dialogue 
was entered into with management and staff in a number of other industries and 
professions – sometimes it was clear that those other industries and professions were 
experiencing very similar problems to those being encountered by commercial 
shipping with the implementation of the ISM Code. Others had shown that they had, 
apparently, overcome those problems.  
A very interesting debate was entered into with an individual who was actively 
involved in trying to encourage the reporting of accidents, hazardous occurrences and 
near misses within the National Health Service of the UK. Clearly this is literally a 
‘life and death’ occupation and, for that reason, it is vitally important that any lessons 
that can be learnt are learnt. It had been very difficult to persuade medical doctors and 
nurses to report their mistakes, or near mistakes, not only because of any personal 
pride but because they were afraid of being sued, prosecuted or possibly struck off the 
practitioners register. However some success was achieved and a number of Health 
Authorities did persuade their staff to cooperate and report. In the spirit of the ‘no-
blame’ culture the results were published and immediately the front pages of the 
newspapers were covered with headlines saying that the Health Service was in a state 
of disaster with Doctors and Nurses admitting to thousands of mistakes. All the good 
work which had been done, all the potential lessons which could have been learnt, all 
the lives which could have been saved as a consequence were instantly thrown out of 
the window by an utterly ignorant and irresponsible press. 
Whilst contact was made with many individuals working within the offshore oil 
industry – one particular encounter proved to be very interesting. A relatively young 
Master had decided to leave the sea and move into the offshore oil industry – the 
dialogue with the author spanned this career transition period. At sea the individual 
was Master with a ‘blue chip’ liner operator which is a household name. He was quite 
typical of many Masters from a similar background with whom the author had had the 
privilege of talking – he believed that on board his ship they managed safety very 
well, they worked in a ‘no-blame – safety’ culture and really didn’t need the ISM 
Code. When he started his familiarisation and training programme, ahead of actually 
going offshore, he was amazed to find that there was in fact an enormous divide 
between the whole approach to safety in the offshore industry compared with 
commercial shipping – his expression was something along the lines that ‘shipping 
was still living in the dark ages’. Very soon after commencing his training the 
induction group was visited by the Vice-President of the Company who had flown in 
from the States. It appears that the visit had a three-fold purpose: 
 
1. to welcome the newcomers to the company 
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2. to emphasis that safety takes priority over everything else 
3. to make it very clear that anyone found not complying with the safety 
policy would be instantly dismissed. 
 
Safety management systems, or similar concepts, have existed in the airline, offshore 
oil, chemical, nuclear and many other industries and professions for many years. They 
experienced many of the problems which commercial shipping has been experiencing 
with the implementation of the ISM Code and managed to find ways of overcoming 
them. Other problems are still causing them concern. However, it must surely make 
sense for the commercial shipping industry to examine closely what other industries 
have done, or are doing, with regard to managing safety and understand how they are 
doing it. There must be an enormous number of lessons to be learnt from those other 
industries. It seems so obvious yet quite remarkable that little seems to have been 
done to look outside of our world of shipping. There seems to be some sort of 
misconception within the shipping industry that this is a new wheel that needs 
inventing independent of the rest of the world.  
A classic example of this apparent ‘isolationist’ attitude is perhaps highlighted in the 
UK by the fact that the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) are commissioned to 
monitor safety and investigate accidents in just about every high risk industry except 
shipping where it is left to another Government department – the Maritime and 
Coastguard Agency (MCA). The HSE must have an enormous amount of information 
and experience that could be drawn upon by the shipping industry in its efforts to 
manage safety? 
 
A significant number of respondents suggested that the shore management were 
simply not facing up to their responsibilities which was having a very negative effect 
on the ability to manage safety on board ship. Of course we must constantly bear in 
mind that we cannot generalise too much about ISM implementation and it would be 
unfair and incorrect to suggest that this problem is widespread. However, it does 
appear to be sufficiently common to have prompted many people from different 
sectors of the industry and from different parts of the world to report similar problems 
quite independently. 
One German Chief Engineer reported deep-seated problems going back a number of 
years: 
 
“No support (minimal) from head office staff. Main interest of some 
is about profit, and we will be forced / ordered to take shortcuts 
(dangerous measurements i.e. machinery, winches etc.). Ships are 
run on a shoe-string budget, awaiting / never receiving parts, spares 
etc. 
Superintendents and safety manager ordering us to cover up and lie 
about many items. But then of course what’s new, in my 30 years at 
sea with different companies it’s mostly the same. To implement any 
Code or system, I feel that all office / land based staff should attend 
an intensive course about it, and their attitude about personnel 
working on ships should change before any code can work.” 
 
It is certainly possible that the German Chief has touched upon a very important point 
– that some of the people involved in the management and operation of ships these 
days do not have any real understanding of what ISM implementation actually means. 
It is easy to imagine that someone who has not understood the concept of a safety 
management system could very easily be led into the mistaken belief that once the 
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Procedures Manuals have been ‘obtained’ and the DOC and SMC have been awarded 
and nicely framed and displayed – then everyone can relax and get back to making 
money. Clearly such an attitude demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
ISM Code and everything it is trying to achieve. Such an attitude was described by an 
ISM Consultant who was speaking from first hand experience: 
 
 “The Companies in general do far to little to implement the system 
in full. Most companies are satisfied when they have the SMS / DOC 
in order and do not want the system to be active on board. People 
ashore do not pay attention to the reports coming from the ships if it 
involves costs. 
Look at for instance chemical tankers in main ports such as 
Rotterdam. The officers and crew are working around the clock. 
This is well known to the Company, but if the crew complain they get 
no answer or “…if they don’t like the Company they could find other 
work…” 
It will take many, many years yet before we will get a good safety 
system implemented in full.” 
 
8.5 Overcoming misunderstandings 
 
From a review of many of the questionnaires and the detailed comments received, it 
became apparent that there were some quite serious misunderstandings and 
misconceived ideas about the ISM Code held by a significant number of people – 
particularly seafarers. Often these seafarers were in senior positions on board and 
often from the so-called traditional maritime nations. The following comment from a 
British Chief Engineer was quite typical: 
 
Management have effectively thrown responsibility for safety back 
to the vessel. They have taken the ISM Code and produced their 
QA system and told us to make it work. Classification societies 
have helped them as it has created more work for them, hence 
more income. With the vast amount of extra paperwork a paper 
trail can now be followed to point the finger of blame at someone, 
at the bottom of the pile, who was supposed to have done a job.  
 
A British passenger ship Master had arrived at a very similar conclusion: 
 
I feel that the true motivation for the adoption of the ISM code is 
that companies and statutory bodies are intent on totally absolving 
themselves in any blame after an incident. By quantifying 
everything on paper, they can conveniently blame ship staff at all 
times. 
 
There can be no doubt at all that the ‘responsibility for safety’ under the ISM Code is 
very clearly with the Company with the big ‘C’ and that responsibility cannot be 
delegated to the ship or anywhere else. Of course the ship, and those on board are 
partners in the implementation process and to that extent share in the responsibility. If 
the Companies for which this Chief Engineer and Master work actually share their 
views then they are likely to have a big shock coming to them if they do have any 
accidents or claims. If there are vast amounts of extra paper then that would tend to 
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suggest a poorly constructed SMS – which is back to the Company rather than the 
ISM Code. 
One of the great misunderstandings, which is very widely held, is that ISM is 
responsible for creating vast amounts of paper. There is nothing in the ISM Code 
which calls for vast amounts of paperwork to be created.  If there are vast amounts of 
paperwork then that is down to the way in which the particular SMS has been 
constructed. 
 
A cause of concern was that these particular senior officers were not alone in holding 
such views. Indeed, misconceived views were not just restricted to seafarers. A rather 
alarming statement was received from a marine surveyor : 
 
Checklists are futile. A checklist is only as good as the man and 
pencil ticking little boxes. If the man is competent why does he 
need a checklist? It would appear that the ISM Code is assisting 
operators employ cheap low skilled crews with the benefit that they 
can get adequate on board training with checklists. Senior 
personnel have a difficult job onboard running ships with these 
inexperienced ‘check list crews’ who invariably have not received 
proper shore based training. 
 
A British Master was making the same point: 
 
If seafarers were properly trained to do their respective jobs, then 
checklists would not be needed. 
i.e. before you drive a car do you complete a checklist? 
 
Perhaps the surveyor and the Master should pop their heads into the cockpit of the 
next aeroplane they join and explain their theories to the pilot, co-pilot and flight 
engineer who will, most probably, be filling in their checklists. Or maybe they would 
care to visit a Nuclear Power Plant and suggest to the duty engineer that if he was a 
properly trained nuclear scientist he wouldn’t need that checklist he happens to be 
carrying around. 
Within a properly functioning SMS the use of checklists will reduce considerably the 
risk of human errors being made – i.e. forgetting to do something. Certainly checklists 
should never be used as some sort of substitute for employing properly trained and 
skilled crews – but they do have a very important memory jogging function to 
perform.  
 
Following on a similar point a Second Engineer shared the following thoughts: 
 
Precedence of qualification needs addressing, at the moment in my 
company at least, ISM related subjects appear to be superior to 
professional qualifications which I personally find highly insulting. 
ISM appears to be a substitute for proper effective training i.e. 
cheaper. 
ISM should make it possible to pluck someone off a street corner and 
let them operate a ship from a tick list. My company even has a 
T.R.A. for entering and leaving ports and also the likes of when to 
abandon ship, God forbid we are ever at a point where Masters need 
to use a check list to issue abandon ship orders. 
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As far as the author understands there is nothing contained within the ISM Code 
which could lead to such conclusions being reached – quite the opposite. The 
intelligent use of a check list for an abandon ship situation would certainly not be a 
bad idea – it would avoid important things being forgotten during a most stressful 
situation. In fact Masters have had checklists for such situations long before the 
introduction of ISM – it is just that these were mental check-lists and thus may not 
have been written down. It is suggested that there is no attack upon the 
professionalism of an individual because such check-lists are written down – rather 
they may very well save peoples lives! In all other high-risk industries such checklists 
are common place and part of doing the job – with seafaring it appears that it may 
take a little while to educate people into a similar safety culture. 
 
A related issue is criticism of a ‘Permit to Work’ system. A most worrying report was 
submitted by another British Master: 
 
The Code has increased the number of accidents and incidents 
because it encourages reporting of such. It has introduced a permit 
system that many, if not most, seafarers find unnecessary and 
demeaning their professionalism. Consequently permits are filled 
out and their guidelines ignored. This is because there are too 
many permits for activities that were once just routine jobs. 
(climbing a mast, working overside in port). 
The sheer volume of paperwork, particularly on busy offshore 
vessels, means short-cuts are taken and if you can get away 
without filling in the correct forms then you will. 
 
There are many issues which arise here which are cause for considerable concern. The 
first sentence doesn’t seem to make any logical sense at all? The fact that in the past 
accidents and incidents were not reported does not mean that they didn’t happen – it 
merely suggest that they were not considered important.  
With regard to the Permit to Work point - the ISM Code does not, of itself, require 
permit systems to be in place for jobs such as ‘climbing masts’ or ‘working overside’ -  
these requirements are set out in the Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant 
Seamen which pre-dates the ISM Code by many years. If, as seems to be suggested by 
the Master, such procedures were not being followed before or since ISM 
implementation then his ship would appear to have been operated in breach of the 
Code of Safe Working Practice – which is a very serious offence (Merchant Shipping 
(Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seamen) Regulations 1998 (SI 1998 / 
1838)). He suggests that to comply with the ISM Code, and by implication with the 
Code of Safe Working Practices is ‘demeaning to the seafarers professionalism’ – such 
a statement is incomprehensible to the author.  
 
There are also some who appear to have firmly held preconceived ideas about ISM 
but one would have to question to what extent they have actually understood what 
ISM was all about. The following attack on ISM was received from a British Master: 
 
ISM makes no difference to a well run vessel because it is well run. 
ISM makes little difference to a poorly run vessel, if the normal 
practice of good seamanship can be ignored so can ISM. 
ISM is a huge raft of paperwork that has been dumped onto ships 
staff, the main object of which is for management to clear their 
yardarms. 
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More enforcement of regulations is required, not more regulations. 
Evoli Sun, Erika and Norwegian Dream were all ISM compliant. 
 
As was explained above there is certainly no question of management ‘clearing their 
yardarm’ by dumping paperwork on board the vessel – the Eurasian Dream 
judgement is well worth reading if anyone should be in any doubt. A properly 
constructed SMS will provide a structure on which management of safety can be 
constructed. This is not an alternative to ‘the normal practice of good seamanship’ 
but rather an opportunity to ensure that good seamanship is applied in practice and in 
a consistent way.  
Whether or not any of the vessels the Master mentions in his last sentence were or 
were not ISM compliant would be a matter of fact. Presumably, what he means is 
that those vessels held SMC’s and the operating companies held DOC’s. Whilst 
every effort should be made to raise the standards and standardisation of the issuance 
of SMC’s and DOC’s – they can only represent a statement that at the time of initial, 
or interim verification, an authorised representative of the particular Flag State 
Administration (or R/O) was satisfied that the Company and the ship / crew did 
comply at that time.  Adequate policing of the system may very well need improving 
as well as standardising compliance criteria and these are discussed in the section 
above. 
 
One British Master quite proudly declared that onboard the ships in the company he 
works for they get on with managing safety in the way they always did and totally 
ignore the ‘formal’ SMS. He described the situation as follows: 
 
Initially the system was badly implemented and not fully 
explained to ship’s personnel. A load of manuals were thrown on 
board and we were told to get on with it. 
The ships are well run anyway so the only noticeable difference 
was an increased paperwork load. 
After the initial flurry of activity the general feeling is that the 
running of the ship has got back to normal while the manuals 
gather dust on the shelves. 
 
This would suggest that a very serious and major non-compliance with the ISM 
Code, Section IX of the SOLAS Convention and the relevant domestic legislation of 
the Flag State (in the UK that would be the Merchant Shipping Act SI 1998 No 
1561) is knowingly and deliberately taking place. In the UK that would expose the 
Master, the Shipowner, the DP and possibly others to fines up to £5000 and a prison 
sentence of 2 years – possibly longer. If an incident occurred, particularly if loss of 
life was involved, the charges could involve manslaughter and / or very high levels 
of fines and / or very long prison sentences. A pollution incident would also result in 
very high levels of fines and possible prison sentences. If it transpired that there had 
been a deliberate policy to ignore the official SMS then it is very unlikely that any 
defence would be possible – this would be the case whether the incident was in the 
civil or the criminal courts. If there is a problem with the documented procedures of 
the SMS then that needs addressing immediately and appropriate corrective action 
put in place. An ostrich approach to the problem is likely to result in very serious 
consequences including being in breach of all insurance cover. 
 
Yet another British Master submitted a whole menu of critical comments about the 
ISM Code which the author at least found difficult to understand: 
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“1) ISM – another way still to inundate seafarers with largely 
irrelevant paperwork to the detriment of time spent understanding 
the ‘job’ properly. 
2) Creating more employment for people with little understanding 
or qualification within the industry (perhaps personally felt – our 
ISM manager used to be a car salesman!)  
3) Creates confusion as to which takes precedence state / 
international law v. ISM. Contrary to belief this has still to be 
tested – by someone else hopefully! 
4) ISM does little to alleviate original / base problem – too many 
substandard ships run by inexperienced ‘idiots’ around UK coast 
and Europe – accidents waiting to happen – Governments 
impotent / naïve – shipowners lobby too clever.” 
British Master  
 
It maybe that this particular Master has also had a bad experience of a particular 
Safety Management System introduced by his ship operating company but it really is 
very difficult to understand how such conclusions could possibly be reached. For 
example, what can be the basis for his argument in numbered paragraph 1? What 
irrelevant paperwork does the ISM Code require? As far as creating some sort of 
impediment to the job is concerned - Section 6 of the Code raises this as an extremely 
important issue and makes it very clear that the Company has the responsibility to 
make sure that everyone is properly trained and familiarised with the jobs they are to 
undertake on board.  
It is very difficult to try and make any sense of numbered paragraph 3. How can ISM 
stand in some way in contradistinction to the law of the Flag State or the law of the 
Port State? The ISM Code does not exist as some separate set of divine Rules. The 
ISM Code was incorporated into a new Chapter IX of the SOLAS Convention - which 
almost all maritime nations have ratified and have incorporated into their domestic 
legislation. The Flag State will determine whether the particular ship complies with 
their interpretation of the Code or not and will issue a SMC after verification. Only 
the Flag State can revoke or cancel the SMC. Each Port State will have its own 
interpretation of how the ISM Code should be implemented and the PSCO decides 
that they want a closer look at the SMS then they will examine the system according 
to their interpretation. If, on their interpretation, they find deficiencies in the system 
then they may detain the vessel. The Flag State may very well be called in at that 
time. At this time there is still no uniformity in the interpretation of the Code between 
Flag States, Port Sates or Classification Societies acting as Recognised Organisations 
on behalf of Flag State. There is certainly no question of the 'ISM Code' somehow 
conflicting with International Law. 
 
It is interesting to compare and contrast the views of other experienced seafarers. It 
can then be seen that many of the misunderstandings about ISM could probably be 
attributed to bad experiences of particular SMS’s and poor quality shipping 
companies. The following British Master had clearly enjoyed the benefit of 
experiencing a properly structured and implemented SMS in a company that cared 
and understood what ISM was trying to achieve: 
 
The ISM Code and SMS is the best thing that has happened in my 33 
years at sea. It has taken all the guesswork away from the Master. 
The SMS is also there for everyone onboard to read understand and 
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use. It covers both the Masters and the company in their 
responsibilities. I know the company I work for use the SMS like a 
Bible. The company encourages the review of SBMS and suggest any 
changes that could improve its operations 
 
Again the point is that it is not the ISM Code which is the problem but rather the way 
in which individual safety management systems have been constructed and 
implemented. 
One consequence of an inadequately implemented SMS is that the whole thing is 
perceived to be something to do with Master and senior officers – and perhaps the 
people ashore – but nothing to do with anyone else on board. The following comment 
from a Third Engineer clearly illustrates this misconception: 
 
“Has little or no effect on third engineers, but appears to be a 
complicated paper chase” 
 
Clearly it is more than just a reflection of a very poorly implanted SMS which would 
leave a Third Engineer with such a perception – it perhaps is a reflection of a failure 
by our industry, and our training establishments, to explain and describe the basic 
concepts of the ISM Code to our seafarers. 
 
Interestingly, another Third Engineer provides a very different perception and a 
refreshingly illuminated insight: 
 
 “Before gaining my C.o.C  (Certificate of Competency) I worked as 
donkeyman on my vessel. All the ISM Code meant to me then was a 
never ending stream of inspections and audits. It’s fair to say that 
then the Code meant nothing  more than a ‘buggerance’ factor – as it 
still does to the ratings onboard.  
Now I have moved on and subsequently found out more about it and 
its implications, I can safely say that I am fully behind it and that with 
time we will see the benefits of its setting up.” 
 
There is no reason, and there should be no excuse, for intelligent people on board ship 
not to understand what is the basic concept and philosophy behind the ISM Code. 
They should also understand their own role in the working of the SMS and a general 
idea of how the system is structured on board their ship. Indeed they should feel a part 
of the system and have a positive input via safety meetings and the like. 
 
The author tried to establish whether there might be some common source that was 
responsible for generating such misconceived ideas. He not only failed to find any 
such source – what he did find was of even greater concern. Apart from the ISM Code 
itself and the other related IMO resolutions and formal documents, many of which are 
quite technical and written in a legalistic style, the ICS / ISF Commentary – which is a 
good reference source for a DP, for example, and the authors own ‘Legal and 
Insurance implications’ book – which anticipates a certain amount of prior knowledge 
– there did not appear to be any publication generally available which would provide 
a seafarer with an introduction in to the basic concept and philosophy of the ISM 
Code. This really was quite remarkable bearing in mind that the Code would have a 
direct effect on the way in which almost every ship and every seafarer in the world 
would work. It became apparent that individual companies had produced their own 
guidance, in house, which were made available to their own staff. However, if a 
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seafarer was not fortunate enough to work for such a company they were left to their 
own devices.  
In an attempt at remedying that immediate problem the author broke off from his 
main research program in the early part of 2002 to compile ‘A Seafarers Guide to 
ISM’.  In an attempt to speed up the writing and production process the author teamed 
up with Peter Kidman of INTERCARGO  and published the book through the North 
of England P&I Association (see Anderson and Kidman) 
 
8.6 The potential consequences of not making ISM work 
 
Whatever individual perceptions, views or prejudices might have been held regarding 
the ISM Code, the fact is that the Code is now in place and mandatory for just about 
every sea going commercial vessel in the world. There are some who still seem to 
have a desire to condemn it to the depths – the author would suggest that we need to 
be very careful as to how we move forward from this point. There is a very real and 
very great danger that if the industry does not make the ISM Code work then the 
alternative will be infinitely worse. 
At the moment, whilst the Code itself is mandatory, each Company is given the 
freedom to develop its own Safety Management System in its own way. The Code 
may state, for example, that ‘…the Company should establish procedures to identify, 
describe and respond to potential emergency shipboard situations…’ (ISM Code Sec. 
8.1) The Code does not attempt to provide any sort of definitive list of what those 
‘…potential emergency situations…’ might be, nor does it describe how any 
particular emergency situation might be dealt with. Each Company, and each ship, 
will know best what types of emergencies might arise on board their ships, what 
personnel and equipment they will have available and the way in which relevant 
training has been provided. The types of emergencies which might arise on board an 
inter Island ferry on the West Coast of Scotland with a mixture of passengers, vehicles 
and farm animals on board, and the way they are dealt with, will be quite different 
from the types of emergencies which might arise on board a 40,000 cubic metre LPG 
tanker.   
Clearly we cannot realistically expect that the ISM Code will provide some sort of 
‘quick fix’ across the industry. An interesting and relevant observation was received 
from a very experienced external ISM auditor: 
 
I am an ISM external auditor with 250+ audits.  Much of the 
shipping industry expected ISM to be a "quick fix" to substandard 
shipping - it is not a quick fix, and this expectation runs contrary to 
the ISM philosophy. In my experience, I have seen a big 
improvement in the audit results of vessel after having the SMS in 
place for some time; ie. Intermediate audits reflect a much better, 
practical SMS than the initial audits. Based on this and other 
factors, I believe that the ISM can work on a long-term basis (5-10 
years), but we must focus on that and not on the short-term 
problems.  In the end, port state control will contribute more than 
any other group towards the success of the code, as they appear 
without notice to see the actual state onboard. 
 
His observation concerning the important potential role of the port State control 
authorities is very interesting. It is to be hoped however that certain flag State 
© Phil Anderson  
26/06/13 195 
Administrations will face up to their own responsibilities with regards to policing the 
systems. 
The author would tend to agree with  an ISM Consultant who made the following 
prophesy: 
 
The problem is not with the Code but rather with the policing of its 
implementation. IACS has proved largely ineffective with its 
members and Port State Control needs to be encouraged more. What 
are seafarers to believe when even the Hours of Work is not 
enforced? ISM must not be allowed to fail through lack of 
commitment, I don’t believe we will have a another chance at 
putting the industry in order.” 
 
 If the industry does not get itself into a position whereby it can demonstrate that it 
can manage safety with this non-prescriptive Code then Governments are quite likely 
to start imposing prescriptive Rules and Regulations telling ship operators how they 
will manage safety. It may only take one more major incident involving serious loss 
of life or pollution in the US or Northern Europe for the politicians, prompted on by 
media hysteria and public hype, to see legislation imposed. 
 
Different people made this same point in different ways but perhaps as poignant a 
message as could be made was submitted by an Indian Second Engineer who shared 
the following thought: 
 
The impact of the ISM code is being felt across the board in 
Shipping today - what needs to be conveyed to seafarers is the 
REASON behind the ISM code . It is meant for us - the seafarers , we 
are the ones to be benefited the most - therefore we should embrace 
it without reservations . A job lost can be regained (some other 
company etc. ) A life lost cannot. 
 
Hopefully more and more employers will understand the wisdom of this Second 
Engineer and help create an environment where the seafarers work safely – because 
in that way the ships will become safer and, as a direct consequence, will make them 
more efficient. More efficient ships will make more profits! 
 
One such employer is the British MD of a ship management company who said: 
 
I believe that the ISM code is still in its formative years. For heavens 
sake let us not get rid of it or give it up now. This is a long term 
project. 
Now let the powers that be get tough with those shipowners who do 
not pay any more than lip service to the idea. 
 
Throughout this report we have laboured the importance of leadership from the top, 
communication, the development of no-blame safety cultures and many other related 
things that are needed if ISM is to work. Perhaps we can learn one of the greatest 
lessons of all though from a report received from an Able Seaman working on board a 
tanker. He described his introduction to the world of the International Management 
Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (International 
Safety Management (ISM) Code) in the following terms: 
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The last vessel I was on had a strong environment of safety that 
began at the top of the corporate management. The 2nd mate 
introduced me to the vessel and orientated me to the A.B. work. I 
had more knowledge at the beginning than ever before. 
 
That AB had surely achieved ISM enlightenment! It is achievable. 
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